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Introduction 
 
 
„Human behaviour may be governed by rules, but it is possible that these 
rules simply encode preferences. […] Many psychologists argue that 
behaviour is far too sensitive to context and affect to be usefully related to 
stable preferences. However, if there are underlying preferences, then even if 
the link from preferences to rules is quite noisy it may be possible to recover 
these preferences and use them to correctly evaluate economic policies, at 
least as an approximation that is good enough for government policy work.” 
 
Daniel L. McFadden. Nobel Prize Lecture 2002. 
 
 
 
Economics has always been concerned with the investigation of the decisions and the 
motivations of agents. The standard theory of decision-making under risk – Expected 
Utility Theory – was first proposed by Daniel Bernoulli (1738) and axiomatized by John 
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1947). Since then, this prescriptive and axiomatic 
framework has been the key building block in micro- and macroeconomic theory.  
Over the last decades, the social sciences have developed numerous alternative 
axiomatizations and descriptive theories of choice under risk. The development of these 
theories has often been inspired by behavioral information in experimental and survey 
data. Overall, the scientific investigation of the decisions and motivations of human beings 
has been characterized by a rich interaction between theory and empirical evidence and 
between various disciplines of the social sciences, mainly economics and psychology. 
Despite or maybe because of all the ongoing discussions between economists and 
psychologists as well as between theoretical and empirical researchers, the development of 
knowledge about human decision behavior and the application of this knowledge to 
important problems in the real world has certainly been a success story of an intra- and 
interdisciplinary relationship. While the huge collection of findings is beginning to be 
organized under broader generalized frameworks and principles, many methodological – 
some would say: epistemological – differences between economics and psychology 
remain and warrant continuing, passionate, and fruitful interaction between the two 
disciplines. 
Economists are generally more interested in a single theoretical approach that might 
be applied in various decision contexts, and they emphasize that an underlying theory is 
needed to interpret data in any structural way. Psychologists, on the other hand, tend to be 
more concerned with developing local theories that are designed for specific contexts, that 
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are connected to a specific observed phenomenon, and that stem from less structural and 
more descriptive analyses of the underlying data. Rather than mapping information input 
to decisions based on a model that is built on a set of axiomatized behavioral assumptions 
– such as preference maximization – psychologists tend to focus on investigating the 
nature of individual traits and behavioral processes that are relevant given a specific 
decision context. Accordingly, they have developed a rich terminology that describes 
various factors and phenomena that are related to individual decision behavior. Reflecting 
many psychologists’ opinion that existing knowledge about human behavior can hardly be 
codified into one parsimonious model, their terminology involves terms such as 
“attitudes”, “motives”, and “modes”. While these terms denote individual-specific 
characteristics that are related to human behavior, they are not clearly defined based on an 
underlying behavioral model – in contrast to, e.g., the term ”preference”, which is central 
in economics. Overall, although methodological approaches and specific research 
priorities differ between the disciplines, both disciplines are united by their interest in 
gaining a better understanding of human behavior, and this involves an interest in 
exploring whether there exist individual characteristics that are relevant for decision 
behavior.  
The existence of underlying individual characteristics or traits is an important 
question for social scientists: Discerning individual characteristics that are related to the 
enormous heterogeneity that is observable in human decision behavior eventually helps to 
build better models of human behavior and, thereby, to evaluate policies. Identifying these 
characteristics empirically is a challenging intellectual task. Ideally, the scientist would 
have a structural model that maps information input to decision behavior of an agent, 
given all relevant individual characteristics of the agent. This model would capture 
explicitly the underlying cognitive or mental process – e.g., preference maximization in a 
classical economic model. To test the descriptive validity of her model, the social scientist 
would search for situations and settings that are informative with regard to the model, and 
she wishes to observe controlled comparisons of different treatments in a natural 
environment, in which one variable X varies exogenously. Finally, she wants to obtain the 
complete and exact information required by her theory, such that she is able to test derived 
hypotheses and to refine her theories or develop alternative theories, if necessary. 
Unfortunately, such natural experimental settings occur only very rarely. In most 
cases, finding the underlying determinants of human decision behavior is a difficult 
enterprise and the scientist inescapably faces several constraints. First, most empirical 
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studies on human activity – regardless of whether they are based on experimental data or 
on survey data – have to deal with at least some degree of measurement error or 
incomplete information. This involves problems such as nonresponse to survey questions 
and uncertainty about answers on the part of the respondent. Second and related to the first 
issue, for many parameters of the underlying model, it is not clear how to measure them 
appropriately or they might not have a well-defined quantitative meaning. This issue is 
particularly apparent for psychometric measures, such as measures of individual attitudes. 
Furthermore, there are deeper problems involved: Assume that the researcher investigates 
a model that deals with stock market decisions and includes risk preferences as an 
individual-specific characteristic. If information on individual risk attitude is elicited using 
a series of lottery questions, then this measure of risk attitude is likely to be endogenous, 
since similar underlying and unobserved factors might drive stock market decisions and 
lottery decisions; briefly, in many cases it is not clear whether measured variation is really 
exogenous in a given context. Third, in real-world settings, many confounding and hardly 
controllable or measurable effects might have an impact on observed decision behavior. 
While controlled environments, such as laboratory environments, might be a remedy, they 
have their own limitations. For example, they are deliberately stylized and the sampled 
populations are far from being representative. Respecting all these constraints, the 
empirical scientist must evaluate which method from the universe of data collection and 
measurement methods is appropriate and practically feasible, given her interest in a certain 
phenomenon.  
This dissertation presents a collection of papers which are inspired by my interest in 
the phenomenon that economic agents are heterogeneous in their decisions and which are 
concerned with the investigation of the relationship between individual-specific 
characteristics – such as preferences, modes, and motives – and economic decisions. All 
papers in this dissertation are united by the objective to obtain inference about 
determinants of economic behavior in empirical studies. I investigate behavior in distinct 
contexts, and I use data which have been collected in different ways: in a controlled 
laboratory setting and in a nationwide household survey. The first study, co-authored with 
Cornelia Betsch (Schunk and Betsch, 2006), combines elements of economics and 
psychology and investigates individual decision behavior in a static decision context. We 
use data from a laboratory experiment to analyze the link between psychometric measures 
of individual decision modes and individual utility functions, the backbone of modeling 
decision-making in the economic sciences. The second paper explores individual decision 
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behavior in a dynamic decision context. I develop utility-based models of sequential 
decision behavior and design a laboratory experiment to investigate the relationship 
between individual preferences and behavior in the sequential decision tasks. The third 
paper is concerned with the saving decisions of German households. I use data from a 
representative socio-economic survey – the SAVE survey on household saving behavior – 
and analyze to what extent four co-existing saving motives are related to the saving 
decisions of private German households. While surveys are an important source of data 
for the study of household behavior, incomplete information, such as item and unit 
nonresponse, is a data problem that is particularly prevalent in surveys dealing with 
sensitive financial issues. Therefore, the last paper of this dissertation is concerned with 
designing an iterative statistical algorithm for dealing with the problem of incomplete 
information that results from item nonresponse to questions in the German SAVE survey. 
I find that there is heterogeneity in nonresponse behavior across different questions and 
that – in line with existing findings in cognitive psychology – item nonresponse is not 
occurring randomly but is related to the individual-specific characteristics of the survey 
participants. In a sense, this finding in the last paper – obtained using an involved 
statistical methodology – leads back to the first paper of this dissertation, since it 
underlines the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration: Cognitive psychologists have 
investigated the phenomenon of item nonresponse and have developed models for the 
processes that lead to nonresponse behavior. In a collaborative effort, these findings can 
help to understand and model the mechanisms of survey nonresponse better, and – a 
complementary approach to correcting data problems ex post based on statistical methods 
– they can help to address the problem of item nonresponse by improving the data 
collection methodology. 
 
While all four papers presented in this dissertation are related to the empirical study of 
economic decision behavior, they touch different disciplines. Each of the papers is a self-
contained study which can be read independently. In the remainder of this introduction, I 
describe the content and the results of each paper in more detail. 
The first paper is motivated by the observation that in many economic decision 
situations people differ systematically in their preference for an intuitive or a deliberative 
decision mode – here I talk about preferences in the psychological sense of the word, i.e. 
this term denotes a subjective comparative judgment in a general sense, and is not used in 
the narrow sense that is connected to the economic concept of utility functions. In a 
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laboratory setting we elicit subjects’ utility functions, using a lottery-based elicitation 
method, and we obtain a psychometric measure of the relative preference for an intuitive 
and a deliberative decision mode. We then analyze the relationship between the curvature 
of the utility function and the psychometrically measured preference for an intuitive and a 
deliberative decision mode. The findings indicate that the curvature of the individual 
utility function is systematically related to the decision mode of the subjects: People who 
prefer the deliberative mode generally have a utility function that is more linear than the 
utility function of people who prefer the intuitive mode. We suggest the explanation that 
intuitive people’s decisions in the lottery context mirror a feeling of risk and lead to 
behavior which is not risk neutral. They might have additionally integrated affective 
reactions towards the stimuli into the decision, influencing their decision towards the 
affective reaction. Deliberate decision makers seem to perform time-consuming cognitive 
operations – apparently not just calculation – leading to more risk neutral decisions and a 
more linear utility function. Overall, the findings suggest that individually stable traits, 
measured using a psychological questionnaire, might help explain people’s decisions over 
monetary values; that is, they might be informative for understanding observed economic 
behavior, such as finance and insurance decisions. 
The starting point of the second paper is the observation that individuals are 
heterogeneous with respect to their behavior in simple dynamic choice situations. In 
particular, their behavior does not correspond to the predictions of an optimal decision 
rule that is derived under the assumption of risk neutrality. A very elementary 
representative of a dynamic choice situation is a so-called search task. Search tasks are 
attractive for the experimental study of dynamic choice behavior: first, because of their 
simple sequential decision structure and, second, because this decision structure masks a 
complicated optimization problem that – comparable to sequential decision situations in 
our everyday lives – cannot be solved without a computer. Economic theory suggests that 
the heterogeneity observed in search behavior is reflected in the heterogeneity of 
individual preferences. Do individual preferences, which can be revealed using a simple 
preference elicitation mechanism, inform us on behavior in search situations? The paper 
first develops models for search behavior under the assumption of expected utility 
maximization and under the assumption of sequential updating of utility reference points 
during the decision task. Then, data from an economic laboratory experiment are used to 
investigate the link between individual preferences and search behavior. I find 
experimental evidence that supports the new reference point model: Though subjects 
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could not make losses during the experiment, individual loss aversion is systematically 
related to the observed decision behavior in a way that is consistent with the predictions of 
a model that involves utility reference point updating. Measures of risk attitude, however, 
are not related to observed behavior. The finding that many people set reference points in 
sequential decision tasks has been obtained in a controlled laboratory setting and it is of 
primary interest for decision theory. It might also be of more general interest in, e.g., 
consumer economics, labor economics, and finance, and it might serve as a guide to 
theoretical and structural econometric specifications in applied search theory that 
explicitly allow for individual heterogeneity. 
The third paper uses survey data from a random cross-section of German households 
to investigate household saving decisions. There are many different motives for saving a 
portion of one’s income; these motives co-exist over the life-cycle and their relative 
importance changes. Existing research further emphasizes an enormous heterogeneity with 
respect to the household saving rate and the extent to which households plan their saving. 
The paper is concerned with linking heterogeneity in household saving behavior to four 
co-existing saving motives. First, the paper shows that the importance that households 
attach to the saving motives is related to how much households save at different life 
stages. The estimated effects are appropriate given the different stages of the households’ 
life-cycle and they are broadly in line with existing findings in theoretical and empirical 
studies of life-cycle saving that focus on only one specific saving motive. Second, I 
classify the saver type of the households based on whether they engage in regular savings 
plans, or rather save irregularly and without a savings plan and I find that saving motives 
are related to the saver type of the household. Overall, the results indicate that 
heterogeneity with respect to the saving rate and the saver type is systematically related to 
the importance that households attach to different saving motives. This suggests that 
policy reforms that substantially change the importance of certain saving motives in the 
eyes of private households might alter household saving behavior in various ways.  
As the third paper of this dissertation demonstrates, important empirical information 
on household behavior can be obtained from surveys. However, many interdependent 
factors that can only be controlled to a limited extent – such as privacy concerns, 
respondent uncertainty, cognitive burden of the question, and survey context – often lead 
to unit and item nonresponse. Missing data on certain items is a frequent source of 
difficulties in statistical practice, and it generally leads to biased inference. Therefore, the 
fourth paper is concerned with an imputation method for missing data. The purpose of the 
 7
paper is to present and discuss the theoretical underpinnings and the practical application 
of an iterative multiple imputation method that has been developed for the German SAVE 
dataset. The developed algorithm essentially simulates the distribution of missing data and 
yields complete datasets that can be analyzed without discarding any observed values and 
that incorporate the uncertainty about which values to impute. The paper discusses 
properties of the iterative imputation algorithm, investigates the distribution of imputed 
values, and compares these findings with results from other imputation approaches. I find 
that there is heterogeneity in nonresponse behavior across different questions and that – in 
line with existing findings in cognitive psychology – item nonresponse is not occurring 
randomly but is related to covariates included in the imputation models. 
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 Explaining heterogeneity in utility functions by individual 
differences in decision modes1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The curvature of utility functions varies between people. We suggest that there 
is a relationship between preferred decision modes (intuition vs. deliberation) and the 
curvature of the individual utility function. In this study the utility functions of the 
subjects were assessed using a lottery-based elicitation method and related to the relative 
preference for intuition vs. deliberation. We found that people who prefer the deliberative 
mode have a utility function that is more linear than the utility function of people who 
prefer the intuitive mode. We suggest that intuitive people’s decisions mirror a feeling of 
risk and lead to behavior which is not risk neutral. They may have additionally integrated 
affective reactions towards the stimuli into the decision influencing their decision towards 
the affective reaction. Deliberate decision makers seem to perform time consuming 
cognitive operations (apparently not just calculation) leading to more risk neutral 
decisions and a more linear utility function. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is joint work with Cornelia Betsch. It is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Psychology in 
2006. 
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1 Introduction 
For decades economists and psychologists have investigated the relationship between 
stimuli and the perception and processing of stimuli. In psychophysics, for example, the 
relation between stimulus intensity (e.g., weight) and the related sensation (e.g., the 
perception of heaviness) is described in Fechner’s law (Fechner, 1860). In the decision-
making literature, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) describes the relation between varying amounts of money and its 
perceived utility. As a common denominator of this “psychophysical numbing” 
(Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997, p. 297) we find curved, non-linear relationships between the 
variation of a stimulus and the subjective feelings towards the stimulus variation for most 
people. Value functions are typically concave (i.e., constant increments of scope yield 
successively smaller increments of value) and inversely s-shaped, which is usually 
interpreted as risk averse decision behavior when gambling for monetary gains and as risk 
seeking behavior in gambles with loss outcomes (Abdellaoui, 2000; Gonzalez and Wu, 
1999; Tversky and Fox, 1995). However, the curvature of the value function varies as the 
subjective perception of the stimuli also varies between people. For example, 
Fetherstonhaugh and colleagues (1997) found that not all subjects had curved utility 
functions. “People […] exhibit diminished sensitivity in valuing lifesaving interventions 
against a background of increasing numbers of life at risk. […] Although psychophysical 
numbing was present in each study, its prevalence varied.” (p. 283, 297). Considering 
individual differences could help explain why some people value saving 4,500 people 
independent of the number of threatened people (e.g., 11,000 or 250,000), and why others 
show dramatic differences. 
The goal of our study is to link psychometric measures with individual utility 
functions, the backbone of all research on individual decision-making models in the 
economic sciences. We suggest that individually stable traits, measured based on a 
psychological questionnaire, might help explain observed economic behavior, such as 
finance and insurance decisions.  
It is an established method to compare people’s choices between risky monetary 
gambles to assess their utility function.2 The gambles used are of the kind “win $x with 
                                                 
2 Research in psychology emphasizes that the attitude towards risk cannot solely be captured by the 
curvature of the utility function. In most existing economic models, a person’s attitude towards risk is 
exclusively captured by the curvature, i.e., the shape, of the person’s utility function. We want to stress that 
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the probability of p vs. win $y with the probability of (1 – p)”. Linearity of the utility 
function means that the utility of a risky monetary lottery is determined by the 
multiplication of the stated monetary value and its probability. If people place subjective 
values on the stated monetary outcomes (given the probability is held constant to exclude 
effects of probability weighting), the utility function becomes curved (i.e., it deviates from 
linearity). For example, your subjective feeling of the utility of $5 depends on the 
reference total amount of money. It makes an affective difference to save $5 when you 
buy a $10 bottle of wine or when you buy a VCR for $400. The increment of utility for the 
same amount of money is smaller as the scope increases. The stronger the influence of 
subjective values, the more the decision can deviate from the decision of an expected 
value maximizer. 
In addition to the automatic subjective valuation by feelings, humans are able to use 
(meta)cognition, a deliberative, conscious reflection of the problem at hand. Previous 
research has shown that priming participants to use cognitive strategies makes the effect 
of subjective feelings disappear. For example, Bless et al. (1998) showed that the well-
known framing effects in the gain and loss domain (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) 
disappear when the problem is subtly framed as a statistical problem. Metacognitive 
comprehension, a deliberative mode of thinking, can overcome the automatic subjective 
feelings and would lead to a utility function that is not curved but instead approaches 
linearity. Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) suggest that the value function differs depending 
on the decision mode. They label the two opposed modes as “valuation by calculation” vs. 
“valuation by feelings”. They suggest “that concavity arises in part because most real-
world valuations mix calculation and feeling. […] In such mixes, greater reliance on 
feeling yields greater concavity.” (p. 28). 
Although most real-world valuations might indeed mix deliberative and intuitive 
strategies, there is strong evidence that individuals differ in the way they habitually use 
the affective-intuitive or deliberative decision mode (e.g., Langan-Fox and Shirley, 2003). 
People with a preference for intuition base most of their decisions on affect, resulting in 
fast, spontaneous decisions, whereas people with a preference for deliberation tend to 
make slower, elaborated, and cognition-based decisions (Betsch, 2004). Intuitive 
processing means following instant, effortless evaluation processes (Hogarth, 2001) 
                                                                                                                                                   
in this paper, we are not concerned with discussing the distinction between different notions of risk aversion 
in detail. How broad one defines the concept of risk aversion is essentially related to the model one has in 
mind. 
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involving automatic, affective (good vs. bad) reactions. Various models capture the 
intuitive mode as a complementary concept to a deliberative, effortful, planned and 
analytic way of making decisions (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Epstein, 1983; Hogarth, 2001). 
Intuitive people ask themselves, “How do I feel about it?”, while deliberative people ask, 
“How do I think about it?” (for differences regarding this question format, see Verplanken 
et al., 1998).  
Insights into the relationship between preferred decision modes and utility functions 
might be of particular relevance for understanding portfolio choice and stock market 
decisions. The question of whether or not there are stable individual differences in 
reasoning or decision-making competence has recently gained interest (see Parker and 
Fischhoff, 2005; Stanovich and West, 1998; 2000), for example in the context of investor 
overconfidence models (Glaser et al., 2004; Glaser and Weber, 2005).  
We argue that the subjective assessment of intuitive people should be more 
influenced by affective reactions than the subjective assessment of deliberative people. 
According to the “risk as feelings” hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001), probabilities and 
outcomes can directly evoke affect and impact behavior without cognitive mediation. We 
suggest that intuitive people use this feeling of risk to make their decisions. These 
decisions should mirror the feeling of risk and should lead to behavior which is not risk 
neutral. Thus, for intuitive people the utility function should be curved and not linear.  
The subjective values of deliberatives (i.e., deliberative people) should correspond 
more closely to the stated monetary values presented. Although they might also have a 
sudden feeling of risk, their decision might be cognitively mediated and be a result of 
enhanced cognitive processing. Emotion leads to diminished sensitivity because the 
emotional response is relatively insensitive to quantity (or scope), once some change has 
been registered (Hsee and Rottenstreich, 2004). When people deliberate, however, they 
should pay more attention to quantity.  
The individual preference for intuition and deliberation should therefore be related 
to the shape of people’s value function. Concretely, we claim that the monetary utility 
function of people with a preference for intuition should reflect affect-based decision 
making and be curved (i.e., deviate from linearity). Conversely, the utility function of 
people with a preference for deliberative decision-making should be more linear than the 
one of non-deliberative decision makers. 
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2 Method 
2.1 Overview 
This hypothesis was tested in a lottery-based study that is presented in this paper. First, we 
assessed subjects’ utility functions, based on a sequence of individually-adapted lottery 
questions in which the lottery probabilities were kept equal to avoid the potentially 
perturbing effect of individually-different probability weighting. Then, subjects filled in 
an inventory assessing their Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID, Betsch, 2004). 
Based on the lottery choices, we were able to estimate an index for the curvature of the 
utility function that we related to the individual preference for deliberation and intuition. 
2.2 Subjects 
A total of 200 students from the University of Mannheim participated in groups of at most 
17 participants per session. The sample was obtained in two separate blocks 
(Sample 1 = 68 subjects, Sample 2 = 132); the procedure differed only minimally (see 
Procedure).  
2.3 Procedure 
Upon entering the lab, subjects were seated individually in front of a PC. In both samples 
the subjects were told that they would have to make many decisions regarding lotteries 
with two alternatives. The two lotteries (A and B) were presented simultaneously on the 
computer screen. Subjects were instructed to indicate their choice by clicking on the 
respective button for lottery A or B. After a selection was made, the next lottery appeared 
on the screen. Subjects were not constrained by time and answered all lottery questions at 
their leisure.  
At the end of the procedure, the first sample answered the PID questionnaire by 
clicking on one of five radio buttons indicating their agreement with the statements. The 
second sample took part in 3 more unrelated studies before they answered the PID 
inventory, which was identical to the first sample. This order was chosen in attempt to 
prevent an influence of the value function elicitation procedure on the PID values. The 
time elapsed between the value function elicitation and the PID inventory was 
approximately 45 minutes. After the procedure, subjects from both samples were thanked, 
debriefed, and dismissed. 
In order to provide incentives and to enhance motivation, one of the subjects in each 
session in the first sample was randomly selected to play for a real monetary pay-off based 
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on his or her choices made in one of the lottery tasks. Since the outcomes of the lotteries 
were up to €6000, we informed the subjects that the randomly selected person played for 
1% of the positive outcomes (i.e., the gains) presented in the lotteries. We dropped this 
procedure in the second sample and found no change in results. In the next section we 
describe the materials in more detail.  
2.4 Materials 
2.4.1 Value Function Elicitation 
A value function assigns a subjective value, or utility, to a stated (objective) value. To 
approximate such a function, it is necessary to elicit a number of points of this function for 
every individual (for an illustration cf. Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Utility function for gains for individual 1. The xi are equally spaced in terms of 
their utility. This allows for the assessment of the curvature of the value function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Various methods exist to construct individual value functions (i.e., to assess these 
points) from observed decisions in a series of monetary gambles (Farquhar, 1984). Our 
elicitation mechanism is based on a method proposed by Abdellaoui (2000) in which 
seven points are elicited separately for both the gain and loss domains {x0 to x6}. To elicit 
one single point xi, subjects are required to make five decisions between lotteries. The 
lottery outcomes are adapted based on the prior decision of the subjects, in order to 
determine (after five iterations) an outcome xi for which the subject is indifferent between 
the two lotteries, A and B. This indifference is achieved as follows: If the subject prefers 
lottery B to lottery A, then the value of xi in lottery B is decreased such that lottery B is 
less attractive. Conversely, if the subject prefers lottery A to lottery B, then the value of xi 
is increased such that lottery B becomes more attractive. These steps are repeated five 
times for all elicited points xi. Based on the x values and the assumption of a utility 
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function of a power form, it is possible to estimate two parameters, alpha (α) and beta (β). 
Alpha describes the utility function in the gain domain, and beta describes the function in 
the loss domain. Appendix A gives a detailed description of the method and calculation of 
α and β.  
Alpha and beta characterize the risk attitude of the individuals in the sense of a 
measure of proportional risk attitude (Eisenführ and Weber, 2003). Standard nonlinear 
least squares regression is used to estimate α and β for gains and losses. A value of α and 
β equal to 1 denotes a linear utility function on gains and losses, respectively. If α is larger 
than 1, the utility function is convex and the individual is risk seeking for gains, if α is 
smaller than 1, the individual is risk averse for gains, since the utility function is concave 
(for β, vice versa).  
We use the absolute difference between the risk parameters, α and β, and 1 as a 
measure for the curvature of the utility function; the higher the value is, the more the 
utility function is curved (i.e., the more it deviates from a linear function; see Figure 2). 
Therefore, we define a = | 1-α | and b = | 1-β | as indices for curvature (i.e., for the 
deviation of the particular utility functions from a linear function).  
 
Figure 2: The utility function for gains for various values of α. The absolute difference 
between the parameter α and 1 is a measure for the curvature of the utility function. 
α = 1.5α = 1.0
α = 0.5
0 0.5 1.0
0
1.0
 
2.4.2 Individual Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID) 
To assess preferences in making decisions intuitively or deliberatively, we use the 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation scale (PID; Betsch, 2004). The measurement 
consists of 18 questions: nine items assessing the habitual preference for deliberation 
(PID-D) and nine items assessing the preference for intuition (PID-I). On a 5-point scale 
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anchored at 1 (“I don’t agree.”) and 5 (“I totally agree.”), subjects answered questions 
regarding their decision-making habits. PID-D consists of items such as ”I prefer making 
detailed plans to leaving things to chance” or ”I think before I act.” PID-I includes items 
such as, “With most decisions it makes sense to rely on your feelings” or ”I carefully 
observe my deepest feelings” (the complete PID inventory is included in Appendix B). In 
prior studies (total N > 2500; Betsch, 2004) the scale proved as reliable (Cronbach’s α for 
PID-D varied between 0.78 and 0.84, for PID-I between 0.78 and 0.81), and the 2-
dimensional structure was confirmed. The inventory captures a habitual preference that is 
stable over time. A preference for a decision mode influences decision-making especially 
in unconstrained situations (e.g., no time pressure, enough resources, etc.).  
People with high scores on deliberation have been shown to be conscientious 
perfectionists with a high need for structure (Betsch, 2004, Study 3). They aim at 
maximizing rather than satisficing their decision outcome. On the other hand, highly 
intuitive people are speedy decision-makers and tend to score high on social and emotion-
bound personality dimensions like extraversion, agreeableness, and openness for 
experience.  
3 Results 
We tested the equality of means and variances between the samples for the 
parameters describing the utility functions (α and β), and for PID-I and PID-D. As the 
hypotheses of equality could not be rejected (all F- and t-values < 1.2), the data of the two 
samples were combined. From the total of 200 subjects, 15 were found to be outliers in 
terms of the standard error and were therefore deleted.3 
For data analysis, we first calculated correlations between the curvature indices and 
the PID values. In line with previous findings (e.g., Betsch, 2004), the subjects in general 
had a significantly greater preference for deliberation (PID-D = 3.7, sd = 0.6) than 
preference for intuition (PID-I = 3.3, sd = 0.6), t (185) = -4.9, p < 0.001.  
                                                 
3 The 15 excluded subjects were outliers in terms of the standard error of the coefficient estimates of the 
utility function: We excluded all subjects whose standard error of one of the coefficient estimates was more 
than one standard deviation larger than all other standard errors of coefficient estimates. High standard 
errors indicate unsystematic clicking, suggesting a lack of motivation. It is interesting to note that some of 
the deleted subjects were not only outliers in terms of the standard error of their coefficient estimates but 
also in terms of the time needed for the completion of the lottery questions: They needed considerably less 
time than all other subjects. There was no systematic relation between preference for intuition and 
deliberation and the occurrence of outliers. 
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The median of the coefficient estimates of the power function on gains (α) was 0.91, 
with a mean standard error (se) of the nonlinear least squares estimation of 0.06 
(Mα = 0.99, sd = 0.44). In the loss domain, the median β equaled 0.90 (se = 0.05; 
Mβ = 0.95, sd = 0.38).4 The coefficients of determination of the nonlinear regression 
approach 1 (the mean R² is 0.995 for α and 0.995 for β). In total, the results regarding 
subjects’ risk attitudes are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) and subsequent work based on prospect theory.  
3.1 Relationship between Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID) and the 
Curvature of the Utility Function 
We hypothesized that high values of deliberation (PID-D) should coincide with a less 
curved utility function. Conversely, subjects with a greater degree of intuition (PID-I) 
should have more curved utility functions.  
Based on this hypothesis, we expected that both curvature indices, a = | 1-α | and 
b = | 1-β |, would be positively correlated with a preference for intuition and negatively 
correlated with a preference for deliberation. This was supported by our data: A high 
preference for deliberation was found to be negatively and significantly related to the 
curvature of the utility function in the gain domain, ra (Pearson’s correlation coefficient) = 
-.20, p < 0.01, and in the loss domain, rb = -0.15, p < 0.05. Similarly, a high preference for 
intuition was significantly positively correlated with the curvature index on both the gain 
(r = 0.18, p < 0.05) and the loss domain (r = 0.22, p < 0.01). Thus, more deliberative 
decision-makers had less curved, or more linear, utility functions, while more intuitive 
decision makers had more curved, or less linear, utility functions. This hypothesis found 
further support in an overall test.5 Though the intuition and deliberation dimensions of the 
PID were not highly negatively correlated (r = -.36, p < 0.001), we defined c = PID-I –
 PID-D as an overall measure for the preference for intuition (Mc = -.37, sd = 1.0). Higher 
values of c indicate a higher preference for intuition. Our hypothesis that c is positively 
correlated with the curvature indices a and b was strongly supported by the data (see 
Table 1, rows 1 and 2). Additionally, we performed a regression analysis to test whether 
the observed relationship deviates significantly from linearity, i.e., whether it is driven by 
extreme groups, the very intuitive and the very deliberative subjects. This is not the case, c 
                                                 
4  Abdellaoui (2000) found 0.89 and 0.92 for the sample median of α and β, respectively, based on a study 
with 40 subjects in total. 
5 We are grateful to a reviewer suggesting this test to us. 
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is a significant predictor (p < .01) of both, a and b, but higher order terms of c, (i.e. c², 
c³,…) are not significant predictors. 
 
Table 1: Overall test. Correlation between overall measure of preference for intuition (c) 
and the curvature indices (a, b) of the utility function. The table also presents results for 
various sample partitions. 
 
 c  
a (N = 185)  0.23 **   
b (N = 185)  0.23 **   
a (α >= 1: N = 74)  0.41 ***  
a (α <= 1: N = 136)  0.14 +  
b (β >= 1: N = 80)  0.34 **  
b (β <= 1: N = 131)  0.15 +  
a (α ≠ 1: N = 160)  0.20 **  
b (β ≠ 1: N = 159)  0.19 **  
 
Note: A higher c denotes a higher preference for intuition. A higher a or b value is 
associated with a more curved utility function. Correlations flagged with a + are 
significant on the 0.10-level, * on the 0.05 level, ** on 0.01, and *** on 0.001. c = PID-I 
– PID-D. 
3.2 Partitioning the Sample  
Do our correlation findings reflect a relationship between habitual preferences for a 
decision mode and the curvature of the utility function, or do they rather stem from a 
systematic relationship between specific risk attitudes and the habitual preference for a 
certain decision mode? To investigate the robustness of our statistical findings, in 
particular to see whether the results are only driven by specific subgroups of the sample, 
we subdivided the sample into various partitions.  
Table 1 presents the results from the sample partitioned based on the curvature 
estimates of the utility functions (i.e., based on their risk attitude). All correlation results 
held for the subgroups. If risk seeking subjects on the gain domain (i.e., we excluded the 
subjects with α ≥ 1) or subjects that were risk averse on the loss domain (i.e., we excluded 
the subjects with β ≥ 1) were excluded, the correlation results are only marginally 
significant.  
The results from the subgroup analysis provide further evidence that our data do not 
suggest a systematic relationship between the preference for a decision mode and a certain 
risk attitude. However, as we have hypothesized, there is instead a systematic relationship 
  11
between the preference for a decision mode and the degree of curvature of individual 
utility functions. In sum, our findings are neither driven by only one specific subgroup of 
the sample, nor by differences between the PID extreme groups in their mean curvature 
estimates. 
The last two rows of the subgroup analysis in Table 1 address an important 
interpretative point of our analysis: They show that the results still hold even if we delete 
all subjects with linear utility functions from the sample, that is, if we exclude all subjects 
whose behavior follows an expected-value calculation. This suggests that our results 
cannot be explained by proposing that the less intuitive subjects are simply calculating. 
Still, it is likely that they perform more complex cognitive operations than intuitive people 
as can be seen by the analysis of decision times.  
3.3 Decision Times  
Decisions based on affect should be faster compared to deliberative decisions because 
affect is quickly accessible (cf. affective primacy hypothesis, Zajonc, 1980) and cognitive 
operations are time consuming. We have correlated the total decision times of every 
individual with the individual overall measure for the preference for intuition, c. The 
findings (r = -0.18, p < 0.05) support the hypothesis that the more intuitive a subject is the 
less time the subject takes for completing both lottery tasks.  
Our approach to classifying the curvature of the individual utility function is based 
on the assumption of the power functional form (see Appendix A and Fig. 2). Do intuitive 
and deliberative subjects differ systematically in the way the power function fits the 
elicited points of their utility function? As a measure of fit, we used the standard errors, 
seα  and seβ, of the coefficient estimates of α and β and we correlated them with c. Linear 
utility functions are the only utility functions that were, by construction of our mechanism, 
be fitted with a zero standard error of the coefficient estimate. Due to this fact those corner 
outcomes are excluded from the correlation. We found that c was not correlated with 
seα (r = 0.07, N = 161), but it was correlated with seβ (r = 0.17, p < 0.05, N = 160). We 
conducted a mediation analysis with the loss domain data and regressed b on c in a first 
regression, se on c in a second regression and b on se and c in a third regression (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986). In the third regression both predictors were significant, indicating that 
se partially mediates the effect of c on b. A Sobel test revealed that the indirect effect of c 
on the b via the mediator seβ is nearly significantly different from zero (regression 
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coefficients for c in the first step: 0.08, se = 0.03, in the third step: 0.05, se = 0.03, 
z = 1.94, p < .06).  
That is, on the gain domain the fit of the power utility functions was unrelated to the 
habitual decision mode of the individual. On the loss domain, though, the more intuitive a 
person was, the worse was the fit of the power function, i.e., more intuitive subjects had 
given answers to the lottery questions that were less consistent with our parametric 
functional assumption of a regular and smooth utility function. The resulting higher 
standard error served as a mediator for the relation between the degree of intuition (c) and 
the degree of curvature in the loss domain (b). A possible explanation is that more 
intuitive subjects might have answered the lottery questions on the loss domain (which 
were asked after the 32 questions on the gain domain had been asked) in a rather erratic 
way and have made decision errors on the loss domain. An outlier analysis revealed that 
the correlation between seβ and c was driven by 3 subjects, who had seβ > 0.35, which was 
almost 6 standard deviations above the mean standard error. Excluding the outliers leads 
to a correlation between c and seβ of r = 0.10, p > 0.20, thus a mediation analysis is not 
necessary any more.  
4 Discussion  
In this study we showed that the curvature of individual value functions, assessed with an 
established elicitation method, is correlated with the individual preference for intuitive 
and deliberative decision-making. The more people preferred deliberative strategies, the 
more linear their utility functions were. Conversely, the more intuitive a person was, the 
more curved the utility function was. The effect was stable for various partitions of the 
sample.  
This effect might have occurred because intuitive and deliberative decision-makers 
used different sources of information. While intuitive decision makers might have used the 
instant affect produced by the risky alternatives, deliberatives may have used rather the 
stated values as presented by the experimenter. Intuitives “go beyond the information 
given” (Bruner, 1957, p.41) and bias their judgment with additional affective information, 
while deliberates seemingly bias their judgment less with subjective evaluations. Several 
findings support this assumption.  
First, if intuitive subjects rely on quickly accessible affect, their reaction times 
should have been shorter compared to deliberative decision-makers who tend to reflect on 
their decisions. Indeed, this was the case in our sample and this is in line with findings 
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from Betsch (2004): The time needed to finish the 64 lottery choices decreased, the more 
the decision maker preferred the intuitive over the deliberate decision mode. In Betsch’s 
(2004) study, intuitive subjects indicated faster decision making than deliberative decision 
makers on a self-report scale. Furthermore, subjective evaluation happens automatically, 
but a meta-cognitive correction needs extra time, which might have caused the prolonged 
decision time for deliberative decision-makers. Second, as our analysis above shows, the 
faster decisions of intuitive decision makers were not generally a result of random clicking 
or a lack of motivation (though our results suggest that some very intuitive subjects might 
have answered the questions on the loss domain in a rather erratic way). Third, 
deliberative people tend to be maximizers of the objective expected values, which was 
demonstrated by the nearly linear shape of their utility functions. Again in line with 
findings by Betsch (2004), preference for deliberation (PID-D) correlated significantly 
with maximization (r = .27), a construct expressing the tendency to make optimal 
objective decisions as opposed to subjectively satisfying decisions (Schwartz et al., 2002). 
Maximizing is a highly cognitive process, involving conscious weighting, information 
search, for example, which requires more cognitive capacity than affective-intuitive, 
satisfying decisions.  
Finally, in an unpublished pilot-study, we simply asked subjects after the utility 
elicitation procedure to what extent they relied on affect vs. calculation. Deliberatives 
reported that they calculated in 9% of the cases, whereas intuitive decision-makers 
reported that they calculated in only 5% of the cases. On the other hand, self-reports 
additionally showed that intuitive decision-makers (56%) used significantly more affect 
than deliberative decision makers (41%), the interaction effect was significant, p < 0.05. It 
seems unlikely that deliberatives actually “calculate” in the literal sense (also given the 
fact that the mean total time used for the 32 lottery decisions was max. 5 minutes). 
However, the self-report data on strategy use in addition to the decision time differences 
in this study indicate that deliberative decision makers did indeed perform more time-
consuming cognitive operations.  
As a limitation of this study we have to note that our explanation of the effect was 
not directly tested in this study. The basis of information used for the decisions was not 
manipulated. Johnson et al. (1988) found, for example, that the display of numbers (e.g., 
the probability of .9 as 9/10 or 513/570) elicits different strategies, namely calculation-
based strategies vs. heuristic strategies. Such a method could be useful in future studies to 
further investigate the reported findings. 
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To summarize, in our study we found empirical evidence for the hypothesis that a 
habitual individual difference factor is able to account for the observed variation in the 
curvature of individual utility functions. This is another piece of evidence that both 
affective and deliberative processes play a role when people make decisions (cf. 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2004). On one hand, the findings in this study suggest that 
deliberative people use more cognitive strategies than intuitive people, and on the other 
hand, the data substantiates the speculation that the curvature of utility functions might 
come from affective evaluation and the integration of affect into the decision. This is 
especially the case for intuitive decision makers.  
5 Conclusion 
The degree of curvature of the utility function is interpreted as a measure of the risk 
attitude of a decision-maker. Psychologists claim that attitudes consist of affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral components (e.g., Breckler, 1984). One can argue that for 
intuitive subjects, the affective part of the attitude contributes more to the overall risk 
attitude compared to the cognitive part (vice versa for deliberative decision-makers). An 
explanation for our findings is that intuitive people use the affective risk information 
contained in the lotteries when making their decisions, which might lead to the risk 
attitude (i.e., a feeling of risk) becoming integrated in the judgment, resulting in risk 
averse or risk seeking behavior. Deliberative people, on the contrary, seem to base their 
decisions on the stated values rather than on affect. It seems unlikely that deliberative 
people do not have any affective reactions to the lotteries, but they might therefore 
abstract from this affective information and might discount or neglect it when making 
their judgments (a process that requires time).  
This interpretation of the observed relationship between habitual decision modes 
and lottery choice behavior is in line with other research as well. In Kaufmann’s (2003) 
study, people were presented with a list of return values for individual stocks, which 
differed in the total return and the variance of the return (i.e., the associated risk of the 
stock). People classified as intuitive, based on the PID scale, had a higher degree of 
sensitivity towards the risk of the individual stocks than the deliberatives. They preferred 
the shares with less variance in returns, thus they showed behavior which was not risk 
neutral which is in line with our findings. Similar to the findings in our study and 
consistent with the “risk as feelings hypothesis” (Loewenstein et al., 2001), the risky 
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stocks seem to trigger a feeling of uncertainty that particularly affects intuitive people in 
their evaluations of the lotteries. 
Although affect and risk perception are increasingly mentioned in the literature, the 
focus has mostly been on the influence of mood or affective states on risky decision-
making (e.g., Isen et al., 1988; Mano, 1994; Wright and Bower, 1992). In this work we 
consider the impact of intuitive or deliberative decision-making based on the idea that the 
information used for a judgment varies with respect to the individually preferred habitual 
decision mode. While deliberative people rather use the stated information, intuitives 
seem to process not only the stated values but also their subjective feeling of how safe or 
how good a lottery is. People using affective information (i.e., people with a preference 
for intuition) may be more prone to the effects of mood on their decisions in risky 
situations. Future studies might attempt to control for mood effects to rule out this 
explanation. 
Our results suggest that people differ systematically in the way they solve simple 
monetary risky decision problems. This study links psychometric measures with 
individual utility functions, the backbone of modeling individual decision-making in the 
economic sciences. We have identified a person variable – the individual preference for 
intuition and deliberation – that helps to explain heterogeneity in utility functions. The 
findings are further evidence that affective-intuitive and deliberative decision modes affect 
peoples’ decisions in substantial ways. Further theoretical and empirical work on 
decision-making under risk and uncertainty will profit from considering different decision 
modes, for example by assessing the individual preference for intuition and deliberation.  
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Details of Eliciting the Value Function and Risk Attitude Parameters (α and β) 
Individuals’ utility functions for the gain and loss domains are elicited using a series of 64 
individually adapted lottery choice questions presented by the computer.  
The method of utility function elicitation is based on the construction of so-called 
standard sequences of outcomes, {x0 to x6} (i.e., monetary outcomes that are equally 
spaced in terms of their utility). In our design, we use a five-step interval bisection 
procedure to determine an outcome x1 for which the subject is indifferent between the 
lotteries A=(x0, p; R, 1-p) and B=(x1, p; r, 1-p) (see Figure 3), where x0, R, x1, and r denote 
monetary payoffs of the lottery and p and (1-p) denote the probabilities of the respective 
payoffs (see Figure 3). Here, we have 0 ≤ r < R < x0 < x1 with r, R and x0 held constant. 
The answers to the first five presented lottery choice questions allow us to determine the 
desired x1 that achieves indifference between lottery A and B.  
 
Figure 3: An example of the two presented lotteries. 
 
p 
1-p 
Xi-1 
R 
p 
1-p 
Xi 
r 
Lottery A Lottery B 
 
In the next step of this procedure (i.e., the next 5 presented lotteries) we determine, 
again based on bisection, an x2 for which the subject is indifferent between the lotteries 
(x1, p; R, 1-p) and (x2, p; r, 1-p). We continue this method until we have determined an x6, 
(that is, until we have 5 · 6 = 30 lottery choice questions in total, plus two consistency 
check questions). Another 32 questions that follow the same logic explained above are 
presented for the elicitation of the utility function for losses. Note that in our study we 
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have set R to €100 and r to €0; x0 has been set to €200.6 These values are based on the 
suggestions of Abdellaoui (2000) and Wakker and Deneffe (1996). We start every five-
step bisection procedure for the elicitation of a new xi with a value of xi = xi-1 + €500. The 
interval within which we determine the new xi via bisection is then [xi-1, xi-1 + €1000]. 
Furthermore, p is set to 2/3 for all subjects and for all lottery choices, thus excluding the 
possibility of the perturbing effect of different individual probability weighting functions 
for the construction of the utility function.  
Now, let u(·) denote the value- or utility-function on the gain or the loss domain and 
let w(·) denote the probability weighting function for the respective domain.7 Then the 
constructed indifferences give pairs of equations of the following type: 
 
w(p) u(xi) + (1-w(p)) u(R)    =   w(p) u(xi+1) + (1-w(p)) u(r)     (1) 
w(p) u(xi+1) + (1-w(p)) u(R) =   w(p) u(xi+2) + (1-w(p)) u(r)     (2) 
From these two equations it follows: 
u(xi+1) - u(xi)     =    u(xi+2) - u(xi+1)         (3) 
That is, in terms of utility, the trade-off of xi for xi+1 is equivalent to the trade-off of 
xi+1 for xi+2. We obtain a standard sequence of outcomes, {x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, which 
is, by construction, increasing for gains and decreasing for losses and uniquely 
characterizes the individuals’ utility function, since all xi are equally spaced in terms of 
their utility (see Figure 1). 
Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we assume a power utility function that 
is “by far the most popular form for estimating money value” (Prelec, 2000):  
⎩⎨
⎧
<−−
≥=
0
0
xifx
xifxxu
 )(
 )( β
α
                                                             (4) 
 
                                                 
6 For the loss domain, we used the negative of the above values as R, r, and x0, respectively. 
7 That is, we implicitly assume that individual preferences can be represented by, for example, (Cumulative) 
Prospect Theory. Note, however, that the value function that we elicit is indeed a von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. Equation (3) holds also under Expected Utility Theory, which can be shown 
by substituting p for w(p) in equations (1) and (2). 
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6.2 Items of the Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale (Betsch, 2004) 
Item 
No. Preference for deliberation                                                                          α =.76 
1 Before making decisions I first think them through. 
3 Before making decisions I usually think about the goals I want to achieve. 
6 I think about myself. 
7 I prefer making detailed plans rather than leaving things to chance. 
10 I am a perfectionist. 
11 I think about a decision particularly carefully if I have to justify it. 
13 When I have a problem I first analyze the facts and details before I decide. 
14 I think before I act. 
16 I think more about my plans and goals than other people do. 
 Preference for intuition                                                                               α =.77  
2 I listen carefully to my deepest feelings. 
4 With most decisions it makes sense to completely rely on your feelings. 
5 I don’t like situations that require me to rely on my intuition.       
8 I prefer drawing conclusions based on my feelings, my knowledge of human nature, and my experience of life. 
9 My feelings play an important role in my decisions. 
12 When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. 
15 I prefer emotional people. 
18 I am a very intuitive person. 
19 I like emotional situations, discussions, and movies. 
  
Note: Instructions: Please answer all the following questions about your life in general. 
Your answers should correspond to the way you generally make decisions. Circle the 
number that best represents your opinion. 1 means that you very much disagree; 5 means 
that you very much agree.   
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Sequential Decision Behavior with Reference Point
Preferences:
Theory and Experimental Evidence
Abstract: People are heterogeneous with respect to their behavior in sequential decision
situations. This paper develops models for behavior in a simple sequential decision situ-
ation under the assumption of expected utility maximization and under the assumption
of sequential updating of utility reference points during the decision task. I find experi-
mental evidence that supports the new reference point model: Individual loss aversion is
systematically related to the observed behavior in a way that is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the reference point model; that is, loss aversion helps to predict heterogeneity
in behavior. Risk attitude is not related to observed behavior. The finding that many
people set reference points in sequential decision tasks is of interest in, e.g., consumer
economics, labor economics, finance, and decision theory.
1 Introduction
Sequential decision situations occur often in our everyday lives and people are very hetero-
geneous with respect to their behavior in these situations. Does information on individual
preferences help us to predict how people behave in sequential decision situations? The
goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between individual preferences and
sequential decision behavior based on a controlled laboratory experiment.
A very elementary representative of a sequential decision situation is a so-called search
task. Search tasks are attractive for the study of sequential decision behavior: first,
because of their very simple sequential decision structure that can be easily dealt with
theoretically and empirically and that participants in a laboratory experiment understand
easily; second, because this decision structure masks a complicated optimization problem
that – comparable to sequential decision situations in our everyday lives – cannot be
solved without a computer in most cases. Indeed, we face search tasks in many everyday
situations, e.g., when we look for the best price of a certain product or when we search
for a new job. In those tasks, we must essentially decide between committing resources to
an attractive proposition or deferring the decision in the hope of receiving a better deal.
Behavior in economic search situations has been investigated both theoretically and ex-
perimentally in the fields of economics, mathematics, and psychology since the 1950’s.
Seminal theoretical work in the economic strand of this literature was done by Simon
(1955) and by Stigler (1961). Since then, numerous authors have investigated variations
of search problems, and they have focused on examining the huge heterogeneity in search
behavior (e.g., Cox and Oaxaca, 1989; Harrison and Morgan, 1990; Hey, 1981; 1982;
1987; Houser and Winter, 2004; Kogut, 1990; Schunk and Winter, 2004; Sonnemans,
1998; 2000).
Economic theory suggests that this heterogeneity observed in sequential decision behavior
is reflected in the heterogeneity of individual preferences. In this paper, a lottery-based
preference elicitation mechanism is combined with a price search task in an economic
laboratory experiment in order to investigate the link between individual preferences and
individual search behavior based on utility-based search models. The underlying idea is
that in price search tasks as well as in lottery tasks, people make financial decisions under
risk, and they thereby reveal their preferences.
The contribution of this work is, first, the theoretical development of search models that
are not based on the assumption of risk neutrality as well as the development of a model
that involves reference point updating. Second, the paper provides experimental evidence
that measures of loss aversion are a better predictor of search behavior than measures
of risk aversion. An explanation for this finding is that subjects set utility reference
points relative to which they evaluate the possible future outcomes in the search task.
In particular, heterogeneity in individual search behavior might be better explained by a
model that assumes sequential updating of utility reference points than by search models
that are based on expected utility theory.
The findings are of interest for decision theory. They help to understand the determi-
nants and properties of individual search behavior in markets (e.g., Zwick et al., 2003),
and they serve as a guide to theoretical and structural econometric specifications that
explicitly allow for individual heterogeneity in applied search theory. These specifications
are being developed in many fields, including research on consumer search and job search
(Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2006). Finally, the sequentially risky decision nature of
the search problem makes the results interesting for theoretical and applied research in
finance (Gneezy, 2003).
This paper first establishes links between search behavior and individual preferences by
developing various search models, in particular the reference point model (section 2).
Then, the experimental design (section 3) and the methodology to draw inference about
search behavior and preferences based on the experimental data (section 4) are described.
Next, the link between the elicited preferences and the observed search behavior is in-
vestigated (section 5): I first discuss descriptive information and a correlation analysis,
and I finally present an analysis that exploits the discrete time-to-event nature and the
panel nature of the data in order to investigate this link. The methodology and possible
explanations for the findings are discussed in section 6; section 7 concludes.
2 Models of Search Behavior
In this section I first derive the optimal search behavior of an expected utility maximizer,
both under risk neutrality (section 2.1) and without restrictions on individual risk attitude
(section 2.2). For the derivation of the decision rules, two cases are considered: In the first
case, the cost of each completed search step is treated as sunk costs; in the second case,
I derive the finite horizon optimal stopping rule assuming that subjects do not treat past
search costs as sunk costs. Finally, in section 2.3, I develop the reference point model.
2.1 Optimal Stopping in Search Tasks under Risk Neutrality
Assume that a searcher’s goal is to purchase a certain good that she values at e100. The
searcher sequentially observes any number of realizations of a random variable X, which
has the distribution function F (·). In the current experiment, F (·) is a discrete uniform
distribution with lower bound e75 and upper bound e150. Let the cost of searching
a new location be e c. Assume that at some stage in the search process, the minimal
value that the searcher has observed so far is e m.1 Basic search theory assumes that
individuals treat the cost of each search step, once completed, as sunk costs (Kogut, 1990;
1 For the remainder of the derivation in this section, the currency units are skipped.
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Lippman and McCall, 1976) and that they compare the payoff of one additional search
step with the payoff from stopping.2
Then, subjects solve the problem based on a one-step forward-induction strategy and the
expected gain from searching once more before stopping, G(m), is generally given by:
G(m) = − [1− F (m)]m︸ ︷︷ ︸⊗ −
∫ m
75
xdF (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸⊕ −c+m. (1)
The term
⊗
accounts for the case in which a value larger thanm is found with probability
(1−F (m)). In this case, m remains the minimum price. The term⊕ stands for the case
in which a lower value than m is found and computes the expected value in this case.
There exists a unique value m∗ with G(m∗) = 0, if G(·) is continuous and monotonic.
Straightforward manipulation shows that the solution to this problem is identical to solv-
ing the following problem for m:
pi(100−m) = (1− F (m))pi(100−m− c) +
∫ m
75
pi(100− x− c)dF (x) (2)
Here, pi(·) is the payoff-function from the search game. The payoff is truncated at e0 in
the experiment:
pi(x) = max{0, x} (3)
The left-hand side of equation (2) is the payoff from stopping, and the right-hand side
denotes the payoff from continuing the search. It is found that the optimal strategy is
to keep searching until a value of X less than, or equal to, the optimal value m∗ has
been observed. For the search task considered in this paper, I find m∗ = 86. That is, a
risk-neutral searcher has the following decision rule: Stop searching as soon as a price less
than or equal to e86 is found.
Now, consider that subjects do not treat search costs as sunk costs. That is, for their
decision whether to stop or to continue the search, they consider the total benefits and
costs of the search; the agent stops searching only if the stopping value is higher than the
continuation value. It follows that the problem is treated as a finite horizon problem that
is solved backwards. Define St = {t,m} as the agents’ state vector after t search steps.
After the agent has stopped searching, she will buy the item and she receives a total
payoff:
Π(St) = max{0, 100−m− t · c}. (4)
The agent stops searching only if the continuation value of the search is lower than the
stopping value. The recursive formulation of the decision problem is therefore:
Jt(St) = max{Π(St), E[Jt+1(St+1)|St]}. (5)
2 Kogut’s (1990) findings show that a certain proportion of subjects does not treat search cost as sunk.
A model in which search cost are not treated as sunk cost is presented later in this section.
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E(·) represents the mathematical expectations operator, and the expectation is taken
with respect to the distribution of St+1|St. Again, this problem has the reservation price
property at every t. The reservation price begins at e86, first stays constant, then starts
decaying slowly, reaches e80 in the 19th round, and then decays at a rate of about one
per round from that point forward.
2.2 Stopping Rules in Search Tasks Without Restrictions on Risk Attitudes
The derivations above are based on the assumption of a risk neutral searcher as in the
existing literature on search behavior. Only for risk neutral subjects it is individually
rational to use a risk neutral optimal stopping rule.
Figure 1: Constant reservation price path (type-1-rules) for different risk attitudes in, e.g.,
CARA or CRRA specifications of a utility function. The more risk averse a searcher is, the
higher is her reservation price level.
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As a more general case, I therefore develop models for a searcher with an arbitrary,
monotone utility function u(·). If the searcher ignores sunk costs and takes her decisions
based on a one-step forward-looking strategy, the equation that determines her reservation
price m∗ then has the following form that follows from (2):3
u(100−m) = (1− F (m))u(100−m− c) +
∫ m
75
u(100− x− c)dF (x) (6)
Equation (6) is solved numerically for the reservation price m∗(η), given the search en-
vironment and a utility function on gains that is parameterized entirely by a parameter
3 This equation does not characterize the optimal solution to the search problem. It gives the optimal
strategy for a searcher with arbitrary risk attitude, captured by u(x), who ignores sunk costs, and who
uses a one-step forward induction strategy.
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(vector) η. The solution has the constant reservation price property, independent of the
functional form of u(·). Figure 1 shows the constant reservation price decision rule for
different risk attitude parameters of, e.g., a CRRA or a CARA utility function. The more
risk averse the searcher is, the higher is her constant reservation price value. Henceforth,
I refer to rules of this type as forward optimal rules, keeping in mind that this rule is only
optimal conditional on the individual utility function and on the assumption of a one-step
forward strategy that ignores sunk costs.
Analogous to the derivation of the optimal search rule in the risk neutral case, I now
consider that subjects do not treat search costs as sunk costs. Again, this is a finite-
horizon problem. After the agent has stopped searching, she buys the item and receives
a total payoff:
Πu(St) = max{0, u(100−m− t · c)}. (7)
The recursive formulation of the dynamic discrete choice problem is:
Jut = max{Πu(St), E[Jut+1(St+1)|St]}. (8)
This problem has, at every t, the reservation price property. The monotonically falling
reservation price implies that the agent should not exercise recall, i.e. she should not recall
previously rejected prices. Figure 2 plots the reservation price paths for a CRRA-utility
function specification; figure 3 assumes a CARA-specification. Henceforth, I refer to rules
of this type as backward optimal rules. These rules are optimal search rules conditional
on the individual utility function.
Figure 2: Reservation price path for type-2-rules for different risk attitudes. CRRA specifi-
cation of the utility function. The more risk averse a searcher is, the higher is her reservation
price level.
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6
Figure 3: Reservation price path for type-2-rules and different risk attitudes. CARA specifi-
cation of the utility function. The more risk averse a searcher is, the higher is her reservation
price level.
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From the theoretical deliberations so far it can be inferred that – regardless of what type
of rule subjects use, forward or backward optimal rules – the more risk averse a person
is, the earlier she should stop search, i.e. the higher is the reservation price that she uses.
2.3 The Reference Point Model
When talking to people that are actually facing a search situation, for example graduate
students on the job market, many people talk about their decision situation as if they
were comparing their possible future offers from continuing the search with the current
best alternative that they have already been offered. They consider everything that is
worse than the current best payoff that they have for sure as a loss relative to that sure
payoff, and everything that is better is considered as a gain relative to the sure payoff. The
model that I develop in this section, the reference point model (henceforth: rp-model),
captures this idea that future possible payoffs are compared to a reference point. The
model is based on a concept from the psychology of decision-making, the concept of loss
aversion, which plays a central role in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) descriptive theory
of decision-making under risk. Loss aversion refers to the tendency of people to be more
sensitive to reductions in their current level of well-being than to increases. The rp-model
claims that during the search task, subjects set reference points relative to which the de-
cision whether to stop or to continue the search is evaluated in terms of gains and losses.
While the models based on EU-maximization (see previous subsection) implicitly assume
that the reference point is always at zero payoff, the rp-model assumes a reference point
7
which is always at the current best payoff.
To formalize these ideas, let u(·) be the individual utility function. Following Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), I decompose the function into the utility function on gains, u+(·),
and the utility function on losses, u−(·):
u(x) =
{
u+(x) x ≥ 0
u−(x) x < 0.
(9)
Subjects have to decide whether to stop or to continue the search at every search step t.
The reference point at time t is the payoff that they get from stopping when they realize
the best price draw, mt, that they have in hand at time t. The utility from continuing
the search is evaluated relative to this reference point:
If subjects find a price lower [higher] than mt− c in the next round t+1, they make a net
gain [loss] relative to their current situation where they have mt in hand – see the term⊗
[
⊕
] in (10).
The model implicitly assumes that subjects solve the problem based on one-step forward-
induction. In the rp-model the expected gain at time t from searching once more before
stopping, G(mt), is given by
G(mt) =
∫ mt−c
−∞
u+(mt − x− c)dF (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸⊗
+
∫ mt
mt−c
u−(mt − x− c)dF (x) + (1− F (mt)) · u−(−c)︸ ︷︷ ︸⊕ . (10)
That is, the model assumes that people sequentially update their reference point in every
time step. Model (10) is stationary in the same sense as the forward optimal model (6):
The search behavior is independent of time t since subjects focus on the marginal gain
or loss from the next step but not on the total payoff from the search. Identical with
the prediction of the forward optimal search model (6), this model results in a constant
reservation price over time. As in the forward optimal search model, the negligence of
the sunk costs incurred during the search process is here responsible for the stationarity
of the model.
I rewrite equation (10) for simplicity. For this purpose, define p(x,mt) as the rp-payoff-
function, i. e. the function that determines individual payoff (relative to the reference
8
point) in the framework of the rp-model (10), conditional on having the best offer mt in
hand at time t:
p(x,mt) =
{
mt − x− c x ≤ mt
−c x > mt
(11)
With the help of (11), the rp-model (10) is equivalently written as:
G(mt) =
∫ mt−c
−∞
u+(p(x,mt))dF (x) +
∫ ∞
mt−c
u−(p(x,mt))dF (x)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(p(x,mt))dF (x). (12)
Several studies (e.g., Kogut, 1990; Sonnemans, 1998) find that many subjects also focus
(to some extent) on total earnings from the search game, instead of only focusing on the
marginal return of another draw. This translates into a reservation price that does not
remain constant, but is falling when t increases, similar to the prediction of the backward
optimal model (8).
In the framework of the rp-model, this means that subjects take into account that total
payoff is left-truncated at e0. In other words, if subjects focus on total earnings, they
take into account that when continuing the search, they do not risk losing money if their
payoff at the current reference point is already e0. That is, the maximal loss that they
can incur is the search cost (if the payoff at the reference point is higher than the search
cost), or the payoff at the reference point (if the payoff at the reference point is less than
the search cost).
This idea, namely that subjects also focus on total earnings instead of only focusing on
the marginal return of another draw, is translated into the framework of the rp-model by
a modification of the rp-payoff-function.
For this purpose, I first define two functions q(·) and v(·):
q(y) =
{
q(y) = y y ≥ 0
0 y < 0
(13)
v(y) =
{
v(y) = y y ≥ −c
0 y < −c (14)
The modified rp-payoff-function p(x,mt, t) now has the following form.
4
p(x,mt, t) =

q(100− c · t− x− c) mt ≥ 100− c · t
v(mt − x− c) mt < 100− c · t ∧ x ≤ mt
v(mt − (100− c · t)) mt < 100− c · t ∧ x > mt
(15)
4 A detailed derivation of the function p(x,mt, t) is given in the appendix of the paper.
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With the modified version of the rp-payoff-function, the rp-model (12) is written as follows:
G(mt) =
∫ mt−c
−∞
u+(p(x,mt, t))dF (x) +
∫ ∞
mt−c
u−(p(x,mt, t))dF (x)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(p(x,mt, t))dF (x). (16)
I have now developed two search models, (16) and (10), that assume that subjects update
their reference points during the search process. The EU-based models presented in the
previous subsection are based on only one branch of the utility function, u+(·), that is, in
these models, behavior can essentially be captured by a one-parameter functional form.
However, both rp-models are based on two independent branches of the utility function,
u+(·) and u−(·). In line with existing empirical studies on loss aversion (e.g., Benartzi
and Thaler, 1995; Schmidt and Traub, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), I therefore
assume the following one-parameter form of the reference point utility function:
u(x) =
{
u+(x) = x x ≥ 0
u−(x) = λ · x x < 0 (17)
This functional form is a strong assumption since it imposes that individuals are risk
neutral and that only the kink at the utility reference point plays a role for observed
search behavior. The assumption is introduced to reduce the reference point model to
one preference parameter which can be identified with a standard experimental method,
and I essentially impose the same assumption for the identification of loss aversion mea-
sures based in the experiment. The measurement of a parameter that characterizes loss
aversion is, of course, always connected to a functional form assumption and there is
much disagreement over the definition and empirical measurement of an index for loss
aversion (see Johnson et al., 2006; Koebberling and Wakker, 2005).5 I will come back to
this important issue later in this paper (in particular in the discussion section) and I will
discuss that the main conclusions from this paper are robust to this assumption. Based on
utility specification (17), the crucial parameter that determines individual search behavior
is now the individual loss aversion parameter λ. The stationary rp-model (10) implies a
constant reservation price search rule; the level of the reservation price path is a function
of loss attitude λ.6
The non-stationary rp-model (16) implies, in line with the stationary rp-model (10), a
5 For example, it is under debate, whether and how to define a global measure of loss aversion. Equation
(17) implies that λ is a global measure of loss aversion, but it is obvious that under the assumption
of more flexible functional forms for u+(·) and u−(·), loss aversion can also be defined locally, i.e. as
a function of x. As section 3, which describes the experimental design, shows, I estimate five different
measures of loss aversion (based on five different x-values) for each subject and the results of this
paper are investigated for all five measures. This serves to underline that the findings are independent
of one specific local measure of loss aversion.
6 Algebraic transformations show that under (17) the rp-model (10) is identical to the classical risk
neutral forward induction model (2) under the assumption that λ = 1.
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reservation price path that varies systematically with the loss aversion parameter λ: the
higher loss aversion, the higher the reservation price. However, in contrast to the station-
ary rp-model, the reservation price starts falling after a certain number of time-steps (see
figure 4).
Figure 4: Reservation price path for type-3-rules: Non-stationary reference point model under
risk neutrality. The more loss averse a searcher is, the higher is her reservation price level.
75
80
85
90
95
252015105
R
es
er
va
ti
on
P
ri
ce
[e
]
Search Step
t378
t394
The stopping rules derived from the reference point models (10) and (16) are comparable
to two classical search models that are based on EU-maximization:
– The stationary rp-model (10) predicts the same search behavior as the EU-based forward
optimal search model (equation (6)), and both models assume that subjects ignore sunk
costs.
– Similar to the EU-based model (8), the non-stationary rp-model (16) predicts that the
reservation price is first constant and starts falling after a certain number of time steps.
In both models, subjects do not ignore sunk costs.
While EU-based models and the rp-model predict very similar search behavior, the expla-
nation for the search behavior is different: In the rp-model, loss aversion explains the level
of the reservation price path, whereas in the EU-models, risk aversion explains this level.
The rp-model is built on the idea that “loss aversion [...] provides a direct explanation for
modest-scale risk aversion” (Rabin, 2000, p. 1288). Due to the similar predictions of the
models, distinguishing between these preference-based explanations for search behavior
requires independent measures of individual preferences, which I elicit in the experiment
for each subject using standard lottery procedures.7 I come back to this point in section
5.2. The following section describes the experimental design.
7 It is tempting to find a parametrization of the decision environment (i.e., search cost c and price dis-
tribution F (·)), in which the (empirical) identification of the underlying preferences based on only the
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3 Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of three parts (A, B, and C) that were presented to the subjects
in fixed alphabetical order. Parts A and C of the experiment served to elicit parameters
that characterize subjects’ preferences, and part B consisted of a series of repeated price
search tasks used to elicit subjects’ search behavior.
Note at this point that the decision in the price search task (part B), namely whether
to stop (s) or to continue (c) the search, corresponds conceptually to the choice between
a sure payoff (s) and a lottery (c) with several consequences. In order to create similar
decision situations in both, the search task (part B) and the preference elicitation parts
(part A and C), the certainty equivalent method (e.g., Wakker and Deneffe (1996) for
risk aversion, and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) for loss aversion) has been used for
preference elicitation. This way, subjects also deal with decision situations involving the
comparison between a sure payoff (s) and a lottery (c) in the preference elicitation part
of the experiment. Various methods for the elicitation of risk and loss attitudes exist, in
particular the multiple price list design (Andersen et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2002),
and parameter-free methods that have been developed in the decision-theoretic strand of
the literature (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000). The certainty equivalent method was used in this
experiment since the decision situation used in this method is most similar to the decision
situation in search tasks, as mentioned above.8 For all participating subjects, the method
has been used with various starting parameters, both for the case of loss and risk aversion,
to get an estimate of the robustness of the results.9
observed search behavior (and without additional and independent preference information) would be
easier. This would require finding an environment, in which the models do not yield similar predictions
over observed ranges of the underlying preference parameters. Simulation studies, obtainable from the
author upon request, show that identification is not easier in other environments. The key issue is that
at the search step where the models yield different predictions, most subjects have already stopped
searching. For example, consider a risk neutral searcher. This person has a constant reservation price
of e86 for 8 search steps (see figure 2 and figure 3), but – if she were behaving according to the
rp-model (see figure 4) – she has a constant reservation price of e86 for 13 search steps. Now, the
probability that I observe her searching for more than 8 steps (which would allow for discrimination
between the two models) is only (1 − ( 1276 ))8 ≈ 25%, and this percentage – one possible measure for
how easy one can discriminate between EU-based models and the rp-model based on observed search
behavior alone – does not change much if the search environment is modified, i.e. if I use different price
distributions or search cost. I make a similar argument in the appendix, section 8.4, in the discussion
about the assumptions that underlie the empirical analysis of search behavior.
8 Wakker and Deneffe (1996) used - also at the University of Mannheim where the present experiment
takes place and at various other places - the same elicitation method with the same stimuli, identical
number of iterations, and identical probability parameters, but with different starting values. This
method has the disadvantage that it does not use incentives, its advantage is that subjects are exposed
to only few lottery decisions and it is the only established preference elicitation method that involves
comparisons between sure payoffs and a lottery.
9 To further motivate the usage of the certainty equivalent method, note that – compared to multiple
price list methods – the method in use avoids using probabilities other than 50-50-probabilities. 50-
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The descriptions of the experimental design will begin with part C, continue with part A,
and end with part B. This makes some details of the design clearer.
3.1 Part C: Risk Attitude
In part C, the certainty equivalent method (e.g., Wakker and Deneffe, 1996) is used to
elicit individual risk attitude. That is, subjects are presented with a two-outcome lottery
(c) and a sure payoff (s) and they are asked to enter one missing value such that they
are indifferent between the sure payoff and the participation in the lottery. In total, only
three lotteries are presented to the subjects.
Two values, xmin =e0 and xmax =e24, are defined. The subject is asked to enter a
sure payoff, the certainty equivalent s0.50, that is as attractive to her as the participation
in the lottery (xmin, p;xmax, (1 − p)).10 In the second question, the subject is asked to
enter the sure payoff s0.25 that is as attractive to her as the lottery (xmin, p; s0.5, (1− p)).
Finally, in the last question, the subject is asked to reveal indifference between the lottery
(s0.5, p;xmax, (1− p)) and a sure payoff by stating the sure payoff s0.75.
The values e0, es0.25, es0.5, es0.75, and e24 are equally spaced in terms of their utility,
which allows for the estimation of the individual utility function, thereby obtaining a risk
attitude index for each subject in the domain between e0 and e24.11
3.2 Part A: Loss Attitude
Part A consists of two blocks, (A-1) and (A-2), that are presented in random order, such
that a direct order effect on the behavior in the search task can be excluded. In block
(A-1) I use a method by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Subjects are again presented
with a 50-50-gamble (x, 50%; y, 50%) and a sure outcome (s). In all five presented lottery
tasks the sure consequence (s) has the value e0. One consequence of the two-outcome
lottery has a value of x ∈ {e-1,e-10,e-25,e-50,e-100}. These values are presented in
random order. Subjects are asked to enter the monetary value y of the other outcome of
this 50-50-lottery such that the lottery and the sure payoff of e0 are equally attractive to
them (i.e., they have to adjust a mixed prospect to acceptability).12
In block (A-2), subjects are presented with three pure certainty-equivalent lotteries of the
same type as in part C, but with xmin =e1 and xmax =e9.13
50-probabilities have the advantage that they are well-known to most decision-makers through events
such as throwing coins.
10 The value of p was set to 50% for all subjects, i. e. p = 1− p.
11 Note that the search task is designed such that subjects earn at least e0 and at most e24.
12 Please see the appendix, figure 5, for the graphical presentation of the lotteries.
13 The lottery with xmax =e24 as one consequence was intentionally not shown in part A (but only in
part C) in order to exclude an effect on the behavior in the search task, in which the maximum possible
13
3.3 Part B: Search Behavior
In part B subjects perform a sequence of search tasks. Each subject’s goal is to purchase
a certain good that she values at e100. The good is sold at infinitely many locations14,
and visiting a new location costs e1. Subjects are informed that the integer price at each
location is drawn independently from a uniform price distribution with a lower bound of
e75 and an upper bound of e150. After each price draw, subjects can stop and choose
any price encountered so far, or they can continue their search at the incremental cost
of another euro. The outcome of each search task is calculated as the evaluation of the
object (e100) minus the price at the chosen location minus the accumulated search cost.
To ensure that subjects are experienced with the task and to minimize the observation
of learning behavior, subjects are allowed to perform an unlimited number of practice
search tasks before performing a sequence of 15 tasks that determine their payoff for part
B of the experiment. Finally, after the experiment is completed, one of these 15 rounds
is selected randomly to determine the payoff.
The search-model question.
After the search task is finished, there is one additional lottery question (henceforth re-
ferred to as the search-model question), worded as follows:15
You have now dealt with lottery tasks and a price search task. Perhaps you have realized
that the decision in the search task (to stop or to continue the search) is similar to the
decision between the lotteries presented to you:
If you stop your search, you obtain a sure payoff, but if you decide to continue the search,
you essentially play a lottery with a risky outcome.
Which of the two lotteries, I or II, is most similar to the lottery that you play when you
continue the search from your point of view?
Lottery I: (eA, p%;eB, (100-p)%)
Lottery II: (eX, p%;e –Y, (100-p)%)
(A, B, X, and Y denote arbitrary positive numbers, and p is a (percentage) number be-
tween 0 and 100).
gain is e24. The main purpose of the lotteries in block (A-2) in the framework of this design, in which
the order of (A-1) and (A-2) was randomized, was to exclude systematic effects of (A-1) on the search
task. Note that the data from (A-2) can still be used to check the validity of the analyses presented in
this paper: I find that the conclusions of this paper are independent of which risk attitude parameters,
those stemming from part C or those stemming from part (A-2), are used in the analysis.
14 In other words, subjects are not prevented from searching as long as they want. It is not reasonable,
however, to search for more than 25 steps, because, given the payoff structure, every search task lasting
for more than 25 rounds ends with a zero payoff. No subject has searched for more than 25 steps.
15 The graphical presentation of the two lotteries I and II presented in the search-model question is
identical with the graphical presentation of all other lotteries. Furthermore, the two lotteries, I and
II, are presented in random order.
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This question is of importance: Search models that are based on expected utility theory
(henceforth: EU-theory) assume that subjects evaluate the next search step as a pure
lottery (cf. lottery I). In contrast, the new rp-model assumes that subjects evaluate
the next search step as a mixed lottery (cf. lottery II). Therefore, the answer to the
search model question allows for subdividing the subject sample into two groups: subjects
behaving in a manner consistent with an EU-based model and subjects behaving in a
manner consistent with a model in which subjects set utility reference points.
A few final remarks on the experimental design: First, the purpose of including both
mixed (A-1) and pure (A-2) lottery tasks in the first part is to have subjects get used to
both tasks before they have to answer the search-model question. Second, to make sure
that subjects have sufficient experience with the search task and have been exposed to
pure and mixed lotteries, the search-model question is presented directly after they have
performed the search task. Third, since subjects are informed on the instruction sheet
about the properties of the search experiment (i.e., they are aware that their minimum
payoff is e0 and that their maximum payoff is e24), the certainty-equivalent method with
the values xmin =e0 and xmax =e24 is used after they have answered the search-model
question (i.e. in part C). This avoids the potential influence of an exposure to lotteries
with xmin =e0 and xmax =e24 on the answer to the search-model question.
3.4 Administration and Payoffs
The study was conducted in the Summer and Fall of 2004 in the experimental laboratory
of the SFB 504, a national research center at the University of Mannheim. In eight sessions
119 students of the University of Mannheim participated in the experiment which was
run entirely on computers using software written by the author. The instruction sheet
presented full information about the search task (i.e., as in section 3.3) and I want to
stress that it was emphasized that (i), subjects’ payoff was truncated at e0 (i.e., they
could not incur losses from the search task) and that, (ii), they would not earn a show-up
fee (i.e., no reference point was induced).
4 Inference about Preferences and Search Behavior
This section first presents and discusses how risk and loss attitude is estimated from the
data obtained in the lottery tasks of the experiment. Then, I describe how individual
search behavior is classified based on the data obtained in the search experiments and the
search models developed above.
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4.1 Estimation of Risk Attitude
I estimate individual risk attitude based on a parametric approach allowing for a specifi-
cation of both constant relative and constant absolute risk aversion (CRRA and CARA,
respectively). For both functional forms, the utility function is estimated from the data
obtained in part C using nonlinear least squares.
Utility functions of the power form (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
assume that subjects have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):
u(x) = (
x− xGmin
xGmax − xGmin
)(α+1) (18)
xGmax is the largest elicited value of x in the gain domain, i.e. e24; x
G
min is the smallest
elicited x-value in the gain domain, i.e. e0. The estimated coefficient α characterizes
each subject’s risk attitude under the CRRA-assumption. If α > 0, the subject is risk
seeking; if α < 0, the subject is risk averse.
Utility functions of the exponential form (e.g., Currim and Sarin, 1989; Pennings and
Smidts, 2000) assume that subjects have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):
u(x) =
1− e−γ(x−xGmin)
1− e−γ(xGmax−xGmin) (19)
For γ = 0 the function is defined to be linear, i.e. the subject is risk neutral. In the CARA-
specification, the estimated coefficient γ characterizes each subject’s risk attitude in the
sense of an Arrow-Pratt-measure of risk attitude (Pratt, 1964), that is: −u′′(x)/u′(x) = γ.
If γ < 0, the subject is risk seeking; if γ > 0, the subject is risk averse.
4.2 Estimation of Loss Attitude
Based on the subjects’ responses in part A of the experiment, an individual-specific index
for loss aversion is calculated. The statistic λx = −y/x is a measure of individual loss
aversion, where x ∈ {e-1,e-10,e-25,e-50,e-100} and y is the response to the correspond-
ing lottery given in part A. This method of estimating a coefficient of loss aversion is the
method used in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and its idea is to obtain a simple measure
that captures the tradeoff between gains and losses. Note that because of the five x-values
that are used for the elicitation, I essentially elicit five different measures of loss aversion,
and I will use all measures in the subsequent analyses.
4.3 Classification of Decision Rules Used in the Search Task
The next step of the analysis is to determine the decision rule used by each subject in
the search task. In order to do so, a fixed set of candidate decision rules is specified,
the “universe of search rules”, and the decision rule that fits observed behavior best is
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attributed to each subject. Since the utility-based search models developed in section 2
establish a relationship between preference parameters and decision rules, I can assign
preference parameters to the subjects based on the attributed search rules.16
The Universe of Search Rules
For the investigation of the relationship between individual preferences and search be-
havior, I use as candidate decision rules all those search rules that can be derived from
the search models developed in section 2. The universe of search rules (i.e., the set of
candidate search rules that are used in this paper to characterize search behavior) consists
of the following 51 rules:
The first class of these decision rules, henceforth referred to as type-1-rules, share the
constant reservation price property (see figure 1). These rules are either based on the
assumption that subjects use the forward optimal search rule (equation (6), the EU-
based model that neglects sunk costs), or the stationary rp-model (equation (10), the
rp-model that neglects sunk costs). Each rule says that the subject uses a reservation
price r ∈ {e78, ...,e94} which is constant during the complete search round. The universe
contains 17 type-1-rules denoted by t178, t179, ..., t194. Every rule corresponds to a certain
risk attitude parameter αsearch and γsearch.17
The second class of decision rules is based on the finite horizon search model (i.e., the
backward optimal search rules developed in section 2). According to these type-2-rules,
the reservation price is a function of the search step t and of individual risk attitude.
I assume again 17 different type-2-rules, denoted by t2CRRA78 , t2
CRRA
79 , ..., t2
CRRA
94 , derived
based on the assumption of a CRRA-specification of the utility function: For the first rule,
the reservation price at t = 1 is e78, for the second rule, it is e79, etc., and for the last rule
it is e94 (see figure 2). Each reservation price path corresponds to a certain α-interval.
The 17 price paths t2CRRA78 , t2
CRRA
79 , ..., t2
CRRA
94 correspond to a decreasing sequence of 17
α-intervals taken from the interval [−0.973, 25.20].
Alternatively, the 17 type-2-rules can be derived based on the assumption of a CARA-
specification of the utility function (see figure 3). Then, each reservation price path
corresponds to a certain γ-interval, and the 17 paths correspond to an increasing sequence
of γ-intervals taken from [−2.028, 0.837]. In the paper, it will always be clear from the
context whether the particular type-2-rules are derived based on either a CRRA- or a
CARA-specification of the utility function. Conditional on the assumption that a certain
subject uses a finite horizon search model, risk coefficients αsearch and γsearch can be
16 I can attribute only small intervals of preference parameters and not exact point-values, since the
prices presented in the price search task are discrete.
17 Under risk neutrality, one finds a constant reservation price of e86. The set of 17 constant reservation
price rules, t178, t179, ..., t194, is sufficiently large to classify all observed behavior (see figure 6 in the
appendix), no subject is assigned a lower or higher reservation price, if I allow for a larger universe of
rules.
17
attributed to her. These coefficients are the risk attitudes that explain best the observed
search behavior.
Finally, the type-3-rules are based on the non-stationary rp-model (16), the rp-model
developed under the assumption that subjects focus on total payoffs from searching. The
reservation price is a function of the search step t and of individual loss aversion λ (see
figure 4). Again, 17 different rules are considered, t378, t379, ..., t394: For the first rule,
the reservation price at t = 1 is e78, for the second rule, it is e79, etc., and for the last
rule it is e94. The rules correspond to a decreasing sequence of λ-intervals taken from
the interval [0.042, 3.392]. Based on the type-3-rules, I attribute to every individual a
loss coefficient λsearch. The assigned loss attitude coefficient best explains the observed
search behavior conditional on the assumption that the subject uses the non-stationary
rp-model.
Classification Procedure
To classify search behavior, I determine for each subject the proportion of choices consis-
tent with each decision rule and I maximize this proportion over the set of all candidate
decision rules (i.e., a subject is assigned the decision rule that generates the largest frac-
tion of correct predictions). It is assumed that each subject follows exactly one of the
decision rules in the universe of candidate rules and that she uses the same rule in each of
the 15 payoff tasks. This assumption seems reasonable in view of the fact that all subjects
are experienced when they begin the 15 payoff relevant tasks (see section 3.3).
Formally, the classification procedure is described as follows: Each search rule ci ∈ C,
where C is the universe of search rules described above, is a unique map from subject
i’s information set Sit to her continuation decision dit ∈ {0, 1} : dciit (Sit) → {0, 1}. Now,
let d∗it denote the observed decision of subject i in period t. Then, define the indicator
function:
Xciit (Sit) = 1(d
∗
it = d
ci
it (Sit)) (20)
Let Ti be the number of decisions that are observed for subject i. I attribute to each
subject the search rule that maximizes the likelihood of being used by that subject:
cˆi = argmax
ci∈C
Ti∑
t=1
Xciit (Sit) (21)
5 Results
This section starts with self-contained descriptions of the findings from the utility function
elicitation (part A and part C) and of the search task (part B). The main contribution
of this section is the combination of the data on individual preferences and on search
behavior, such that correlations on the subject level can be analyzed. I test whether
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basic hypotheses on the relationship between search behavior and preference parameters,
derived from the search models developed in section 2, are supported by the data.
5.1 Part C and Part A: Risk and Loss Attitude
Of the 119 subjects that participated in the experiment, 13 were excluded.18 From the
data in part C two indices of risk attitude, an index α (derived from a CRRA specification)
and an index γ (derived from a CARA specification), were estimated for each subject.19
From the data obtained in part (A-1), five indices of loss attitude, λ1, λ10, λ25, λ50, and
λ100, were calculated for each subject.
Table 1: Estimation results of the CRRA and CARA utility function specification and classi-
fication of subjects according to their risk attitude.
Functional specification
CRRA(α) CARA (γ)
Minimum coefficient estimate -0.457 -0.153
Maximum coefficient estimate 2.345 0.093
Median coefficient estimate 0.000 0.000
Mean R2 of all estimates 0.998 0.998
Proportion risk averse 37% 37%
Proportion risk neutral 37% 37%
Proportion risk seeking 26% 26%
Table 1 reports results of the nonlinear least squares estimation of the risk coefficients α
and γ, including the mean coefficient of determination R2 for those two estimations. The
coefficients of determination are close to 1 for all nonlinear regressions. The proportions of
different risk attitudes in the sample are independent of the functional form assumption of
the utility function. The proportions of subjects in the particular categories is in general
agreement with findings in other experimental studies. For example, the proportion of
risk seeking subjects is higher than the proportions reported by studies based on, e.g.,
multiple-price list elicitation methods (e.g., Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2002),
and it is lower than the proportions reported by, e.g., Abdellaoui (2000).
18 In contrast to all other subjects, the utility functions derived from the answers of these 13 subjects
are not strictly monotone. This is evidence that they did not understand the lottery tasks correctly
or did not take it seriously.
19 Alternatively, the data from part (A-2) can be used for the estimation of risk attitude. The data from
part C are preferable, since in part C, the risk attitude index has been elicited in a monetary domain
which is identical to the payoff domain of the search task. (Part (A-2) has in fact only been included
to avoid order effects, see section 3.2). Therefore, only the results from part C are reported here.
The conclusions of this paper are identical if the data from part (A-2) are used. The corresponding
analyses can be obtained from the author upon request.
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Table 2: Results of the loss aversion lottery questions and classification of subjects according
to their loss attitude.
x-values
−100 −50 −25 −10 −1
Minimum λ 1 .9 .96 .9 .5
Maximum λ 10 16 20 20 20
Median λ 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.5
Loss averse 70% 69% 69% 69% 61%
Loss neutral 30% 30% 30% 30% 37%
Loss seeking 0% 1% 1% 1% 2%
Table 3: Pearson correlation between the different elicited loss aversion coefficients. All corre-
lations are statistically significant at the 1%-level.
x-values
−100 −50 −25 −10 −1
−100 1.00
−50 0.88 1.00
−25 0.82 0.95 1.00
−10 0.80 0.94 0.96 1.00x-
v
a
lu
e
s
−1 0.66 0.73 0.72 0.74 1.00
Table 2 shows the results of the loss aversion elicitation part of the experiment. Across
all five elicited loss aversion questions subjects were predominantly loss averse in their
choices. I find median loss aversion coefficients that are significantly higher than 1, and
the values are higher than those reported in Schmidt and Traub (2002), but lower than
the median values reported in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). As expected, there is a
high and statistically significant degree of correlation between the individual answers to
the various loss aversion questions (see table 3). In fact, 39% of the subjects exhibited
constant loss aversion, that is, their loss aversion coefficient is identical for all loss aversion
questions.20
5.2 Part B: Search Behavior
Search behavior differs considerably across individuals, for more information, see the ap-
pendix (section 8.3). Overall, I find a preponderance of early stoppers compared to behav-
ior under the risk neutral stopping rules; this confirms results from earlier experimental
studies (e.g., Hey, 1987; Sonnemans, 1998).
20 Several empirical studies confirm the predominance of loss averse choices (e.g., Fishburn and Kochen-
berger, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Schmidt and Traub, 2002; Pennings and Smidts, 2003).
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Considering (a) the universe of 51 search rules (see figures 1, 2, 3, and 4), (b) the rather
low average number of search steps compared to the optimal strategy, and (c) the fact
that only a finite number of search rounds per individual (namely 15 rounds) is observed,
it is clear that discrimination between very similar reservation price paths, that is across
search rule types (e.g., between t180, t280, and t380), is hardly possible. Individual search
rule types are not (empirically) identified.21 In contrast, the identification within a certain
rule type is clear: For example, there is significant difference in whether a subject’s
behavior is more consistent with, for example, t180 rather than with t181.
22 In other
words, individual risk attitude or loss attitude parameters can be attributed to a subject
based on her behavior in the search task, conditional on the assumption that the subject
uses a specific model. But, as I have already discussed at the end of section 2.3, this
model itself cannot be identified based on the observation of the search behavior alone;
independent measures of preferences that are elicited in part A and part C are additionally
needed.
5.3 The Search-Model Question: Subdividing the Sample
As I have explained above (see section 3.3), the search-model question is used to subdivide
the sample into PR and PC : 39 subjects answered that they see a similarity between the
search task and lotteries with gains and losses and were categorized into group PR; 67
subjects think about lotteries with only gains and were categorized into group PC .
Descriptive statistics on individual preferences and search behavior by subgroup are re-
ported in table 4.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the complete sample and the subgroups PR and PC .
Complete Sample PR PC
Median Std.Dev. Median Std.Dev. Median Std.Dev.
λ1 1.5 2.57 1.5 1.72 1.5 2.96
λ10 1.9 2.63 1.7 1.41 2.0 3.12
λ25 1.6 2.38 1.5 1.02 1.6 2.86
λ50 1.6 2.27 1.5 1.21 1.8 2.68
λ100 1.7 2.10 1.5 1.84 2.0 2.23
α 0.0 0.38 0.0 0.26 0.0 0.44
γ 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.04
Search steps (ss) 80.49 18.05 81.79 18.99 79.73 17.57
21 Asymptotically, that is if an infinite number of search rounds per individual is observed, individual
search rules types are, of course, identified.
22 For more details about the classification, please see the appendix, section 8.3.
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5.4 Analyzing Search Behavior and Individual Preferences
As mentioned above, observed search behavior alone is not sufficient to identify “users” of
the reference point model. However, in order to discriminate between subjects that use the
rp-model and subjects that use one of the classical EU-based models, I can derive hypothe-
ses on the relationship between search behavior and individual preferences that are testable
based on the information gained in parts A, B, and C of the experiment. Essentially, it is
hypothesized that for subjects from PR, individual loss aversion is systematically related
to search behavior, while for subjects from PC , risk aversion is systematically related to
search behavior. Specific hypotheses are stated below:
Conditional on the assumption that a population PR of subjects uses the rp-model, the
rp-model predicts that:
(H1) The more loss averse – measured as λx in part A – a subject from P
R is, the fewer
search steps (denoted by ss) this subject should do in the search task.
(H2) For subjects from PR, the index of loss aversion λx – elicited in part A – should
be positively correlated with the index of loss aversion, λsearch, elicited in the search task,
part B.
Conditional on the assumption that a population PC of subjects does not use the rp-model
but one of the classical models (either the forward optimal search model or the backward
optimal search model), it is claimed that:
(H3) The more risk averse – measured as α and γ in the preference elicitation part C –
a subject from PC is, the fewer steps ss this subject should do in the search task.
(H4) For subjects from PC , the indices of risk attitude – measured as α and γ in the
preference elicitation part C – should be positively correlated with the particular indices
of risk attitude γsearch and αsearch, respectively, revealed through the search behavior.
In the remainder of this section, I study the correlation between preference parameters
and search parameters in the sample. Then, I develop a duration model that investigates
which of the risk and loss aversion measures has better explanatory power for the observed
search duration. But before these analyses, it is helpful to compare descriptive statistics
on preference estimates (see table 1 and table 2) with the theoretical findings on the
relationship between preference parameters and search behavior (see section 4.3). This
gives a first impression of the relationship between the empirical findings and the theory.
Risk attitude (CRRA-specification): Table 1 shows that all estimates for α lie in the in-
terval [−0.457, 2.345]. From the developed search models follows that these estimates
correspond to reservation price paths that start between e83 (for α = 2.345) and e87
(for α = −0.457). That is, essentially only the following search rules are compatible with
the preference estimates: {tX83, ..., tX87} for X ∈ {1, 2}.
Risk attitude (CARA-specification): Table 1 shows that all estimates for γ lie in the in-
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terval [−0.153, 0.093]. These estimates correspond to reservation price paths that start
between e84 (for γ = −0.153) and e87 (for γ = 0.093). That is, only the following search
rules are relevant: {tX84, ..., tX87} for X ∈ {1, 2}.
Loss attitude: The estimated λx-values lie in the interval [0.5, 20], see table 2. This cor-
responds to reservation price paths that start between e83 (for λ = 0.5) and e98 (for
λ = 20).23 From the universe of search rules, the following rules apply: {tX83, ..., tX94}
for X = 3.
The first finding from this descriptive analysis is: The variance in the degree of curvature
of the utility function is not sufficient to explain the heterogeneity in the observed search
behavior. As figure 6 (see appendix) suggests and I have already argued, the complete
universe of search rules is needed but also sufficient to describe the search behavior of all
observed individuals. The second finding from the descriptive analysis is that although
the estimated loss aversion coefficients are generally compatible with a wider range of dif-
ferent search rules than the estimated risk aversion coefficients, the variation observed in
loss aversion is also not sufficient to capture the observed heterogeneity in search behavior.
Correlation Analysis
Table 5 reports the results of an investigation of the above mentioned hypotheses (H1)-
(H4) based on a rank correlation analysis between observed preference and search param-
eters. A clear pattern emerges: For the complete sample P , there are negative correla-
tions of marginal significance between most estimates for individual loss aversion and the
number of search steps (ss); this is consistent with (H1). In contrast, the estimates for
individual risk attitude are not correlated with the number of search steps.
For the subgroup PR, I find strong support for (H1): There are significantly negative cor-
relations between all estimates for individual loss aversion and the number of search steps
(ss). Additionally, results from these analyses support (H2): The estimates for individual
loss aversion derived from the lottery questions, λx, and the estimates derived from the
observed search behavior, λsearch, are correlated at the 10%-level (λ1 and λ10), or even at
the 5%-level (λ25, λ50, and λ100). For P
C , no significant correlations are found, suggesting
that none of the hypotheses (H3) and (H4) for this group is supported. The hypotheses
(H3) and (H4) are not supported by any of the considered subgroups either.
23 It was always the same subject who is responsible for the maximum value for λ in all five cases (see
table 2). Without this subject, reservation price paths between e83 and e95 would correspond to all
estimated λx-values.
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Table 5: Spearman correlations between preferences and search parameters for the
(sub)samples.
[P (106 individuals)]
Search steps (ss) λsearch αsearch γsearch
ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value
λ1 -0.10 0.29 0.04 0.65
λ10 -0.17 0.08 0.11 0.28
λ25 -0.17 0.08 0.08 0.39
λ50 -0.16 0.10 0.10 0.29
λ100 -0.16 0.10 0.11 0.28
α -0.02 0.87 0.03 0.78
γ -0.01 0.88 0.06 0.63
[ PR (39 individuals)]
Search steps (ss) λsearch αsearch γsearch
ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value
λ1 -0.32 0.05 0.28 0.09
λ10 -0.40 0.01 0.30 0.06
λ25 -0.40 0.01 0.30 0.05
λ50 -0.38 0.02 0.32 0.05
λ100 -0.41 0.01 0.33 0.04
α -0.10 0.56 0.00 1.00
γ 0.10 0.56 0.00 0.99
[ PC (67 individuals)]
Search steps (ss) λsearch αsearch γsearch
ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value ρ p-value
λ1 0.03 0.80 -0.09 0.48
λ10 -0.03 0.82 -0.01 0.95
λ25 -0.04 0.77 -0.04 0.75
λ50 -0.03 0.83 -0.01 0.91
λ100 -0.02 0.89 -0.02 0.90
α 0.07 0.55 0.03 0.81
γ -0.07 0.57 0.00 1.00
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Duration Analysis
A further analysis of the relationship between individual preferences and search dura-
tion controls for the simultaneous influence of risk and loss attitude on search behavior.
Furthermore, the inclusion of unobserved effects for each observed search round captures
possible behavioral differences that stem from the particular sequence of price draws
that the subjects face in each single round. The analysis also exploits the discrete time-
to-event-nature and multiple-spell-nature: The event is the stopping of the search, the
duration is measured discretely as the number of search steps, and 15 spells (= search
rounds) per subject were observed.
For one specific search round, let T ≥ 1 denote the search duration that has some distribu-
tion in the population. From the distribution function of T , I derive the hazard function
h0(t) for T . The discrete time hazard gives the probability of stopping the search in the
next time step, conditional on not having stopped so far:
h0(t) = P (T = t | T ≥ t) (22)
Assuming that the subjects in the population use a constant reservation price rule, the
hazard function h0(t) is constant. That is, the stopping events are generated from a
process without memory and h0(t) = h0, leading to a geometric duration distribution.
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To account for the finite horizon nature of the search problem (i.e., subjects stop their
search in time step 25 if they have not been successful until then), a piecewise constant
hazard function is used:
h0(t) =
{
h1 t < 25
h2 t = 25.
(23)
To investigate the hypotheses derived above, I test whether the hazard, i.e. the con-
ditional probability of stopping in the next time step, can be explained by individual
preference parameters. Therefore, two covariates X are used in the hazard function: one
covariate that characterizes risk attitude (α or γ) and one covariate characterizing loss
attitude (λ1, λ10, λ25, λ50, or λ100). The idea of a proportional hazard is adopted (i.e., the
conditional individual probability of stopping the search differs proportionately based on
a function of the covariates). For discrete time data, this leads to the complementary
log-logistic model (Clayton and Hills, 1993) and the discrete time hazard can be written
as:
hi(t,X) = 1− exp[−exp(β′Xi + δ1h1 + δ2h2)], (24)
where, i = 1,..., 106. β is a parameter vector, h1 and h2 characterize the baseline hazard.
24 The assumption of a constant hazard can be motivated based on theoretical deliberations and based
on the empirical finding that non-constant reservation price paths did not perform significantly better
than constant reservation price paths in the classification procedure. Please see the appendix, section
8.4, for a discussion of the constant hazard assumption.
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Table 6: Duration analysis. Estimation results for various preference specifications and
(sub)samples. I use two covariates in each duration regression: One covariate for loss atti-
tude (λ1, λ10, λ25, λ50, or λ100) and one covariate for risk attitude (α or γ). That is, for each
considered sample, 10 duration regressions are presented.
[ P (106 individuals)]
CRRA CARA
Regressor Coefficient p-value Regressor Coefficient p-value
λ1 0.02 0.08 λ1 0.02 0.07
α 0.02 0.73 γ -0.59 0.34
λ10 0.02 0.04 λ10 0.02 0.03
α 0.04 0.57 γ -0.76 0.23
λ25 0.02 0.03 λ25 0.02 0.02
α 0.02 0.75 γ -0.69 0.28
λ50 0.02 0.04 λ50 0.03 0.02
α 0.02 0.77 γ -0.68 0.28
λ100 0.02 0.12 λ100 0.02 0.11
α 0.02 0.74 γ -0.58 0.35
[ PR (39 individuals)]
CRRA CARA
Regressor Coefficient p-value Regressor Coefficient p-value
λ1 0.07 0.01 λ1 0.07 0.01
α 0.17 0.28 γ -1.67 0.15
λ10 0.09 0.00 λ10 0.09 0.00
α 0.18 0.26 γ -1.80 0.12
λ25 0.14 0.00 λ25 0.14 0.00
α 0.20 0.21 γ -1.91 0.11
λ50 0.09 0.01 λ50 0.09 0.01
α 0.15 0.35 γ -1.61 0.16
λ100 0.04 0.09 λ100 0.04 0.08
α 0.18 0.26 γ -1.72 0.14
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[ PC (67 individuals)]
CRRA CARA
Regressor Coefficient p-value Regressor Coefficient p-value
λ1 0.02 0.17 λ1 0.02 0.18
α -0.02 0.83 γ 0.11 0.89
λ10 0.02 0.17 λ10 0.02 0.18
α 0.00 1.00 γ -0.09 0.91
λ25 0.02 0.09 λ25 0.02 0.10
α -0.01 0.94 γ -0.04 0.96
λ50 0.02 0.08 λ50 0.02 0.08
α -0.01 0.94 γ -0.06 0.94
λ100 0.03 0.12 λ100 0.03 0.13
α -0.01 0.86 γ 0.10 0.90
Now, recall that every subject had to play 15 search rounds. All prices were drawn
from a uniform distribution. The series of price draws are different across rounds but
they are identical across individuals. Therefore, I expect an unobserved effect for each
search round. To account for this unobserved heterogeneity, a random effect that is com-
mon to all observations from a certain search round j (j = 1, ..., 15) is included. The
following model is considered:
hi,j(t,X) = 1− exp[−exp(β′Xi + δ1h1 + δ2h2 + uj)] (25)
where uj is supposed to be normally distributed with mean zero.
Table 6 presents estimation results for the complete sample and for the subgroups. In all
estimations a likelihood ratio test suggests that the included unobserved effect is highly
statistically significant. For the complete sample of subjects, P , (H1) is supported: An
increase in individual loss aversion is related to a significant increase in the conditional
probability of stopping the search, i.e. to a decrease in search duration. This effect
is significant at the 5%-level for λ10, λ25, and λ50; it is marginally significant for λ1,
regardless of the specification of the risk attitude coefficient (α or γ). In all specifications,
risk attitude has no significant explanatory power for search duration.
Considering the subsample PR, even stronger support for (H1) is found: Apart from λ100,
all estimates for individual loss aversion have explanatory power for search duration at
least at the 2%-significance level. Again, individual risk attitude is always insignificant.
In the subgroup PC , no preference parameter has significant explanatory power. I have
performed all analyses presented in table 6 including higher order terms of the risk and
loss aversion measures in order to test for possible nonlinear relationships. The same
conclusions as those reported above are obtained. While the risk attitude terms are never
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jointly significant, the loss attitude terms are jointly significant in the same cases as
reported in table 6.25
According to the analyses presented above, all estimated loss attitude coefficients have
better explanatory power for individual search behavior than the estimated risk atti-
tude coefficients, which are insignificant in all analyses, regardless of whether CARA- or
CRRA-specifications of the utility function are considered. The findings concerning the
explanatory power of loss aversion do not hold for the subgroup PC , but they are very
strong for the subgroup PR, suggesting that members of the two groups behave differently
when “solving” the search task.
6 Discussion
This paper focuses on the development and experimental testing of various search models,
in particular the reference point model (rp-model). The results suggest that the rp-model
is similar to EU-based models in its predictions about reservation price paths, but it is
better than EU-based models in reconciling the experimental data on individual prefer-
ences with the data on individual search behavior. Combined with established empirical
results on individual preferences (such as the empirical distribution of loss aversion in
a population, see, e.g., Johnson et al., 2006; Pennings and Smidts, 2003; Schmidt and
Traub, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the rp-model is consistent with existing
findings on search behavior, for example the large heterogeneity of search rules and the
predominance of early-stopping in the population (Cox and Oaxaca, 1989; Hey, 1987;
Sonnemans, 1998).
To further investigate individual heterogeneity, I hypothesize that at least a specific sub-
group, PR, of the subjects uses the proposed rp-model. Since identification of this sub-
group – merely based on the observed search behavior of subjects – is in practice not
possible, the subgroup PR is identified with the help of the search-model question. Un-
der the assumption that subjects understand this question correctly and that they are
able to relate this question to their actual search behavior, the question is likely to be
an instrument for dividing the complete sample into the particular subgroups PR and
PC . The main empirical result of this paper – namely that individual loss aversion is
systematically related to search behavior, whereas risk aversion is not related to search
behavior – is independent of this search-model question. Nevertheless, all specific results
concerning the subgroup differences in search behavior are built on the assumption that
information obtained in this question is valid.
Several issues have to be kept in mind when interpreting the results from this study. First,
the presented experimental setup is based on one specific search environment which is
25 The robustness of the results from the duration analysis has been checked further. Please see the
appendix, section 8.4, for a brief discussion of different specifications of the duration model.
28
characterized by the price distribution, the search cost, and the option to recall previously
rejected offers. It is conceivable that subjects behave differently in a different search
environment (e.g., in an environment, in which the price distribution is not known).
In particular, the effect of loss aversion on search behavior might become more or less
pronounced if higher losses (i.e., higher search cost) are involved. In the context of a search
environment with a considerably longer time between the search steps, the observed effect
of loss aversion might rather be called an endowment effect (Huck et al., 2005; Kahneman
et al., 1991): If a person holds an object that she may keep for sure for a certain time, she
might consider this object as an endowment, and the next step in the search is evaluated
only relative to this endowment.
A further issue to be addressed is the recall option of the search task. To my knowledge,
no search model or rule that explicitly predicts the recall option has been investigated in
the literature so far; the rp-model is not able to predict recall decisions either. Indeed,
2.4% of all stop-or-go decisions in the sample are decisions to stop and recall a price that
had been rejected in an earlier search step.
Finally, a limitation is the linearity assumption of the reference point model. This as-
sumption was introduced in order to reduce the reference point model to one underly-
ing preference parameter which can be identified with a standard experimental lottery
method. While this assumption is critical since it essentially “assumes away” that the
curvatures of u+(·) and u−(·) are a potential explanation for the observed effect, the re-
laxation of this assumption would not compromise the key empirical finding of this study,
namely that the observed tradeoff between gains and losses – measured at five different
values – is related to search characteristics such as search duration. However, a design
that is preferable from a theoretical point of view would avoid relying on measures of
loss aversion, and would instead elicit the complete utility function (i.e., on gains and
losses), estimate an appropriate functional form (that does not impose risk neutrality) for
every individual, and then investigate the relationship between each individuals’ utility
function and her decision rule, based on a reference point model that does not impose risk
neutrality. Ideally, in a nested modeling framework, the question would then be whether
the combination of a gain and loss utility function (u+(·) and u−(·)) is better able to
explain observed search behavior than the restriction to only a utility function on gains,
u+(·). Of course, this would require a more involved econometric methodology, as well as
a more complicated experimental design. The separate elicitation of a utility function on
gains and on losses is not sufficient, since this does not allow for estimating the tradeoff
between gains and losses; subjects would have to answer many more lottery questions
than in the current experimental design, both mixed lotteries as well as pure lotteries in
the gain and in the loss domain.
A further way to improve in particular the statistical methodology of the paper is to
model the joint distribution of individual preference parameters (estimated in the lottery
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part) and decision rules (obtained from the search task) in a full maximum likelihood
framework; this is one way to put more structure on the analysis and to be able to
account for decision errors.
It remains unclear whether these modifications in the experimental design and the statisti-
cal methodology would substantially alter the key finding from this study: Five measures
that capture the tradeoff between gain and loss outcomes in a lottery are significantly
related to characteristics of human search behavior, although the design of the search
experiment prevented the subjects from making any loss during the search task. In con-
trast, measures of the tradeoff between lotteries that involve only gains are not related to
characteristics of search behavior.
In sum, the analyses lend support to the claim that subjects use different strategies when
“solving” the search task. The contribution of this paper is to combine information on
sequential decision behavior and on individual preferences and to investigate correlations
at the subject level. I do not find evidence supporting the classical EU-based search
models in the sample. Controlling for the effect of risk attitude, I do, however, obtain
support for the hypothesis that loss aversion is related to search behavior.
There are two principal explanations for these findings: First, loss aversion could simply be
measured better than risk aversion, and would therefore be a better explanatory variable.
This explanation is in line with Rabin (2000), who provides theoretical arguments that
loss aversion can account better for observed decision behavior over modest stakes than
the standard notion of risk aversion. A second explanation, which is in line with results
on myopic loss aversion in dynamic decision tasks, such as stock market decisions (e.g.,
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), is that people set reference points during their search. It is
important to note that no direct empirical support for the specific reference point updating
assumption that underlies the presented form of the reference point model can be found.
The observed relationship between loss aversion and search behavior is also consistent
with subjects that set one constant utility reference point at a payoff higher than e0
and evaluate the outcomes during the search relative to this fixed reference point. This
explanation cannot be rejected by the experimental data, but from a behavioral point of
view there is no argument that would favor this model over the reference point model
that is developed in this paper.
7 Conclusions
Subjects are heterogeneous with respect to their sequential decision behavior. Using data
obtained in a controlled laboratory experiment that involved a search task as a simple
representative of sequential decision situations, I have shown that – to some extent – this
heterogeneity can be linked to heterogeneity in individual preferences.
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Considering the entire sample, I found that the answers to simple lottery questions that
involve gains and losses, combined with a standard parametric assumption for the identi-
fication of a loss aversion index, had significant explaining power for observed sequential
decision behavior. In contrast, the answers to lottery questions that involve only gains
had no explaining power – regardless of whether a CARA or a CRRA specification was
assumed. I consider this as evidence that loss aversion was systematically related to
search behavior, while risk attitude was not related to search behavior. The experimental
design idea of the test for loss aversion was straightforward: Subjects were not given a
show-up fee such that no reference point was induced and all outcomes of the sequential
decision task were only realized in the positive domain, i.e. the experience of losses was
avoided. Given this design, the findings suggest that people set utility reference points
during their search relative to which they evaluate potential future outcomes. Overall,
the proposed reference point search model describes observed behavior better than search
models derived from expected utility theory.
To further investigate heterogeneity in search behavior, the answer to a question on search
behavior was used as an instrument to subdivide the sample into two subgroups. It is
found that for the subjects from one subgroup, PC , there was no relationship between
individual preferences and search behavior. However, for the other subgroup, PR, individ-
ual preferences and search behavior were strongly related in a way that is consistent with
the predictions of the reference point model. This means, in addition to heterogeneity
in individual preferences, there might also be heterogeneity in the way people solve the
search task: Some people set reference points in sequential decision tasks, while others do
not set reference points. The two subgroups of the sample use different models for solving
the search task, and with the help of an instrument to separate these two subgroups,
individual search behavior is predictable to a certain degree, provided that information
on individual preferences, specifically on loss aversion, is available.
I have discussed that an alternative explanation for the observed effect is that loss aversion
can simply be measured better than risk aversion. However, the fact that about a third
of the subjects answered to the search-model question that they think about losses when
doing the search task as well as findings in other studies about decision-making in dynamic
choice tasks (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Odean, 1998), are further evidence that loss
aversion and reference point setting might indeed play a role for many people in sequential
decision situations. The finding that people set reference points in sequential decision
tasks is of interest for recent theoretical and applied research in many fields, e.g., decision
theory, marketing science (Zwick et al., 2003), labor economics (Eckstein and van den
Berg, 2006), and finance (Gneezy, 2003).
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8 Appendix
8.1 Graphical Presentation of the Lotteries on the Computer Screen
Figure 5: Graphical presentation of the lotteries on the computer screen.
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8.2 On the Function p(x,mt, t) in the RP-Model
The form of the rp-payoff-function p(x,mt, t) becomes clear under a rigorous case differ-
entiation with respect to possible price draws. q(·) and v(·) are defined as in section 2.3,
i.e.
q(y) =
{
q(y) = y y ≥ 0
0 y < 0
(26)
v(y) =
{
v(y) = y y ≥ −c
0 y < −c (27)
The following cases are possible:
Case 1
The price draw is better than the best price in hand minus the search cost: x < mt − c
• mt ≥ 100− c · t
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = 100− c · t− x− c = q(100− c · t− x− c)
• mt < 100− c · t
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = mt − x− c = v(mt − x− c)
Case 2
The price draw is worse than the best price in hand minus the search cost: x ≥ mt − c
• mt ≥ 100− c · t
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = 0 = q(100− c · t− x− c)
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• mt < 100− c · t
• mt − c ≤ x ≤ mt
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = mt − x− c = v(mt − x− c)
• mt < x
• mt ≤ 100− c · t− c
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = −c = v(mt − (100− c · t))
• mt > 100− c · t− c
⇒ p(x,mt, t) = mt − (100− c · t) = v(mt − (100− c · t))
8.3 Details on Search Behavior
Descriptive Findings
In total, 8532 stop-or-go-decisions were observed in the experiment. The mean number of
search steps for all 15 search rounds was 80.5, with a minimum of 49 steps, a maximum
of 135 steps and a standard deviation of 18.1 steps. The mean number of search steps
per search round was 5.4, with a minimum of 1, a maximum of 25 and with a standard
deviation of 3.4 steps. The mean number of search steps was significantly lower than the
expected number of search rounds under the assumption of risk neutrality: The expected
number of search rounds for an individual that uses the forward optimal search rule (i.e.,
a constant reservation price of e86) is 6.3 steps. Under a finite horizon model, 7.2 steps
are expected. Figure 6 shows the distribution of constant reservation price rules in the
sample, conditional on the assumption that all subjects use such a rule.
Classification of Search Behavior
This brief section presents some results of the classification procedure:
If the universe of search rules is limited to the 17 type-1-rules – the constant reservation
price rules – 92.8% of all observed stop-or-go-decisions can be explained. When limited
to the type-2-rules, 93.0% are explained under the CARA-specification and 92.7% under
the CRRA-specification. Finally, the type-3-rules explain 92.8% of all decisions. Under
the CARA-specification, all 3 decision rules (type-1, type-2, and type-3) explain observed
behavior equally well for 83 (78%) of the subjects (i.e., I cannot discriminate between the
3 rule types for 83 subjects). Under the CRRA-specification, all 3 decision rules (type-1,
type-2, and type 3) explain observed behavior equally well for 89 (84%) of the subjects.
In this context, it is important to note that the main purpose of the classification method
is not to determine a minimal universe of decision rules that best describes the behavior
of all subjects in the sample but to estimate the preference parameters that best describe
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Figure 6: Imposing a constant reservation price rule on every subject, I obtain the following
distribution of constant reservation price rules in the sample. The lowest observed reservation
price is e78, the highest reservation price is e94.
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observed search behavior. Therefore, the encountered problems of over-fitting, reflected
in the lack of discrimination between different search rules, are not a problem for the
analysis presented in this paper. In that, the presented method is akin to estimating
other preference parameters from experimental data.26
The findings presented here have again made clear that it is impossible to attribute search
models to the subjects merely based on their revealed search behavior unless we have much
more observations per subject; i.e., discrimination across search rule types is infeasible.
Since I can clearly discriminate within a certain rule-type – i.e., I can discriminate be-
tween, e.g., rule t1p and rule t1q (for p, q ∈ {78, ..., 94} and p 6= q) – I am able to attribute
preference parameters (risk or loss attitude, depending on the search model) to the sub-
jects.
8.4 On the Duration Analysis
The Assumption of a Constant Hazard
The main motivation for the constant hazard assumption is the finding in section 5.2 and
further detailed in the appendix (section 8.3) that a discrimination between the different
search rule-types is hardly possible, since all search rules have a similar rate of consistency
26 Schunk and Winter (2004) use the same classification procedure. More sophisticated statistical meth-
ods for the joint determination of the universe of decision rules and the classification of decision rules
that allow for errors are used by Houser and Winter (2004) and Houser et al. (2004).
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with the observed search behavior. It follows that the assumption of a constant reservation
price, that is a type-1-rule, is generally a good proxy for the observed search behavior. A
constant reservation price, in turn, implies a constant hazard in the duration model, as
the reservation price path is interpreted as a hazard function in a duration model.
A glance at figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 reveals that all of the rules in the universe of search
rules consist of an initial part that has a constant reservation price. What rule is least
consistent with the assumption of a constant reservation price that is used for the duration
analysis? Figure 3 reveals that if a subject uses a CARA-finite horizon rule and if the
subject is very risk averse, it might be using the worst rule in terms of consistency with
the constant hazard assumption. The subject might then have a reservation price of e94
at t = 1 and t = 2, and the price starts falling already from t = 3 on. The probability that
this individual does not search for more than two steps is 1 − (1− 20
76
)2 ≈ 46%. That is,
even in this “worst case”, the constant hazard assumption is correct in 46% of all cases,
and this “worst case” characterizes only very few subjects, as figure 6 reveals.
Since a certain reservation price path in figure 1, 2, 3, or 4 can be interpreted as the
hazard function of the particular individual that is using the corresponding search rule,
a modeling approach that is nonparametric concerning the individual hazard function
would effectively require the identification of reservation price paths. With the data at
hand, this is practically impossible without further restrictions on the hazard function,
given the identification problems encountered in section 4.3, which stem from the low
number of observations per subject.
Robustness
Various alternative specifications for the duration model have been considered:
(a) It is tempting to include a random effect for each subject instead of including an
effect for each search round. In this specification the unobserved effect term is highly
insignificant. However, all results presented in this paper also hold in this specification,
although in some cases they are statistically weaker.
(b) If the unobserved effect is left out from the estimated model, results are obtained
that are virtually identical with results that are obtained based on the random effect
specification for each subject (see specification (a) above).
(c) The hazard h1 is highly significant in all estimations, but the drop-out term h2 for
time-step 25 is in general not significant, suggesting a specification without h2 (i.e., a
constant hazard instead of a piecewise constant hazard). All results are very similar to
those reported in the paper; the effect of the loss aversion coefficient on search duration
is even stronger than in the results reported in the paper.
In sum, the findings from alternative specifications support the conclusions that are drawn
in this paper.
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 What Determines the Saving Behavior of German Households? 
An Examination of Saving Motives and Saving Decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Many motives for saving a portion of one’s income co-exist and their relative 
importance changes over the life-cycle. This paper is concerned with linking heterogeneity 
in household saving behavior to four co-existing saving motives. First, I find that the 
importance that households attach to the saving motives is related to how much 
households save at different life stages. Second, I classify the saver type of the households 
based on whether they engage in regular savings plans, or rather save irregularly and 
without a savings plan. I find that saving motives are related to the saver type of the 
household. The results show that heterogeneity with respect to the saving rate and the 
saver type – which has been emphasized in recent studies – is systematically related to the 
importance that households attach to different saving motives. This suggests that policy 
reforms that substantially change the importance of certain saving motives in the eyes of 
private households might alter household saving behavior in various ways. 
 
 
 2
1 Introduction 
For a typical household, many different considerations influence saving decisions over the 
life-cycle. For example, households save to finance consumption after retirement. They 
save in order to insure against various economic, biometric, and political risks that they 
are exposed to over the life-cycle. Households might also engage in saving for supporting 
their children or grandchildren, e.g. during their education, or for leaving a bequest to 
them. Finally, many households are interested in saving for purchasing real estate at some 
point in their life. Many of these considerations and circumstances imply explicit saving 
targets and they require specific forms of saving, such as long-term and planned saving for 
retirement. 
Briefly, various saving motives co-exist over the life-cycle, and different motives 
might be associated with different forms of saving. Understanding what motives drive 
saving behavior over different stages of the life-cycle and how the relative contribution of 
these motives changes over the life-cycle will help us to understand differences in saving 
rates among households as well as past and future trends in saving behavior. As 
underlined by various authors (e.g., Börsch-Supan and Lusardi, 2003), this understanding 
is of utmost policy relevance, since reforms of the social security systems directly interact 
with household saving as a private insurance. E.g., the currently ongoing reform of the 
German pension system is essentially concerned with the trade-off between public and 
private old-age saving: The reform moves the rather monolithical and very generous 
system that provides almost all retirement income within a single public pay-as-you-go-
framework to a three-pillar system, in which private and occupational pensions will have 
an increasingly important role. Accordingly, the importance of private saving for old age 
has increased in recent years. Understanding the motives for private saving is also 
important from the perspective of taxation: For instance, the taxation of bequests and 
inheritances is non-distortionary if intergenerational transfers are accidental but may have 
efficiency costs if bequests are intentional (see, e.g., Bernheim, 2002). In summary, 
private saving is an important determinant of household economic security as well as 
social and economic well-being.  
 The point of departure of this paper – the observation that co-existing motives 
determine saving behavior – is an idea that goes back to Keynes (1936). While there is an 
extensive body of empirical literature on saving motives, which I review briefly in a later 
section, only few empirical studies take into account that different saving motives co-exist 
over the life-cycle; most studies focus on only one motive and make simplifying 
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assumptions about the other motives such that those can be relegated to the background. A 
consistent finding in the literature is that there is considerable heterogeneity in household 
saving behavior, a point that is emphasized by numerous authors, e.g., Alessie et al. 
(1997), Browning and Lusardi (1996), and Kurz (1985). In addition, many studies 
recognize explicitly that the contributions of saving motives to household saving might 
change over the life-cycle (e.g., Horioka and Wanatabe, 1997; Kennickell and Lusardi, 
2005). So far, however, there has been only little interest in the investigation of how co-
existing saving motives whose contribution might change over stages of the life-cycle help 
to explain the observed heterogeneity in how much households save. This shortcoming is 
criticized by, e.g., Alessie and Lusardi (1997), Samwick (2006) and Wärneryd (1999, p. 
264). Furthermore, extending the vast literature that seeks to explain how much 
households save, a recently emerging literature emphasizes heterogeneity in the extent to 
which households plan their saving or choose specific forms of saving, such as savings 
plans (e.g., Ameriks et al., 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006; Sourdin, 2005). While 
Ameriks et al. (2003) relate heterogeneity in the propensity to plan to the general 
household budgeting behavior as well to a household’s general attitudes and skills, 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) and Sourdin (2005) focus on planning and old-age provision. 
Overall, recent findings, obtained from studies that mostly focus on one specific saving 
motive, suggest that the heterogeneity in household socio-economic characteristics, in 
household preferences, and in household saving motives is associated with heterogeneity 
in saving behavior with respect to two – not necessarily independent – dimensions, 
namely how much households save and whether they plan their saving. 
This paper focuses on the question to what extent heterogeneity in saving behavior 
can be explained by the importance that households attach to four potentially co-existing 
saving motives: The old-age provision motive, the precautionary motive, the bequest 
motive, and the motive to purchase a house (henceforth: housing motive). The paper finds 
that the importance attached to certain saving motives is related to heterogeneity in each of 
the two dimensions of saving behavior. More specifically, the paper first estimates the 
relationship between the saving motives and the saving rate. I find that information on 
saving motives is related to the household saving rate, and that the relative contribution of 
the saving motives to household saving changes over age classes. Second, the paper 
investigates whether saving motives help to explain what type of savers households are, 
e.g., whether they engage in regular savings plans, or rather save irregularly and without a 
savings plan. I find evidence for a relationship between the information on certain saving 
 4
motives and the saver type of the households, i.e. the households’ propensity to plan their 
saving. 
To identify which of the saving motives are operative I use explicit data, i.e. answers 
to survey questions about the importance that households attach to the considered saving 
motives, henceforth referred to as “subjective” measures.1 On the one hand, subjective 
measures can generally be criticized for being more prone to misreporting than other 
measures, for instance in the case when certain answers are socially desired. Furthermore, 
in the specific context of this paper the reported saving motives themselves can cause 
estimation bias since they are endogenous to the saving behavior of households. On the 
other hand, the subjective measures used in this study have considerable advantages: First, 
their cognitive burden is very low and the item nonresponse rate is negligible. Second, 
they provide an alternative way to measure the strength of the precautionary motive, 
which does not restrict attention to income risk only – a limitation in existing studies of 
precautionary saving that is criticized in the literature (e.g., Hurst et al., 2005).2 The 
subjective measure for the strength of the precautionary motive that is considered in this 
study includes other risks, such as health risks, longevity risk, and interest rate risk.3  
Overall, the paper presents empirical evidence that the importance that households 
attach to various saving motives is associated with observed saving behavior. The findings 
suggest that policy reforms that substantially change the importance of certain saving 
motives in the eyes of private households might indeed alter household saving behavior in 
various ways and with differential effects over households’ life stages. 
                                                 
1 Subjective data on saving motives have been used in existing studies. For example, information about 
bequest intentions has been used to learn about the existence of a bequest motive in studies by Alessie et al. 
(1999), Jürges (2001), and by Mirer (1979); Essig (2005b) studies the precautionary motive. Alessie and 
Kapteyn (2001) provide a detailed discussion about the usefulness of subjective data in research on saving 
behavior.  
2 The theory of precautionary saving predicts that households with higher income risk have higher 
accumulation, and most studies investigate the relationship between a measure for income risk and a stock or 
flow measure of saving without considering or controlling for other sources of risk. Essig (2005b), Palumbo 
(1999), Carroll and Samwick (1997), and Kennickell and Lusardi (2005) are exceptions, they consider 
further sources of risk. 
3 Theoretical studies have shown the relevance of these risks for savings behavior, see, e.g., Yaari (1965) 
and Leung (1994) for uncertainty about lifetime. Palumbo (1999) presents a theoretical model that includes 
uncertainty about medical expenses – i.e., health risks – estimates its parameters based on data from the U.S. 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and finds that uncertain medical expenses represent an important 
motive for precautionary saving. 
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 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information 
on the data, describes how the principal variables used in this study are measured, and 
presents basic descriptive statistics. Section 3 provides an overview of studies on saving 
motives and saving behavior and relates the current paper and its empirical framework to 
the existing literature. In section 4, the empirical analysis of the relationship between 
information on saving motives, the saving rate, and household saver types is presented, 
and the findings are discussed. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
2.1 The SAVE Survey 
2.1.1 Overview 
Departing from the Dutch CentER Panel and the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
as an example, researchers of the University of Mannheim have cooperated with the 
Mannheim Center for Surveys, Methods and Analyses (ZUMA), TNS Infratest (Munich), 
Psychonomics (Cologne) and Sinus (Heidelberg) to produce a questionnaire on 
households' saving and asset choice. The SAVE dataset records detailed information on 
both, financial variables such as income, saving, and asset holdings as well as on 
sociological and psychological characteristics of households. Great care was taken that the 
interviewer talks to the member of the household who knows about income, wealth and 
saving behavior whom we henceforth refer to as the household head.  
2.1.2 The Sample 
A first wave of the SAVE study, which was based on quota sampling, was fielded in the 
summer of 2001. The findings from this study were used to investigate the impact of 
different survey modes on response behavior (see Essig and Winter, 2003). The next wave 
benefited from the methodological findings of the 2001 wave and was conducted in 
summer 2003. The 2003 wave, which is used for the analysis presented in this paper, is a 
random sample of 2184 households. 
The data universe for the SAVE 2003 random sample were all German speaking 
households in Germany with the households’ head being eighteen years and older. 
Interviewees were selected from a multiply stratified multistage random sample. All 
communities were segmented into stratifications by regional criteria. Stratification criteria 
were states (Bundeslaender), districts and community types. Further sampling details are 
presented in Heien and Kortmann (2003). 
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2.1.3 Data-Quality, Item Nonresponse, and Multiple Imputation 
Essig (2005a) discusses various methodological aspects of the SAVE dataset, in particular 
the questionnaire, interviewer and interviewee motivation, and the representativeness of 
the survey. He compares the 2003 random sample and the German microcensus 2002 with 
respect to the distributions of age, household net income, and household size, and he 
concludes that the SAVE random sample “fits the German microcensus extremely well”. 
He also confirms that various financial measures, such as income and financial wealth, are 
in line with findings from a related German survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel 
2003 (GSOEP). Finally, Essig concludes that unit and item nonresponse rates are very 
similar to related other surveys in Germany or other countries.  
 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the random sample of 2184 households. 
Characteristic (%)
18-34 21.4
35-49 29.7
50-64 23.7
65+ 25.2
Currently married 59.7
Previously married 20.9
Not married 19.4
Haupt-/Volksschule or below 40.9
Mittlere Reife, Fachhochschulreife 37.8
Allgemeine/fachgebundene Hochschulreife 21.3
Employment Status
Retired 35.2
Blue collar 16.0
White collar 22.6
Civil servant 4.2
Self-employed 6.0
Unemployed 7.0
Education/Apprenticeship/Military service/Parental leave 9.0
0 24.5
1 22.0
2 32.2
3 13.4
4+ 7.9
Number of children
Age
Marital Status
Education
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Item nonresponse to sensitive questions about household financial circumstances is 
documented and discussed in Essig and Winter (2003) and in Schunk (2006). To prevent 
biased inference based on an analysis of only complete cases, an iterative multiple 
imputation procedure has been applied to the SAVE data (Schunk, 2006). Multiple 
imputation simulates the distribution of missing data and allows for a more realistic 
assessment of variances in subsequent analyses than single imputation. The procedure 
uses a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo method to replace missing data by draws from an 
estimate of the conditional distribution of the data. The multiple imputation algorithm 
generates five data sets with all missing values replaced by imputed values. For all 
descriptive statistics and all estimation results presented in this paper, the five imputed 
datasets are analyzed separately, and the results of the five analyses are then combined 
based on methods derived by Rubin (1987). The use of these methods assures that the 
missing data uncertainty is reflected in all findings presented in this paper. 
2.2 Basic Demographic Characteristics 
Table 1 shows basic demographic characteristics of the households in the 2003 random 
sample. Statistics concerning the age, marital status, number of children, education, and 
employment status of the household head are tabulated. Table 1 and all other statistics and 
estimations presented in this paper are not weighted. 
2.3 Measuring Household Saving Behavior 
2.3.1 Saving Motives 
The SAVE survey asks directly about saving motives. Households are asked how 
important they rate the considered saving motives in their own view. Each reason for 
saving has to be rated on a scale from 0 (“of absolutely no importance”) to 10 (“of highest 
importance”). To mitigate interpersonal differences in the response behavior to this 
question, a common approach is to classify the answers on a more coarse symmetric scale: 
All answers from 0 to 3 are in the lowest category (which I denote as “unimportant”), 
answers from 4 to 6 are in the middle category (“important”), and answers from 7 to 10 
are in the highest category (“very important”).  
Table 2 shows the distribution of the answers across the four age classes that are 
considered in this study. Many households rate "saving as a precaution" and "saving for 
old age" as very important motives, whereas the bequest and the housing motive are 
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overall of much less importance in all age classes.4 These findings are in line with findings 
in Alessie et al. (1999) which are based on an analysis of binary measured saving motives.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the question about households’ saving motives. 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
All 22% 19% 59% 14% 24% 62%
<35 20% 21% 59% 15% 25% 60%
35-49 14% 20% 66% 11% 27% 62%
50-64 20% 13% 67% 14% 22% 64%
≥65 35% 20% 45% 18% 21% 61%
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
All 49% 31% 20% 54% 10% 36%
<35 54% 26% 20% 34% 18% 48%
35-49 43% 38% 19% 48% 11% 41%
50-64 53% 30% 17% 61% 8% 31%
≥65 50% 28% 22% 71% 5% 24%
A
ge
Old-age provision motive Precautionary motive
A
ge
Bequest motive Housing motive
 
Note: (1) Unimportant, (2) Important, (3) Very important. 
 
2.3.2 Annual Saving 
After a number of questions that introduce to household finances and saving, respondents 
are directly asked for their saving in the previous year 2002 ("Can you tell me how much 
money you and your partner saved in total in the year 2002?"). Households that did not 
have any positive saving marked that they had zero saving or dipped into their saving; i.e., 
the answers are left-censored at zero. Repayments of all recorded types of housing debt 
(excluding the interest paid) are then added in order to obtain a measure for active saving 
                                                 
4 In this paper, the measure for the bequest motive captures the intention to leave assets to heirs after death 
and the intention to transfer money to children or grandchildren inter vivos (see, e.g., Reil-Held, 2006). The 
measure is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the importance ratings to the question about “leaving 
bequests to children/grandchildren” and the question about “support/education of children/grandchildren”. 
The scale is classified from 1 to 3 after computing the arithmetic mean. The conclusions from this study do 
not change, if I only use the classical bequest motive without inter vivos transfers. This suggests that saving 
for education/support of children/grandchildren alone is not a very important saving motive in Germany. 
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in 2002.5,6 This study is concerned with the relationship between saving motives and 
active saving decisions, therefore, any passive saving flows are not taken into account in 
the considered saving measure.7  
Figure 1 shows the mean and quartile saving rates for the 2003 cross section in each 
of the age classes that are considered in this study. The cross-sectional data exhibit two 
main features that are broadly in line with findings by Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) based on 
cross-sections of the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) in various years: 
First, the saving rate has a hump shape and, second, median saving rates are positive even 
for elderly respondents. The appendix gives further information on the distribution of 
wealth and income across age classes in the SAVE sample.  
 
Figure 1: Mean and median saving rates for different age classes, SAVE 2003. 
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Note: Data points are connected to facilitate readability 
                                                 
5 Household saving(s) can be measured and defined in different ways. For a discussion of micro data 
measures for household saving(s) and the corresponding statistical and methodological issues, see, e.g., 
Alessie et al. (1997), Börsch-Supan et al. (1999), Brugiavini and Weber (2003), and Kennickell and 
McManus (1994). 
6 For 98 households I find that the repayments of housing debt are positive while the answer to the direct 
saving question is zero. For these households, I count the repayments of housing debt as total active saving 
of the household. The conclusions from this study do not change if these 98 households are excluded from 
the analysis. 
7 First, note that this contains a behavioral assumption. Second, note that in the SAVE questionnaire, the 
question about the importance of saving motives is asked in the context of a series of questions about active 
saving decisions; that is, in this respect, the respondents are framed to think about active savings when they 
answer the questions about the importance of saving motives. 
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2.3.3 Saver Types 
SAVE elicits information on whether households save in a planned or regular manner, or 
whether households save irregularly and without a savings plan. The following question is 
asked: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Which sentence best describes the personal saving behavior of you and your partner? 
□ I/we save a fixed amount regularly, for instance in a savings plan, in a savings account, 
in shares or in a life insurance scheme.        [1] 
□ I/we put something aside each month, but I/we decide on the amount according to the 
 financial circumstances.            [2] 
□ I/we put something aside when I/we have something left over to save.    [3] 
□ I/we do not save because I/we do not have enough financial scope to do so.   [4] 
□ I/we do not save because I/we would prefer to enjoy life now.     [5] 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The questionnaire asks households explicitly to choose only the one behavioral 
pattern that characterizes best their behavior. Clearly, the fact that one of the categories 
has been chosen does not rule out that actual saving behavior is more complicated and 
consists of several patterns. Nevertheless, the answers to this question are informative 
concerning the predominant saving pattern of the household. According to the answers 
given to this question, I classify households into four different saver types: Households 
that plan their saving or engage in some sort of savings plan that is associated with fixed 
regular saving (category [1]); households that save regularly, but do not engage in a 
savings plan (category [2]); households that save irregularly (category [3]); and 
households that do not save (category [4] and [5] combined).  
Table 3 cross-tabulates the answers to this question with age classes and shows key 
financial statistics for each saver type. The table shows in particular that a very large 
proportion of households plans their saving and saves a fixed amount regularly. This 
proportion is significantly lower for households in the highest age class; further 
investigation reveals that there is also a significant difference between retired and non-
retired households. Furthermore, table 3 shows that the average saving rate is highest for 
the group of households that engages in fixed regular saving, and decreases across saver 
types. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on household saver types. 
All 35% 20% 21% 24%
<35 34% 14% 19% 33%
35-49 47% 16% 16% 21%
50-64 40% 18% 21% 21%
≥65 20% 32% 27% 21%
Mean saving rate 18.9% 15.2% 10.3% 1.7%
Std. err. 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.3%
Mean financial wealth [€] 40,147 25,050 16,749 9,895
Std. err. [€] 3,917 2,209 2,340 3,604
Mean total wealth [€] 201,074 187,800 114,104 75,635
Std. err. [€] 20,654 18,648 11,063 11,133
A
ge
Household Saver Type
1 2 3 4
Regular, planned Regular Irregular No saving
 
3 Saving Motives and Existing Literature 
In this section, the existing literature is discussed in the context of the four considered 
saving motives and it is then related to the study presented in this paper.  
Classical life-cycle theory goes back to Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and 
Friedman (1957) and derives consumption and saving behavior from a well-defined 
intertemporal optimization problem that assumes rational and forward-looking agents who 
face a deterministic income path and smooth the utility of consumption over their life-
cycle. Under standard assumptions about the utility function and combined with the fact 
that income is usually substantially lower after retirement than before, classical life-cycle 
theory thereby essentially captures an old-age provision motive. While the original 
intuition of the classical life-cycle model – that households save during their working 
years to accumulate assets which they use to sustain consumption after they retire – has 
been confirmed by numerous empirical studies over the years, there is also vast evidence 
that a large fraction of elderly households do not use up their wealth as predicted by the 
classical model; Mirer (1980) and Menchick and David (1983), for instance, are among 
the earliest of these studies. Alessie et al. (1999) show in a panel study that many elderly 
households even continue to accumulate wealth. 
The basic model has been extended to include specific saving motives. To present an 
extension that includes a precautionary saving motive, I follow the prominent example of 
Carroll (1992, 1997). Consider a household who faces a risky labor income path and 
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maximizes the discounted value of future utility from consumption up to time T, his time 
of death: 
∑
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The household faces an intertemporal budget constraint: 
1
)(1 ++−=+ tYCXRX ttt . (2) 
And the household faces a borrowing constraint: 
         0≥− tt CX for all t. (3) 
Here,  tC is consumption,  tX is cash-on-hand at the beginning of the period,  tY is labor 
income which is assumed to follow a stochastic path,  tβ is the subjective discount rate, 
and  R is the constant gross interest rate. 
This model illustrates that, in the absence of complete insurance, expected shocks in 
disposable income lead prudent agents to save for smoothing the consumption path; i.e. 
under the given assumptions, savings do not only serve to finance consumption after 
retirement but also to insure households against income shocks. Simulations of (partially) 
calibrated versions (and various extensions) of the model predict that savings for 
precautionary motives can explain a large share of total wealth accumulation (see, e.g., 
Caballero, 1991; Carroll, 1997; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). Most of the empirical work 
on precautionary saving focuses on income risk as the origin for precautionary wealth 
accumulation and estimates the relationship between various measures for income risk and 
wealth accumulation. Evidence on the precautionary motive based on micro data yields 
mixed results and ranges from little or no evidence (e.g., Guiso et al., 1992; Skinner, 
1988) to evidence for substantial precautionary accumulation (e.g., Carroll and Samwick, 
1998; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). In the context of this variety which might be due to 
numerous reasons such as country and measurement differences, two shortcomings of 
existing studies are being emphasized in the recent literature. First, Fuchs-Schündeln and 
Schündeln (2005) who find considerable precautionary savings in Germany based on data 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), argue that the extreme differences 
observed in existing empirical studies of precautionary saving might stem from the fact 
that many empirical studies fail to control for self-selection into occupations, since they do 
not include measures for the risk attitude of the households. Second, it is argued that the 
total amount of saving for precautionary accumulation might have been underestimated 
because risks other than income risks are not considered in most studies (e.g., Hurst et al., 
2005; Kennickell and Lusardi, 2005). The present empirical study intends to circumvent 
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the former shortcoming by including a measure for risk attitude in the multivariate 
estimation framework; the latter shortcoming is approached by using a measure for the 
importance of the precautionary motive that does not restrict attention to income risk only.  
The basic version of the life-cycle hypothesis has also been extended to include a 
housing motive. Extensions that include a housing motive have been analyzed 
theoretically by Artle and Varaiya (1978) and by Hayashi et al. (1988). They find that in a 
world with downpayment constraints, the desire to purchase a house leads to additional 
saving for the purpose of financing home purchase. Emphasizing the role of downpayment 
constraints in the Italian housing market, Guiso et al. (1994) present evidence from micro 
data that the desire to finance housing purchase has an effect on the consumption profile 
of Italian households. Similarly, Moriizumi (2003) uses household data to investigate the 
presence of a housing motive in Japan and reports that wealth accumulation for housing 
purchase increases household saving and suppresses consumption for younger households. 
The degree of housing financial market imperfections in Italy and Japan might play an 
important role for the estimated effects in those studies, but it should be noted that 
German housing markets are also far from being perfect (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003), 
suggesting that a housing motive might also have an effect on saving behavior in 
Germany. 
Parents might not only care about themselves but also about the well-being of their 
children. Hurd (1987) extends the life-cycle hypothesis such that it includes a bequest 
motive. Again, the evidence on the presence and strength of an altruistic bequest motive is 
mixed (see, e.g., Jürges (2001) and Reil-Held (1999) for an overview and examinations of 
the bequest motive with the German SOEP data). The observed positive saving rates 
among many elderly – which contradict the simple form of life-cycle theory – do not 
prove the existence of an altruistic bequest motive. Bequests might also be purely selfish 
or they might be accidental (see Hurd (1990) and Kotlikoff (2001) for reviews of related 
literature), in which case they might stem from, e.g., uncertainty about the time of death 
(e.g., Davies, 1981), or from an unanticipated lack of capacity to consume (Börsch-Supan, 
1992; Börsch-Supan and Stahl, 1991). Therefore, it is impossible to identify an operative 
bequest motive from saving rates or the shape of the wealth profile in the presence of co-
existing saving motives that a study does not control for. Since the present study includes 
explicit measures for the saving motives, it identifies whether there is an overall 
contribution of an intentional (vs. an accidental) bequest motive; it is not possible to 
identify the separate contributions of strategic vs. altruistic intentional bequests. 
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While the above-mentioned studies are representative of the vast literature that 
focuses on only one specific saving motive and estimates the contribution of one motive 
versus the potential contributions of all other motives, only few studies have focused on 
co-existing motives. An early series of these studies was inspired by Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1981) (and is reviewed in Kotlikoff (1988) and in Kessler and Masson (1989)) 
and has been explicitly interested in the relative contribution of co-existing motives to the 
stock of accumulated wealth. Three more recent empirical studies investigate the 
importance of various co-existing saving motives for the flow of household saving using 
micro data sets. First, Horioka and Wanatabe (1997) calculate the contribution of net 
saving to the flow of household saving for a large number of saving motives. They 
compute this contribution from direct questions about the hypothetical amount of current 
wealth that a household would hold for a specific motive, from questions about the 
household’s hypothetical wealth target for that motive, and from questions about the 
hypothetical number of years until the household’s planned realization date of that motive. 
Horioka and Watanabe find that the old-age provision motive, the precautionary motive 
and the housing motive are clearly the three most important motives in Japan. Second, in 
the context of a detailed analysis of wealth holdings, income and savings in the 
Netherlands, Alessie et al. (1997) report descriptive statistics on a set of binary questions 
on whether certain saving motives exist at different stages of the life-cycle. They find that 
the precautionary motive is the predominant motive over the life-cycle, a housing motive 
is indicated by many young households but only by few older households, saving for 
children is particularly important at older age, and the existence of an old-age provision 
motive is generally indicated by only very few households in the Netherlands. Third, 
Alessie et al. (1999) focus on saving after retirement and report descriptive statistics on 
subjective importance ratings of saving motives; they find that the precautionary motive is 
the most important motive among retired households.  
While these studies dealing with co-existing saving motives are based on descriptive 
statistics of survey questions concerning different saving motives, many studies that focus 
on one specific motive use multivariate reduced form models, in which the saving rate or 
accumulated household wealth is regressed on a number of socio-economic and financial 
household characteristics, and – if available – household preferences and expectations 
enter the equation additively (see, e.g., Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005; Kennickell 
and Lusardi, 2005). The present paper is also based on a reduced form equation for 
explaining saving behavior. While this assures comparability with a huge body of existing 
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work, it neglects that some regressors might be endogenous to the process of wealth 
formation; I present different specifications to show the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to the potential endogeneity of measures for household wealth. Generally, the 
selection of the included regressors is guided by extended versions of the classical life-
cycle model that emphasize the role of households’ expectations about the future (see, 
e.g., Lusardi, 1999).  
4 Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis consists of three parts. In the first subsection, the relationship 
between saving motives and the saving rate is investigated based on different 
specifications of a semiparametrically estimated saving regression. The second subsection 
uses an almost identical multivariate specification but is concerned with the association 
between co-existing saving motives and the saver type of the household based on a 
multinomial model. The last subsection discusses the findings. 
4.1 Saving Rate and Saving Motives 
The estimation is based on the following specification: 
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Here, S is annual household saving as described in section 2.3.2., I is net household 
income, and W is household financial wealth or household total wealth, depending on the 
specification that is used for the analysis. Z is a vector of household characteristics: age, 
age², age³ of the household head, her/his gender, household size, the number of children of 
the household head or family, homeownership, educational status, and various job 
characteristics. The variable riskpref captures self-assessed risk attitude of the household 
head. The inclusion of measures for expectations concerning the future has been motivated 
in a section above; equation (4) refers to the included controls, such as expectations about 
income uncertainty and about the future development of the German economic situation, 
as fut. Finally, motives stands for the measures for the four saving motives (see section 
2.3.1). These four measures are interacted with dummies for the four age classes (< 35 
years, 35-49 years, 50-64 years, ≥ 65 years) that are considered in this study. All included 
regressors are described in more detail in the appendix.8  
                                                 
8 To see that the findings concerning saving motives are meaningful, note also that in each single age class 
and for each considered saving motive, the importance ratings of the saving motives are non-degenerately 
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As is clear from section 2.3.2, the dependent variable in the saving regression is left-
censored at zero. A censored regression model is used to explain the saving rate y for all 
i = 1,..., N: 
)0,max(                     ,' ** iiiii yyXy =+= εβ  (5) 
Tobit estimates will generally be inconsistent if the error terms are heteroscedastic or non-
normal (e.g., Goldberger, 1983; Hurd, 1979). For all specifications that I consider, the 
assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality of the error term are rejected in the 
present censored model at the 5% level based on the corresponding Lagrange Multiplier 
tests for censored models (Chesher and Irish, 1987). I therefore use Powell's (1984) 
semiparametric censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) estimator, which is consistent 
and asymptotically normal even if errors are heteroscedastic. In contrast to the assumption 
of homoscedastic and normal errors, which is imposed in the Tobit model, CLAD imposes 
the following conditional median restriction: 
0)|( =ii XMed ε  (6) 
The CLAD-estimator requires the minimization of a nondifferentiable function, 
Buchinsky’s (1994) iterative linear programming algorithm (ILPA) is used. The properties 
of CLAD with respect to the degree of censoring and the sample size have been 
investigated in various simulation studies (Deaton, 1999; McDonald and Xu, 1996; 
Paarsch, 1984). Both the degree of censoring and the sample size of the considered 
estimation in this paper, fall well beyond the limits that are specified in those studies and 
therefore strongly advocate the use of the CLAD estimator rather than Tobit estimation. 
Standard errors for the CLAD estimates are computed using 150 bootstrap replications.  
The existing stock of wealth might be a substitute for, e.g., precautionary or 
retirement wealth accumulation, that is, it might be endogenous to the saving decision. To 
investigate the sensitivity to the inclusion of wealth, I use three specifications: 
Specification (a) excludes the wealth variables, specification (b) includes financial wealth 
only, and specification (c) uses total net wealth of the household. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
distributed over the three importance rating categories (see table 2). As well, the saving rate has considerable 
and very similar variation in each age class. This is important in order to ensure that the effect of saving 
motives on the saving rate is identified. If, for example, all respondents in a certain age class would rate a 
certain saving motive as “very important”, the saving motive could be operative, although the estimation 
would not find a significant coefficient for the motive in the particular age class. Note further that the results 
presented in this study are robust to the choice of the symmetric scale in section 2.3.1.  
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Table 4: CLAD estimation of three different specifications of the saving regressions. 
 
savings rate Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age 0.263 *** 0.099 0.198 *** 0.076 0.255 *** 0.097
age2 -0.048 ** 0.019 -0.037 ** 0.014 -0.047 ** 0.018
age3 0.003 ** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001 0.003 ** 0.001
partner 0.027 ** 0.013 0.019 * 0.011 0.024 * 0.013
hhsize -0.010 * 0.005 -0.010 ** 0.005 -0.009 * 0.005
children 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004
female -0.015 * 0.009 -0.013 0.008 -0.012 0.009
highschool 0.030 ** 0.012 0.019 * 0.011 0.027 ** 0.014
civilservant 0.032 * 0.019 0.034 ** 0.017 0.035 * 0.018
selfemployed 0.042  0.025 0.021 0.025 0.038 0.026
unemployed -0.079 ** 0.033 -0.063 *** 0.020 -0.077 *** 0.030
homeowner 0.080 *** 0.010 0.068 *** 0.009 0.070 *** 0.012
retired 0.009 0.020 0.010 0.017 0.005 0.018
unemp_prob -0.020 0.020 -0.014 0.021 -0.019 0.022
heritage_prob 0.019 0.027 0.012 0.028 0.014 0.027
earnings_var 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.006 *** 0.002 0.005 ** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002
lifeexpect -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004
dev_health_sit 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
riskpref 0.005 ** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 ** 0.002
netinc -0.065 0.089 -0.111 0.051 -0.070 0.095
netinc2 0.005 0.064 0.009 0.036 0.006 0.086
financialwealth 0.125 *** 0.040
financialwealth2 -0.008 0.015
wealth 0.004 0.003
wealth2 0.000 0.000
mot_oldage1 0.033 * 0.019 0.025  0.017 0.034 * 0.018
mot_oldage2 0.027 ** 0.011 0.021 ** 0.010 0.030 *** 0.011
mot_oldage3 0.005  0.010 0.010  0.011 0.006  0.010
mot_oldage4 -0.004  0.010 0.000  0.009 0.000  0.010
mot_precaution1 0.003  0.017 0.010  0.015 0.005  0.016
mot_precaution2 0.010  0.011 0.011  0.010 0.008  0.012
mot_precaution3 0.025 ** 0.011 0.014  0.011 0.026 ** 0.010
mot_precaution4 0.024 * 0.013 0.022 ** 0.010 0.026 ** 0.012
mot_homepurchase1 0.025 * 0.015 0.021 * 0.012 0.022  0.015
mot_homepurchase2 0.004  0.008 0.005  0.007 0.006  0.008
mot_homepurchase3 0.005  0.010 0.005  0.009 0.007  0.010
mot_homepurchase4 -0.011  0.011 -0.013  0.009 -0.014  0.011
mot_bequest1 -0.011  0.017 -0.011  0.014 -0.011  0.017
mot_bequest2 0.002  0.010 0.004  0.009 0.001  0.010
mot_bequest3 0.017  0.011 0.013  0.011 0.016  0.011
mot_bequest4 0.022 ** 0.011 0.017 * 0.010 0.017  0.012
constant -0.476 *** 0.172 -0.347 *** 0.130 -0.465 *** 0.168
# obs. 2184 2184 2184
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.091 0.071
(a) (b) (c)
 
 
Note: *** : 1% significance level; ** : 5% significance level; * : 10% significance level. 
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Table 4 presents the results of the CLAD estimation, and I report on results that are 
significant at the 10%-level in the text.9 
Each of the three age variables is significant in all specifications, and the three age 
variables are jointly significant in all specifications. The high school dummy which 
indicates whether the household head and/or her/his partner have senior high school 
education (the German “(Fach-)Abitur”), the dummy for civil servants, for unemployed 
household heads and for households that own their currently occupied house or apartment 
are all significant in the three specifications: Households in which at least one of the 
partners has high school education, have on average a saving rate which is about 3 
percentage points higher than the saving rate of households for which this is not the case.10 
Households with unemployed household heads have a saving rate, which is about 8 
percentage points lower than households whose household head is working, and civil 
servants have a saving rate, which is about 3 percentage points higher on average. The 
coefficient of the home-ownership dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that 
households that own their occupied house or apartment have a saving rate that is about 8 
percentage points higher than the saving rate of households that are not homeowners.  
Turning to the main variables of interest, the saving motives, it is first found that 
despite the many included covariates, some of the interactions between saving motives 
and age classes still have significant predictive power. The coefficients of those 
interactions are a measure for the change in the saving rate in percentage points that is 
associated with a one unit increase in the importance rating of a certain saving motive for 
a certain age class in the considered cross-section. That is, on average, a household in the 
oldest age group that rates the precautionary saving motive as “very important” has a 
                                                 
9 Please refer to the tables for more detailed information on the significance levels. 
Two findings stands out in table 4: First, despite the inclusion of many explanatory variables, more than 
90% of the variation in the saving rate remains unexplained. This is common in most studies of this type 
(see, e.g., Lusardi, 1999, p. 103-109). Note that the value of R² even decreases further if I follow a common 
approach, transform zero saving rates to a very small value and then log-transform the data for the savings 
rate. This suggests that the linear specification (4) in combination with the CLAD estimation which is robust 
to outliers (the presence of which is unavoidable in data of this type) should be preferred to the log-
transformation in the present case. Second, while most reported coefficients do not vary much across 
specifications, specification (b) differs somewhat from specifications (a) and (c) – a finding that also shows 
up in the following sections of this paper and that is due to the correlation between financial wealth and the 
dependent variable. 
10 All numerical examples that I use for illustrating the results of the CLAD-estimations refer to specification 
(a).  
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saving rate that is 2.4 percentage points higher than the saving rate of a household with 
identical covariates that rates the precautionary motive as “important”. Figure 2 shows the 
coefficients of the four saving motives by the age group of the household head for the 
three considered specifications. All figures show a similar pattern and illustrate how the 
association between saving motives and the saving rate varies over age groups. 
 
Figure 2: Coefficients of the CLAD estimation for four saving motives and age classes. 
The coefficients of the CLAD estimation denote the change in the saving rate 
in percentage points due to a change in the subjective rating of a certain saving 
motive by one unit.  
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Note: Data points are connected to facilitate readability 
 
The findings from this analysis are informative in two respects: First, concerning the 
subjective information on saving motives that is elicited in the SAVE study and, second, 
concerning the question which saving motives are operative at what life stage.  
Concerning the subjective information on saving motives, I find that while the 
descriptive statistics on the importance ratings of the single saving motives (see section 
2.3.1) do not show a significant trend over all age classes (with the exception of the 
housing motive), the multivariate analysis does find that saving motives change 
significantly over age groups in their explanatory power for actual saving behavior. An 
explanation for the finding that trends over life stages vary between the pure descriptive 
statistics and the multivariate analysis is that households answer the subjective question 
about the importance of the saving motives by just stating their general importance rating 
of the saving motives.11 The multivariate analysis, however, estimates whether 
information on a single motive is indeed related to actual saving behavior at a certain life 
stage and under the assumption of co-existing saving motives. 
 
                                                 
11 I want to give two examples: First, almost every sixth childless household in the oldest age class rates the 
bequest motive as important or very important, although the corresponding question explicitly talks about 
children or grandchildren as the recipients. Second, Table 2 reveals that almost 30% of the households in the 
oldest age class think that the housing motive is an important or very important saving motive; however, the 
age, the financial resources, and the answer to a specific question about the savings goal suggest clearly that 
almost all of these households will most likely not purchase a house in the future. 
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Concerning the question which motive is operative at what life stage, table 4 shows 
that the old-age provision motive and the housing motive both are significantly related to 
the saving rate in early life stages. While the presence of a housing motive in the youngest 
age class of German households is of interest for itself, the finding that there is a 
particularly strong effect of the old-age motive for the youngest age class deserves some 
more explanation as it might be connected to the increased public debate about the 
German pension system which started in the late 1990s and which was associated with 
marketing and information campaigns by insurance and bank companies. These 
campaigns have especially targeted younger households, which will be affected stronger 
by the reforms than older cohorts. Börsch-Supan et al. (2004) provide evidence for a 
recent increase in the awareness about the fact that one effect of the pension reform will be 
a decrease in pension levels, and young households are particularly aware of these facts.12  
Table 4 further reveals that in contrast to the old-age provision motive and the 
housing motive, the bequest motive and the precautionary motive are particularly 
operative for older age groups. Both findings are comparable with existing studies that 
focus on only one specific saving motive. First, in his study that focuses exclusively on the 
bequest motive, Jürges (2001) also finds an operative bequest motive among the elderly. 
He reports consistently and significantly different wealth trajectories for elderly 
households that declare that they have a bequest motive compared to households that 
declare not to have a bequest motive. Second, the effect of the precautionary motive is in 
line with findings on precautionary wealth accumulation by Kazarosian (1997) and 
Lusardi (1998, 2000), who investigate older workers, as well as by Carroll and Samwick 
(1998) and by Kennickell and Lusardi (2005). An explanation for the increase in the 
precautionary motive with age are the increased health risks that older people face, i.e. 
risks associated with considerable health costs. Indeed, even controlling for many 
                                                 
12 Furthermore, the great majority of household heads in the SAVE sample are dependent employees (see 
table 1), for whom participation in the German pay-as-you-go system is mandatory, and for many of whom 
private old-age provision has only recently become an important issue, given that a large proportion had 
completely relied on publicly funded old-age provision provided by the traditionally fairly generous German 
pension system. The German retirement insurance system has a high replacement rate, generating net 
retirement incomes that have been about 70 percent of pre-retirement net earnings for a dependent employee 
with a 45-year earnings history and average life-time earnings in the late 1990s. Overall, public pensions 
constitute more than 80 percent of the income of households headed by persons aged 65 and older, while 
funded retirement income, such as asset income or firm pensions, plays a much smaller role than, e.g., in the 
Netherlands or the Anglo-Saxon countries (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003). 
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household characteristics, I find that with increasing age expectations concerning the 
development of the health situation get worse, whereas expectations about the future 
economic situation are not significantly related to the age of the household, and subjective 
expectations about future earnings variance decrease with an increase in age (see 
appendix, section 6.3).  
4.2 Saver Types and Saving Motives 
The previous section shows that information on saving motives helps to explain how much 
households save. Do saving motives also help to explain how households save, i.e. 
whether they engage in regular savings plans, or rather save irregularly and without a 
savings plan? The goal of this section is to relate heterogeneity in the degree of planning 
and regularity of saving behavior to households’ saving motives in a multivariate 
framework that includes the saving motives as in the previous section. The results are 
informative as to whether certain motives for saving are crucial in determining the saver 
type of a household. 
Authors that are concerned with heterogeneity in the extent to which households 
plan their saving (e.g., Lusardi, 1999; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006; Venti, 2006) underline 
that numerous behavioral and psychological factors interfere with the ability to compute 
optimal plans that would follow conventional theory, or to simply make a plan and 
execute it. Most research on financial planning and saving behavior is specifically 
concerned with long-term planning for retirement. For example, Lusardi (1999) controls 
for numerous variables such as age and lifetime income and finds that those who have 
given “little or no” thought to retirement have financial wealth that is significantly lower 
than the financial wealth of those who have given the subject more thought. 
Conventional life-cycle theory assumes that households formulate savings plans 
based on expectations about the future and is concerned with the amount of household 
saving, but the theory neither models psychological factors that are relevant in this respect, 
nor does it take a stand on the regularity and contractual form of household saving and its 
relationship to saving motives. However, given certain income paths, life-cycle theory has 
some implications: For example, consider a household with an extremely volatile income 
path that regularly drops below the expenditure and consumption path and with only a 
small stock of financial and liquid wealth. This household might well have precautionary 
savings, which have been accumulated in periods with higher income and which are 
needed to finance consumption in unforeseen low income periods (see, e.g., Carroll and 
Samwick (1998), who provide simulations based on the buffer stock model). But in the 
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presence of borrowing constraints, intertemporal consumption smoothing implies that this 
household would not engage in regular or in contractual saving: The household would not 
be a regular saver because of the dramatic income shocks that occur from time to time, 
and the household would not engage in contractual saving since the money should not be 
bound contractually, in order to be able to finance consumption in unexpected low-income 
periods. In turn, high-income civil servants13, for instance, would probably save very 
regularly to provide for unforeseen events for which liquid wealth is needed or to provide 
for old age. Given the attractiveness of certain savings contracts, in particular considering 
existing state subsidies for certain long-term savings plans, it might also be rational for 
high-income civil servants to engage in contractual saving. First, these deliberations serve 
to illustrate that while the life-cycle model is informative concerning the saver type for 
specific income paths, it is generally rather silent about the relationship between the form 
of saving and saving motives. Second, they suggest that any study that is concerned with 
the identification of the relationship between saving motives and household saver types 
should include proxies for the income uncertainty of the household; the present study 
includes dummies for the type of employment and a subjective measure for future 
earnings variance. 
I investigate the relationship between saver type and saving motives using discrete 
choice models. The same explanatory variables as in the analysis in section 4.1 enter the 
estimation. The only difference is that the saving motives are not interacted with age 
classes, since there is no a-priori hypothesis that the effect of saving motives on the saver 
type should vary by age class. Furthermore, the sample for this analysis is restricted to the 
non-retired population, since life-cycle theory predicts that retired households dissave. In 
particular, there should not be an old-age provision motive any more for retired 
households, i.e. those households do not save for an income drop due to retirement. In 
fact, the data show, first, a sudden decrease in the saving rate after retirement and a 
significant increase in left-censored observations with the corresponding saving rate being 
less or equal to zero.  
 
 
                                                 
13 In Germany, civil servants can expect a non-declining income path until retirement. A civil servant can 
only be transferred to a new position if her wage does not decline due to the transfer. Furthermore, a civil 
servant can only be dismissed is she is sentenced to a certain period in prison for any criminal charge or for 
charges associated with treason.  
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Table 5: Multinomial logit estimation for three different specifications. Base category: 
 Irregular savers. 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age -1.424 2.920 -1.551 2.906 -1.444 2.922
age2 0.357 0.752 0.383 0.748 0.364 0.753
age3 -0.028 0.062 -0.031 0.061 -0.029 0.062
partner -0.070 0.266 -0.086 0.266 -0.070 0.266
hhsize -0.087 0.116 -0.082 0.115 -0.092 0.116
children -0.029 0.114 -0.022 0.115 -0.021 0.115
female -0.205 0.208 -0.194 0.208 -0.205 0.208
highschool 0.039 0.245 0.019 0.247 0.038 0.246
civilservant 0.931 * 0.480 0.909 * 0.483 0.929 * 0.480
selfemployed 0.397 0.377 0.396 0.378 0.372 0.381
unemployed -0.732 ** 0.341 -0.709 ** 0.342 -0.721 ** 0.342
homeowner 0.274 0.220 0.199 0.224 0.215 0.244
unemp_prob -0.121 0.376 -0.100 0.379 -0.114 0.377
heritage_prob -0.916 0.575 -0.956 * 0.580 -0.921 0.576
earnings_var -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.003 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.004 0.045
lifeexpect 0.024 0.084 0.018 0.084 0.022 0.084
dev_health_sit 0.032 0.055 0.029 0.055 0.033 0.055
riskpref -0.013 0.043 -0.019 0.043 -0.014 0.043
netinc 1.354 ** 0.585 1.074 * 0.591 1.277 ** 0.595
netinc2 -0.110 0.068 -0.091 0.078 -0.105 0.069
financialwealth 0.857 * 0.487
financialwealth2 -0.077 0.085
wealth 0.030 0.055
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.248 * 0.143 0.238 * 0.144 0.250 * 0.143
mot_precaution -0.129 0.164 -0.138 0.165 -0.131 0.165
mot_homepurchase 0.182 0.116 0.167 0.117 0.182 0.116
mot_bequest -0.081 0.141 -0.088 0.141 -0.082 0.141
constant 1.074 3.589 1.379 3.578 1.113 3.592
Regular, planned, contractual
age 1.538 2.535 1.402 2.538 1.490 2.538
age2 -0.223 0.649 -0.200 0.650 -0.209 0.650
age3 0.003 0.053 0.001 0.053 0.002 0.053
partner -0.103 0.226 -0.143 0.226 -0.104 0.226
hhsize -0.030 0.100 -0.033 0.100 -0.037 0.100
children -0.103 0.100 -0.083 0.101 -0.092 0.101
female -0.157 0.173 -0.138 0.174 -0.161 0.173
highschool 0.155 0.207 0.077 0.210 0.151 0.208
civilservant 0.878 ** 0.441 0.841 * 0.446 0.877 ** 0.441
selfemployed -0.026 0.340 -0.081 0.346 -0.061 0.343
unemployed -0.532 ** 0.258 -0.470 * 0.258 -0.516 ** 0.258
homeowner 0.498 *** 0.183 0.373 ** 0.186 0.420 ** 0.204
unemp_prob -0.151 0.315 -0.104 0.320 -0.139 0.316
heritage_prob 0.060 0.431 -0.057 0.440 0.059 0.431
earnings_var -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.089 ** 0.038 0.088 ** 0.038 0.091 ** 0.038
lifeexpect 0.033 0.068 0.015 0.069 0.030 0.068
dev_health_sit -0.016 0.045 -0.020 0.045 -0.015 0.045
riskpref -0.002 0.036 -0.013 0.036 -0.004 0.036
netinc 0.777 0.544 0.206 0.539 0.676 0.551
netinc2 -0.046 0.056 0.004 0.058 -0.037 0.057
financialwealth 1.400 *** 0.408
financialwealth2 -0.089 *** 0.029
wealth 0.039 0.048
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.790 *** 0.127 0.749 *** 0.127 0.789 *** 0.127
mot_precaution -0.294 ** 0.140 -0.300 ** 0.141 -0.292 ** 0.140
mot_homepurchase -0.122 0.097 -0.129 0.098 -0.119 0.097
mot_bequest 0.172 0.115 0.165 0.116 0.168 0.115
constant -2.829 3.157 -2.331 3.161 -2.750 3.161
# obs. 1066 1066 1066
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.077 0.068
Regular
(a) (b) (c)
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Second, there is a highly significant difference in the distribution of households 
across saver types between the retired and the non-retired sample, and only mild and 
mostly insignificant differences in the distribution between different age classes of the 
non-retired sample. And, third, the analysis presented above shows that the old-age 
provision motive has no significant predictive power for households in the highest age 
class. 
The relationship between the saver type classification and saving motives is first 
investigated using a multinomial logit model for three alternatives.14 Table 5 presents 
estimation results using the type “irregular saver” (category [3]) as a base category. For 
reasons stated above, I present again the three different specifications that have been used 
in the previous section. 
Table 5 reveals that the estimated coefficients and standard errors do not differ very 
much across specifications; therefore, the following interpretation of the results does not 
distinguish between specifications. Focusing on the type of households that plan their 
saving and engage in some sort of regular savings plan (type 1), it is first found that civil 
servants are significantly more likely to be of this type, and unemployed households are 
significantly less likely to be of this type relative to the base category, type 3. While the 
bequest and the housing motive are not significantly related to the relative probability 
ratios, an increase in the subjective importance rating of the precautionary motive is 
associated with a significant decrease in the probability of being of this saver type (type 1) 
relative to being an irregular saver (type 3). More specifically: Relative to the base 
alternative, an increase of the precautionary saving rating from “unimportant” to 
“important” is associated with a 26% smaller probability of being in the group of 
households that plan their saving and engage in some sort of regular savings plan. 
Conversely, an increase in the importance rating of the old-age provision motive comes 
along with an increase in the relative probability of being in this group. The model 
estimates a 120% higher probability relative to the base alternative if the old-age provision 
motive is increased by one unit. For the group of regular savers that do not engage in fixed 
saving (saver type 2), no significant relationship at the 10% level is found except from the 
                                                 
14 In multinomial logit models, the odds ratio between any two choices does not depend on the other choices, 
this property is termed the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). A Hausman-McFadden test 
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984) suggests that for all specifications that I consider, the IIA assumption 
cannot be rejected.  
 26
result that an increase in the importance of the old-age provision motive is positively 
associated with the probability of being a regular saver relative to the base alternative.  
An important underlying assumption of the multinomial logit estimation is the 
assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This assumption implies a 
certain pattern of substitution across alternatives. If substitution actually occurs in this way 
and if the model is specified correctly, then the multinomial logit model is appropriate. 
While the IIA property that gives rise to the proportional substitution pattern of the 
multinomial logit model was not rejected in the present case by a Hausman-McFadden test 
(see footnote 14), it has been noted that this test has low power under many circumstances 
(see, e.g., McFadden, 1987). Therefore, I have also estimated a multinomial probit model 
that relaxes the IIA assumption by allowing for correlation across choices in the 
unobserved components. The findings from the multinomial probit model are in line with 
the conclusions presented above, and they are detailed in the appendix, section 6.4. 
Finally, I have also investigated the relationship between saver type and saving motives 
based on binary logit models for all three specifications.15 In the binary choice models the 
probability of being of a certain saver type is compared to the probability of being in any 
of the other groups. The findings support all conclusions from the multinomial choice 
analysis.  
The analyses in this section present descriptive evidence that there is a relationship 
between importance ratings of saving motives and the household saver type. First, I found 
that an increase in the importance attached to precautionary reasons for saving is 
associated with a decrease in the probability of being of saver type 1 relative to saver type 
3, and – as revealed by further investigation – to a decrease of the probability of being of 
saver type 1 relative to type 2. An explanation is that households with a strong 
precautionary motive are aware that they might need their savings at some particular but 
unknown point in time, and they therefore decide that their savings should not be bound in 
a savings plan or in shares by that unknown point in time. Causality might also go in the 
opposite direction: Households have a strong precautionary motive, because they can only 
save irregularly when there is some money left over and because they might need the 
saved money in periods when nothing is left over.  
Second, I find that an increase in the importance of the old-age provision motive is 
associated with a significantly higher probability of engaging in regular and planned 
saving. This finding might have several explanations. One explanation is that households 
                                                 
15 The results can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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that want to save for retirement react to the incentives of banks and insurance companies 
as well as the subsidies by the government and use the more attractive longer-term savings 
plans in order to save for long-term saving goals. A recent study by Reil-Held and Schunk 
(2006) reveals that – controlling for co-existing saving motives – there is indeed a 
statistically significant association between the importance attached to an old-age 
provision motive and the probability of buying state-promoted and long-term savings 
plans, such as a so-called Riester-pension, life-insurance schemes, or other private pension 
schemes. A further plausible explanation is that households indicating a high importance 
of old-age provision exercise self-commitment: Savings that are planned for retirement 
should remain untouched during work-life and are therefore made in the form of fixed 
contractual savings.  
Through allowing for the co-existence of various saving motives, the presented 
results on the significance of the old-age provision motive add well to findings about 
saving behavior and future planning. First, combined with the descriptive result in table 3 
that households that save regularly and in a savings plan also have a higher saving rate on 
average, the findings are in line with the above-mentioned findings by Lusardi (1999) 
concerning a relationship between retirement planning and wealth accumulation. Second, 
they complement findings by Ameriks et al. (2003), who report direct evidence that 
households with a high propensity to plan their long-term future save more, are better able 
to exercise self-control, and self-commit to a certain behavior.  
4.3 Discussion 
The presented estimations include an extensive set of variables. This serves to show that 
the measures for saving motives correlate with saving behavior even after controlling for 
the rich information about households available in the SAVE survey. The fact that three 
different specifications generally lead to similar results underlines the robustness of the 
results. Of course, the direction of the causality as well as the presence of third factors is 
debatable in the given context; the presented methodology does not address the question 
of causation, and any causal interpretation of the results would depend on the underlying 
model and its underlying assumptions.16 In the given context, accumulated wealth itself 
could have an effect on the importance that households attach to certain saving motives. 
Additionally, it is important to note that the cross-sectional data that are used for this study 
                                                 
16 An example is the basic assumption that people are forward-looking: If people were not forward-looking, 
the saving motives would not play any role for explaining their savings behavior, people would simply save 
what is left over after consumption, without having any specific saving motive in mind.  
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do not allow to control for cohort effects. The cross-sectional data neither permit the 
estimation of structural models that account for endogeneity and dynamics. But since the 
dependent variable in the analysis of saver types characterizes a stable behavioral rule 
rather than one single observed saving decision, the analysis of saver types is not very 
sensitive to dynamic shocks that might have an impact on the findings.  
A limitation of this study is that through providing two independent analyses, I 
implicitly make the behavioral assumption that households face two independent 
decisions: They decide how much they save, and they decide whether to engage in savings 
plans, save regularly, or rather save irregularly. These two decisions are not necessarily 
independent, as the descriptive statistics in table 3 indicate. Another model would be that 
households decide first about how much they save and then – conditional on the amount 
that they want to save – they decide about how regular they save or whether they engage 
in a savings plan. It is not clear which is the correct model for the decision-making process 
in this case. Further multinomial choice analyses of the saver type, in which I include the 
saving rate as an additional covariate, reveal that the saving rate is significantly and 
positively associated with the relative probability of being a regular saver (type 2) and a 
saver who engages in savings plans (type 1); however, the coefficients of the saving 
motives are hardly affected by the inclusion of the saving rate, indicating that the 
established relationships still hold.  
Finally, the measures for the saving motives themselves could be related to other 
included variables – such as risk preferences or future expectations – or to unobserved 
factors that are relevant for decision-making but that the study does not control for, e.g. 
psychological traits of the respondent. Given that there is no testable theory that relates the 
psychological traits measured in SAVE to saving motives and saving decisions and that 
would guide a further analysis of their relationship to savings behavior, a straightforward 
way to learn more about the potential impact of those factors on the presented results is to 
simply include those psychometric variables additively in the regressions. As an example, 
consider that optimism rather than classical preference measures may be linked to major 
economic decisions, as is claimed by various scholars (Gervais and Goldstein, 2004; 
Rigotti et al., 2004; Puri and Robinson, 2005). Following this idea, a self-reported 
measure for optimism has been included in the analysis. As expected, this measure 
correlates with most elicited measures for future expectations. Nevertheless, the inclusion 
of the measure for optimism into the analyses presented in this paper does not have a 
considerable effect on the coefficient estimates for the saving motives, i.e., it does not 
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alter the conclusions from this paper. In the SAVE survey, the household head is also 
asked to provide a self-assessment concerning her happiness, her self-assuredness, and she 
is asked to what degree she considers herself a creature of habit or a person that is open to 
change.17 The inclusion of all these subjective measures in the analyses does not have an 
impact on the conclusions of this paper. As well, SAVE elicits alternative measures for 
risk preferences than the one considered in the presented analysis;18 after including these 
alternative risk measures, still the same relationship between saving motives and how 
much and in what form households save is found. These findings underline the robustness 
of the results. 
 
Overall, the results – established in a framework that controls for the co-existence of 
different saving motives – show that the subjective assessment of the importance of saving 
motives is significantly related to two dimensions of household saving behavior. If these 
relationships are insensitive to a wide range of policy changes and to changes in micro- 
and macro-economic circumstances, then targeted information campaigns or policy 
reforms that substantially change the importance of certain saving motives in the eyes of 
private households might indeed have various effects on the saving behavior of those 
households. These findings are of particular interest in the context of current policy 
reforms in Germany, which directly interact with private household saving, and therefore 
require an understanding of whether and how households react to the desired reforms and 
the associated information campaigns. Particularly helpful for policy would be the 
question whether the relative saving contributions of different motives compete with each 
other. Given that (most) households are constraint in their budget, I argue that saving 
motives compete, and – as suggested by the findings in this paper – that a different set of 
motives competes at different life stages. From a policy perspective it is of interest to 
understand the precise nature of this competition better. Is the old-age provision motive 
competing with the housing motive, with the precautionary motive, or with both motives? 
How does the nature of this competition change over the life-cycle? The present study 
illustrates that indeed many motives whose relative contribution changes over age classes 
                                                 
17 For all these above-mentioned measures (i.e., optimism, self-assuredness, etc.), respondents are asked on a 
scale from 0 to 10 whether a statement of the form “I am optimistic”, “I am a self-assured person”, etc. 
“does not apply at all” (0), or “applies very well” (10). 
18 More specifically, respondents are asked about their willingness to take risks with respect to their health, 
their career, leisure time and sports, and car drving on a scale from 0 to 10. 
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are simultaneously associated with saving decisions and must be taken into account when 
discussing the effect of policy reforms on household behavior. However, the present study 
is neither concerned with exactly estimating the relative contribution of each single motive 
for specific groups of the population; nor does the study investigate precisely to what 
extent specific motives compete with each other.  
5 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated household saving behavior based on a random sample of 
German households. The data contain rich information on household financial and socio-
demographic characteristics and they offer the opportunity to investigate saving behavior 
under the assumption of co-existence of various saving motives which are elicited based 
on subjective importance ratings. 
The results of this study support the view that households’ saving decisions are 
influenced by different saving motives that co-exist over age classes, but whose relative 
contribution to household saving changes with age. Households’ reported importance of 
various saving motives is related to heterogeneity in saving behavior with respect to two 
dimensions: First, it is related to heterogeneity in the household saving rate at different life 
stages. The effects of various saving motives are generally appropriate given the different 
stages of the households’ life-cycle. Second, both the old-age provision motive and the 
precautionary motive are related to heterogeneity in the saver type, i.e. related to a 
classification of households based on whether they engage in savings plans, save 
regularly, or irregularly. While I have discussed that it is debatable how the decision-
making process concerning the choice of the saver type works, the latter findings suggest 
that for many households the decision whether to save in a savings plan is related to the 
purpose of their saving. For instance, according to the estimations, households indicating a 
high importance of old-age provision have a high probability of saving regularly and in 
savings plans. At the same time, these relationships can be driven by a wish to exercise 
self-control on the part of those households that are concerned about their retirement 
saving. How this relationship works precisely, how psychological determinants and 
institutional incentives influence the process of wealth accumulation and how the process 
of wealth accumulation itself might feed back onto the relevant psychological 
determinants of saving behavior are very interesting and important open questions.  
The finding of a significant relationship between the importance that households 
attach to different saving motives and their actual behavior suggests that policy reforms – 
e.g., the current German pension reform – that substantially change the importance of 
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certain saving motives in the eyes of private households might indeed alter household 
saving behavior in different ways, and with differential effects over the life stages. This 
study has not focused on how large the contributions to the single saving motives are for 
specific groups of the population and in which way the relative contributions of the 
motives are competing. An extension of this study that investigates the relationship 
between saving motives and the flow of household saving to various specific financial 
assets – such as pension plans, building society contracts etc. – serves to assess better the 
contribution to each single saving motive and is on the agenda. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Wealth and Income 
 
Table A.1: Distribution of wealth and income of German households in SAVE 2003. 
 
Mean Std. err. Median
All 25,125 1,771 7,986
<35 9,252 922 1,200
35-49 31,778 4,417 10,500
50-64 32,852 2,551 14,100
≥65 23,490 3,920 9,000
Mean Std. err. Median
All 150,833 9,005 25,486
<35 48,215 6,346 2,000
35-49 168,627 23,103 40,000
50-64 206,210 17,545 74,681
≥65 164,889 14,582 37,250
Mean Std. err. Median
All 2,476 92 1,866
<35 2,215 194 1,500
35-49 2,945 158 2,315
50-64 2,832 273 1,990
≥65 1,810 71 1,500
Total wealth in 2002 [€]
Net income in 2002 [€/month]
A
ge
A
ge
Financial wealth in 2002 [€]
A
ge
 
 
Note: The difference in standard errors is often due to a few extremely large values, for 
instance the standard error of household net income in age class 50-64. 
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6.2 Covariates 
 
Table A.2: Description of covariates included in the estimated models. 
 
Variable Description 
  
age, age2, age3 age is the age (in years) of the household head divided by 10, i.e.: age 
= (age of household head)/10. age2 is squared age, and age3 is cubic 
age.  
partner Dummy: 1 if the household is married and/or lives permanently with a 
partner in his/her household. 
hhsize Total number of people living in the household. 
children Total number of children and children-in-law of the household.  
female Dummy: 1 if household head is female. 
highschool Dummy: 1 if the household head and/or his/her partner have a general 
senior high school leaving certificate or a comparable certificate for 
University of Applied Sciences (“(Fach-)Abitur”). 
civilservant Dummy: 1 if the household head is a civil servant (see also footnote 
13). 
selfemployed Dummy: 1 if the household head is running a business or any other 
self-employed activity. 
unemployed Dummy: 1 if the household head is currently unemployed. 
homeowner Dummy: 1 if a household member owns the currently occupied 
house/apartment. 
retired  Dummy: 1 if the household head is retired. 
unemp_prob Subjective probability of becoming unemployed in the year of the 
survey. If living with partner and both partners are working: 
Subjective probability that at least one of the partners becomes 
unemployed. 
heritage_prob Subjective probability of inheriting a substantial amount or receiving a 
gift in the next two years. The probability is included only for those 
respondents who answer in the follow-up question that the inheritance 
or the gift or will improve the financial situation significantly. 
earnings_var Subjective earnings variance. The measure of subjective earnings 
variance is calculated from the subjective unemployment probability 
of both partners, from net income, and from the replacement rate, as in 
Lusardi (1998). 
dev_ger_econ_sit Expectation about future development of German economic situation, 
0 for very negative expectation, 10 for very positive expectation. 
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lifeexpect Subjective life expectancy of the household head, 7 brackets: < 65, 65-
70, 71-75, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90, > 90  
dev_health_sit Expectation about future development of health situation, 0 for very 
negative expectation, 10 for very positive expectation about future 
health situation. 
riskpref Risk attitude: Willingness to take risks with respect to money matters. 
0: no willingness to take risks, 10: high willingness to take risks.  
netinc  Net income of the household, divided by 10,000 €. 
netinc2 netinc · netinc 
wealth  Total net wealth of the household (i.e., savings investments, savings 
bonds, share- and real-estate bonds, occupational and private pension 
schemes, real estate, business wealth etc.), divided by 100,000 €. 
wealth2 wealth · wealth. 
financialwealth Financial wealth of the household (i.e., savings investments, savings 
bonds, share- and real-estate bonds, occupational and private pension 
schemes etc.), divided by 100,000 €. 
financialwealth2 financialwealth · financialwealth. 
  
 
Additionally, subjective importance ratings of the four saving motives are included as 
covariates. In the CLAD-estimation, these measures are interacted with dummies for the 
four age classes that are considered in this study. In the regression output, “1” stands for 
the lowest age class (<35), “2” refers for the age class 35-49, “3” indicates age class 50-
64, and the oldest age class is denoted by “4”. That is, “mot_oldage1” refers to the old-age 
provision motive in the lowest age class. In total, 4 · 4 = 16 interacted variables for the 
saving motives are included in the regressions. 
 
 
 35
6.3 Expectations and Age 
Table A.3: Linear regression of future expectations on age and further household    
                   characteristics. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age -0.391 *** 0.046 0.054 0.049 -1.948 1.385
partner 0.342 *** 0.114 -0.002 0.122 -8.452 ** 3.461
hhsize -0.024 0.053 0.069 0.056 -1.555 1.595
kids_no -0.172 *** 0.040 -0.028 0.043 -0.437 1.211
female -0.259 *** 0.091 -0.066 0.097 -6.709 ** 2.758
highschool 0.328 *** 0.122 0.503 *** 0.130 -6.709 * 3.677
civilservant 0.226 0.251 0.252 0.267 -18.702 ** 7.580
selfemployed 0.464 ** 0.223 0.032 0.238 -8.067 6.771
unemployed -0.568 *** 0.153 -0.662 *** 0.165 2.346 4.657
homeowner 0.302 *** 0.105 -0.010 0.112 -0.868 3.181
retired -0.651 *** 0.163 -0.310 * 0.173 8.094 * 4.883
riskattitude 0.008 0.020 0.104 *** 0.021 -0.154 0.601
netinc 0.284 0.206 0.525 ** 0.220 152.712 *** 6.791
netinc2 -0.028 0.025 -0.036 0.027 -10.096 *** 0.808
wealth -0.007 0.020 -0.022 0.021 -3.567 *** 0.603
wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 *** 0.007
constant 8.804 *** 0.245 2.491 *** 0.260 -2.971 7.373
# obs. 2184 2184 2184
R2 0.227 0.046 0.286
earnings_vardev_health_sit dev_ger_econ_sit
 
Note: This table presents a regression of subjective expectations concerning the health 
situation, concerning the German economic situation and concerning the variance of 
future earnings on household characteristics. The table shows in particular that an 
increase in age is associated with significantly worse expectations concerning the 
development of the health situation. The findings from this regression – a strong negative 
effect of the age-variable on the expectation concerning the development of future health, 
no significant effect of the age-variable for the expectations concerning the development 
of the German economic situation, and a positive but insignificant effect for expectations 
concerning earnings variance – remain the same if I include higher order terms of the age 
variable (age² and age³) and test for joint significance. 
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6.4 Multinomial Probit Model for Saver Types 
The multinomial probit model allows to relax the assumption of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives by estimating the variance-covariance parameters of the latent-
variable errors, instead of imposing that errors are independently and identically 
distributed according to a type 1 extreme value distribution. I have not motivated the 
multinomial choice analysis in section 4.2 based on an additive random utility choice 
framework, since I consider the underlying econometric model less as a behavioral model 
of choice in this context but rather as a descriptive analysis of the statistical association 
between saver types and saving motives. In this line, the purpose of the multinomial probit 
analysis presented in the appendix is not to claim that a different behavioral structure 
describes this association better, but only to show that even if I relax the IIA assumption 
by allowing for correlation between the latent-variable errors, the conclusions from this 
paper still hold. The multinomial probit model assumes that the stochastic error terms 
have a multivariate normal distribution. As described by Train (2003), the model requires 
normalization since both the location and scale of the latent variable are irrelevant. To 
normalize location, I choose – as in the multinomial logit model – saver type 3 (irregular 
savers) as the base alternative. To normalize for scale, I fix the diagonal elements to 1. 
While this still imposes some structure on the covariance matrix that is necessary for 
identification since the model does not include alternative specific variables, it still allows 
for correlation between the error terms of saver type 1 and saver type 2, which the 
multinomial logit model does not do. 
The results (see table A.4), which are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood, 
confirm the role of the precautionary and the old-age provision motive that is discussed in 
the paper. If other categories are chosen as base categories, e.g. saver type 1, and the 
model allows for correlation between the error terms of other saver types, I find similar 
results. 
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Table A.4: Multinomial probit estimation for three different specifications. Base category: 
                   Irregular savers. 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
age -0.497  2.495 -1.540  2.483 -0.526  3.015
age2 0.152  0.507 0.347  0.562 0.158  0.619
age3 -0.014  0.038 -0.025  0.043 -0.015  0.035
partner -0.052  0.190 -0.051  0.201 -0.050  0.191
hhsize -0.057  0.087 -0.063  0.087 -0.061  0.086
children -0.030  0.096 0.001  0.087 -0.024  0.097
female -0.145  0.145 -0.143  0.153 -0.148  0.144
highschool 0.042  0.200 -0.019  0.185 0.037  0.200
civilservant 0.666 * 0.347 0.576 * 0.327 0.660 * 0.353
selfemployed 0.217  0.323 0.363  0.277 0.196  0.335
unemployed -0.533 ** 0.237 -0.480 * 0.256 -0.523 ** 0.240
homeowner 0.235  0.231 0.068  0.169 0.190  0.231
unemp_prob -0.088  0.286 -0.033  0.288 -0.079  0.284
heritage_prob -0.472  0.594 -0.814 * 0.441 -0.484  0.593
earnings_var -0.002  0.002 -0.003  0.003 -0.002  0.002
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.015  0.048 -0.020  0.034 0.015  0.049
lifeexpect 0.023  0.058 0.015  0.061 0.022  0.057
dev_health_sit 0.015  0.043 0.027  0.041 0.016  0.041
riskpref -0.005  0.030 -0.010  0.032 -0.006  0.030
netinc 0.795 * 0.411 0.861 ** 0.429 0.731 * 0.430
netinc2 -0.062  0.049 -0.081  0.070 -0.057  0.051
financialwealth 0.508  0.367
financialwealth2 -0.144  0.095
wealth 0.020 0.037
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.285  0.318 0.043  0.112 0.277  0.323
mot_precaution -0.121  0.160 -0.047  0.126 -0.119  0.159
mot_homepurchase 0.079  0.144 0.167 * 0.088 0.084  0.143
mot_bequest -0.015  0.147 -0.109  0.105 -0.021  0.146
constant 0.245  2.643 1.310  3.092 0.288  2.734
Regular, planned, contractual
age 1.019  2.763 1.738  2.057 1.040  2.679
age2 -0.140  0.498 -0.302  0.502 -0.143  0.467
age3 0.001  0.036 0.011  0.040 0.001  0.033
partner -0.071  0.176 -0.096  0.176 -0.071  0.177
hhsize -0.028 0.083 -0.021  0.078 -0.032  0.083
children -0.075  0.081 -0.076  0.079 -0.068  0.082
female -0.115 0.139 -0.090  0.133 -0.120  0.138
highschool 0.112 0.160 0.052  0.160 0.108  0.160
civilservant 0.647 * 0.345 0.543 * 0.298 0.641 * 0.350
selfemployed -0.021  0.303 -0.193  0.255 -0.059  0.308
unemployed -0.461 ** 0.232 -0.353 * 0.210 -0.445 * 0.234
homeowner 0.367 *** 0.143 0.306 ** 0.142 0.312 ** 0.157
unemp_prob -0.115  0.251 -0.073  0.251 -0.105  0.248
heritage_prob 0.023  0.445 0.133  0.338 0.029  0.452
earnings_var -0.001  0.001 0.000  0.001 -0.001  0.001
dev_ger_econ_sit 0.063 * 0.033 0.077 *** 0.029 0.065 ** 0.033
lifeexpect 0.027  0.053 0.019  0.052 0.026  0.052
dev_health_sit -0.008 0.039 -0.022  0.036 -0.008  0.038
riskpref -0.001 0.028 -0.006  0.027 -0.002  0.028
netinc 0.495  0.476 -0.117  0.360 0.401  0.492
netinc2 -0.027  0.047 0.027  0.040 -0.019  0.048
financialwealth 0.862 *** 0.233
financialwealth2 -0.055 *** 0.018
wealth 0.027 0.034
wealth2 0.000 0.001
mot_oldage 0.588 *** 0.121 0.623 *** 0.102 0.590 *** 0.118
mot_precaution -0.216 * 0.114 -0.241 ** 0.110 -0.216 * 0.111
mot_homepurchase -0.080 0.104 -0.138 * 0.075 -0.079  0.105
mot_bequest 0.118 0.103 0.160 * 0.089 0.116  0.103
constant -1.787 4.731 -2.865  2.598 -1.807 4.919
# obs. 1066 1066 1066
Log Likelihood -996.902 -987.599 -996.342
Regular
(a) (b) (c)
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 An Iterative Multiple Imputation Procedure for Dealing with 
Item Nonresponse in the German SAVE Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Important empirical information on household behavior is obtained from 
surveys. However, various interdependent factors that can only be controlled to a limited 
extent lead to unit and item nonresponse, and missing data on certain items is a frequent 
source of difficulties in statistical practice. This paper presents the theoretical under-
pinnings of a Markov Chain Monte Carlo multiple imputation procedure and applies this 
procedure to a socio-economic survey of German households, the SAVE survey. I discuss 
convergence properties and results of the iterative multiple imputation method and I 
compare them briefly with other imputation approaches. Concerning missing data in the 
SAVE survey, the results suggest that item nonresponse is not occurring randomly but is 
related to the included covariates. The analysis further indicates that there might be 
differences in the character of nonresponse across asset types. Concerning the 
methodology of imputation, the paper underlines that it would be of particular interest to 
apply different imputation methods to the same dataset and to compare the findings. 
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1 Introduction 
Important empirical information on household behavior is obtained from surveys. 
However, various interdependent factors that can only be controlled to a limited extent, 
such as privacy concerns, respondent uncertainty, cognitive burden of the questions, and 
survey context, lead to unit nonresponse and item nonresponse. Unit nonresponse is the 
lack of any information for a contacted survey participant and as such is the strongest type 
of refusal. The phenomenon that only a subset of the information is missing, e.g. only the 
response to the question on household income, is referred to as item nonresponse.  
The general phenomenon of item nonresponse to questions in household surveys as 
well as problems of statistical analysis with missing data have been analyzed by various 
authors, beginning with the work by Ferber (1966) and Hartley and Hocking (1971); see 
Beatty and Herrmann (2002) for a review. Recent examples for Germany, focusing on 
income, saving, and asset choice, are Biewen (2001), Riphahn and Serfling (2005), and 
Schräpler (2003) who work with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
Finally, Essig and Winter (2003) describe and analyze nonresponse patterns to financial 
questions in the first wave of the German SAVE survey. They exploit that this first wave 
has included a controlled experiment specifically designed to analyze the effects of 
interview mode and question format on answering behavior. 
The German SAVE study focuses on details of households' finances, as well as 
households' sociological and psychological characteristics. For the large majority of 
variables in SAVE, item nonresponse is not a problem. For example, there is hardly any 
nonresponse to detailed questions about socio-demographic conditions of the household, 
to questions about households’ expectations and about indicators of household economic 
behavior. Mainly due to privacy concerns and cognitive burden, though, there are 
significantly higher item nonresponse rates for detailed questions about household 
financial circumstances than for other less private and less sensitive questions. Tables 1 
and 2 show that these questions can have a missing rate of over 40%. Similar missing rates 
for questions about financial circumstances have been documented in various socio-
economic survey contexts (e.g., Bover, 2004; Hoynes et al., 1998; Juster and Smith, 1997; 
Kalwij and van Soest, 2005).  
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Table 1: Response rates for monthly net income and for the question about total annual 
saving. 
Value Bracket Unknown
Net income 69% 25% 6%
Annual saving 88% 12%
 
Note: Calculations are unweighted and based on the 2003/2004 wave of the SAVE data. 
 
Table 2: Response rates for financial and real wealth items. 
Yes No Unknown
Savings/term accounts 56% 36% 8% 74%
Building society savings agreements 26% 66% 8% 67%
Whole life insurance policies 28% 64% 8% 57%
Bonds 8% 84% 8% 57%
Shares & real-estate funds 18% 74% 8% 61%
Owner occupied housing 47% 49% 4% 96%
Have item Value reported for 
those having the item
 
Note: Calculations are unweighted and based on the 2003/2004 wave of the SAVE data. 
 
For studies that use the detailed financial information in the SAVE study, missing 
information on one of those variables is a problem. It is tempting and still very common to 
simply delete all observations with missing values. But deleting observations with item 
nonresponse, i.e. relying on a complete-case analysis, might lead to an efficiency loss due 
to a smaller sample size and to biased inference when item nonresponse is related to the 
variable of interest.1 Particularly for multivariate analyses that involve a large number of 
covariates, case deletion procedures can discard a high proportion of subjects, even if the 
per-item rate of missingness is rather low. 
The purpose of this paper is to present and discuss the theoretical underpinnings and 
the practical application of an iterative multiple imputation method that has been 
developed for the German SAVE dataset. Missing item values are imputed controlling for 
observed characteristics of nonrespondents and respondents in order to preserve the 
correlation structure of the dataset as much as possible. The method yields a multiply 
imputed and complete data set that can be analyzed by the public using standard software 
packages without discarding any observed cases. In contrast to single imputation, multiple 
imputation allows the uncertainty due to imputation to be reflected in subsequent analyses 
of the data (see, e.g., Rubin, 1987; Rubin, 1996; Rubin and Schenker, 1986).  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Rubin (1987) and Little and Rubin (2002) for discussions about efficiency and bias in a missing 
data context. 
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Iterative multiple imputation methods have recently been applied to other large-scale 
socio-economic survey data (Bover, 2004; Kennickell, 1998). The imputation method for 
the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, developed by Arthur Kennickell, has been applied 
to the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (Bover, 2004), and it has also inspired the 
development of the imputation method that is presented in this paper. The convergence 
properties of such an iterative procedure have so far only been analyzed systematically on 
simulated datasets and small datasets with only few variables (e.g., Schafer, 1997); as 
well, in the context of survey data, the effects of imputation on the resulting distributions 
of imputed variables have only been documented and compared based on non-iterative 
imputation methods that focus on specific variables such as income (Frick and Grabka, 
2005), or wealth items (Hoynes et al., 1998). The specific contribution of this paper is to 
investigate the convergence properties of an iterative imputation method that is applied to 
a large socio-economic survey, the German SAVE survey, and to analyze the resulting 
distributions of various imputed financial survey items. The latter gives insights about 
item nonresponse behavior of the survey participants and about the bias that would result 
from a complete-case analysis.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the SAVE survey, 
section 3 describes the theoretical underpinnings of the iterative imputation algorithm, 
develops and documents the application of this algorithm to the SAVE survey, and 
describes its relationship to existing work on imputation in large surveys. Section 4 
investigates the convergence properties of the algorithm and compares imputed and 
observed data. Section 5 discusses the presented algorithm and concludes the paper. 
2 The SAVE Survey – An Overview 
In Germany, there has been no dataset available that records detailed data on both 
financial variables such as income, savings, and asset holdings and on sociological and 
psychological characteristics of households. The German Socio-Economic Panel (German 
SOEP) has rich data on household behavior and records indicators of saving and asset 
choices; in 1988 and 2002, the quantitative composition of households' assets was covered 
in much more detail. Another representative survey, Soll und Haben, records detailed data 
on the composition of various financial assets, but it only has qualitative indicators and 
does not quantify asset holdings. Finally, the official budget and expenditure survey 
(Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS), conducted every five years by the 
Federal Statistical Office, has very detailed information on the amount and composition of 
income, expenditure, and wealth, but information on other household characteristics is 
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very limited, in particular in the most recent waves in 1998 and in 2003. Taking as a basis 
the Dutch CentER Panel and the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), researchers of 
the University of Mannheim have cooperated with the Mannheim Center for Surveys, 
Methods and Analyses (ZUMA), NFO Infratest (Munich), Psychonomics (Cologne) and 
Sinus (Heidelberg) to produce a questionnaire on households' saving and asset choice; see 
Börsch-Supan and Essig (2005). The questionnaire has been designed in such a way that 
the interview should not exceed 45 minutes and was first fielded in 2001 using a quota 
sampling design. The first random sample was drawn in 2003.2 The questionnaire consists 
of six parts (see table 3).  
 
Table 3: Structure of the questionnaire of the SAVE Survey. 
Part 1: Introduction, determining which person will be surveyed in the household 
Part 2: Basic socio-economic data of the household 
Part 3: Qualitative questions concerning saving behavior, income and wealth 
Part 4: Quantitative questions concerning income and wealth 
Part 5: Psychological and social determinants of saving behavior 
Part 6: Conclusion: Interview-situation 
 
The first, relatively short part explains the purpose of the study and describes the 
precautions that have been taken with respect to confidentiality and data protection. Part 2 
lasts about 15 minutes and contains questions on the socio-economic structure of the 
household, including age, education and labor-force participation of the respondent and 
his or her spouse. Part 3 of the questionnaire contains qualitative and simple quantitative 
questions on saving behavior and on how households deal with income and assets, 
including hypothetical choice tasks and questions on saving motives; questions are also 
asked on financial decision processes, rules of thumb, and attitudes towards consumption 
and money. Part 4 is the critical part of the questionnaire. It contains a comprehensive 
financial review of the household and therefore the most sensitive questions in financial 
items such as income from various sources and holdings of various assets. Apart from 
financial assets, the questions also cover private and company pensions, ownership of 
property and business assets. Questions are also asked about debt. Part 5 contains 
questions about psychological and social variables. It includes the social environment, 
                                                 
2 A description of SAVE and further details on methodological aspects of the SAVE survey are found in 
Schunk (2006). 
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expectations about income, the economic situation, health, life expectancy and general 
attitudes to life. The interview ends with open-ended questions about the interview 
situation, and a question that asks whether the respondent would be willing to participate 
in a similar survey in the future (part 6).  
3 A Multiple Imputation Method for SAVE 
3.1 Motivation and Theoretical Underpinnings 
To deal with item nonresponse, one can resort to a complete-case analysis, to model-based 
approaches that incorporate the structure of the missing data, or one can use imputation 
procedures. A complete-case analysis may produce biased inference, if the dataset with 
only complete observations differs systematically from the target population; weighting of 
the complete cases reduces the bias but generally leads to inappropriate standard errors. 
Additionally, a complete-case analysis leads to less efficient estimates, since the number 
of individuals with complete data is often considerably smaller than the total sample size.3 
Formal modeling that incorporates the structure of the missing data involves basing 
inference on the likelihood or posterior distribution under a structural model for the 
missing-data mechanism and the incomplete survey variables, where parameters are 
estimated by methods such as maximum likelihood. Multiple imputation essentially is a 
way to solve the modeling problem by simulating the distribution of the missing data 
(Rubin, 1996). Ideally, the imputation procedures control for all relevant observed 
differences between nonrespondents and respondents, such that the results obtained from 
the analysis of the complete dataset are less biased overall and estimates are more efficient 
than in an analysis based on complete cases only.  
The goal of imputation is not to create any artificial information but to use the 
existing information in such a way that public users can analyze the resulting complete 
dataset with standard statistical methods for complete data. It is often seen as the 
responsibility of the data provider to provide the imputations: First, because imputation is 
a very resources-consuming process that is not at the disposal of many users. Second, 
because some pieces of information which are very useful for the imputation, such as 
information on interviewer characteristics, are not available to the public. Users are free to 
ignore the imputations, all imputed values are flagged.  
 
                                                 
3 Rubin (1987) and Little and Rubin (2002) illustrate and discuss biased inference and efficiency losses 
based on complete-case analyses and weighted complete-case analyses. 
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Assumptions 
Many different statistical imputation methods exist and are applied in a variety of data 
contexts. Examples are mean or median imputation, hotdeck imputation and regression-
based imputation. Hotdeck is a very frequently used nonparametric method (e.g., in the 
RAND-HRS). For hotdeck, only very few conditioning variables can be used, even when 
the dataset is very large. Regression-based imputations need parametric assumptions. 
Since regression-based methods allow for conditioning on many more variables than 
hotdeck methods, they are better than hotdeck methods in preserving a rich correlation 
structure of the data, provided that an appropriate parametric assumption is made. 
Ideally, to impute the missing values, a statistical model should be explicitly 
formulated for each incomplete survey variable and for the missing-data mechanism. The 
parameters should then be estimated from the existing data (and from potentially available 
further information, such as information about the interview process) by methods such as 
maximum likelihood. Identifying the probability distributions of the variables under study 
is often very hard and requires weakly motivated assumptions, since the mechanisms of 
nonresponse are often very complex (Manski, 2005). 
Clearly, imputation methods have to make some statistical assumption about the 
nonresponse mechanism and about the distribution of the data values in the survey.4 For 
the imputation method presented in this paper, the underlying assumption about the way in 
which missing data were lost is that missing values are ignorable. To define the 
ignorability assumption, let us first define missing at random (MAR):5  
Suppose that Y is a variable with missing data and X is a vector of always observed 
variables in the dataset. Then, formally: 
Y is MAR ï P(Y is observed | X, Y) = P(Y is observed | X) 
That is, after controlling for information in X, the probability of missingness of Y is 
unrelated to Y.6 MAR implies that the imputation method should condition on all 
                                                 
4 The Bayesian nature of the presented imputation algorithm also requires specification of a prior 
distribution for the parameters of the imputation model. In practice, unless the data are very sparse or the 
sample is very small, a noninformative prior is used (see Schafer (1997) for details). Based on Schafer 
(1997), it can be concluded that the data in the SAVE survey are neither sparse, nor is the sample small. 
Consequently, I do not make any assumption about the prior distribution of parameters. 
5 Note that the MAR assumption cannot be tested from available data (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
6 MAR does not imply that the missing values are a random subsample of the complete dataset. This latter 
condition is much more restrictive and is called ‘missing completely at random’ (MCAR). See Little and 
Rubin (2002) for further discussions. 
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variables that are predictive of the missingness of Y, since MAR may no longer be 
satisfied if variables that determine the nonresponse are not included as conditioning 
variables (Schafer, 1997).  
The missing data mechanism is said to be ignorable, if, (a), the data are MAR and, 
(b), the parameters for the missing data generating process are unrelated to the parameters 
that the researcher wants to estimate from the data.7 Ignorability is the formal assumption 
that allows one to, first, estimate relationships among variables between observed data 
and, then, use these relationships to obtain predictions of the missing values from the 
observed values.  
Of course, for these relationships to yield unbiased predictions, one would need the 
correct model for the observed and missing values. The imputation method presented in 
this paper relies on simple parametric assumptions for all core variables with high rates of 
missingness8 and the method uses nonparametric hotdeck methods for discrete variables 
with only few categories and with very low rates of missingness. The fact that data have 
been multiply imputed increases robustness to departures from the true imputation model 
considerably compared to single imputation approaches that are based on the same 
imputation model. This has been demonstrated in simulation studies (Ezzati-Rice et al., 
1995; Graham and Schafer, 1999; Schafer, 1997). Furthermore, using simulated and real 
datasets from different scientific fields and with varying rates of item nonresponse, 
existing research emphasizes the robustness of multiple imputation to the specifically 
chosen imputation model, given that appropriate conditioning variables are available in 
the dataset (e.g., Schafer, 1997; Bernaards et al., 2003). 
The imputation method used for SAVE aims at capturing all relevant relationships 
between variables in order to preserve the correlation structure between the variables. The 
method therefore conditions on as many relevant and available variables as possible in the 
imputation of each single variable. All possible determinants of the variable to be imputed 
are included as predictors of that variable. Additionally, as has been argued above, 
including all variables that are potential predictors of missingness makes the MAR-
assumption more plausible, because this assumption depends on the availability of 
                                                 
7 In the literature, MAR and “ignorability” are often treated as equivalent under the assumption that 
condition (b) for ignorability is almost always satisfied (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
8 In line with other iterative or non-iterative and regression-based imputation methods for survey data, e.g. 
Bover (2004), Frick and Grabka (2005), and Kennickell (1998), I generally assume a linear model for the 
imputation of continuous variables with high missingness. 
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variables that can explain missingness and that are correlated with the variable to be 
imputed.9  
Multiple Imputation 
Single imputation does not reflect the true distributional relationship between observed 
and missing values and it does not allow the uncertainty about the missing data to be 
reflected in the subsequent analyses. Estimated standard errors are generally too small (see 
also appendix, section 6.2), and even if an appropriate imputation model is chosen, single 
imputation is more prone to generate biased estimates than multiple imputation. These 
defects – documented and discussed in, e.g., Li et al. (1991) and Rubin and Schenker 
(1986) – can seriously affect the subsequent interpretation of the analyses.  
In multiple imputation, M>1 plausible data sets are generated with all missing 
values replaced by imputed values. All M complete datasets are then used separately for 
the analysis and the results of all M analyses are combined such that the uncertainty due to 
imputation is reflected in the results (see appendix, section 6.2). Briefly, multiple 
imputation simulates the distribution of missing data and the resulting overall estimates 
then incorporate the uncertainty about which values to impute. This involves two types of 
uncertainty: Sampling variation assuming the mechanisms of nonresponse are known and 
variation due to uncertainty about the mechanisms of nonresponse (Rubin, 1987).  
Unless the fraction of missing data is extremely large, it is sufficient to obtain a 
relatively small number M of imputed datasets, usually not more than five, which is the 
choice for M in the SAVE imputation method.10 The relative gains in efficiency from 
larger numbers are minor under the rates of missing data that are observed in surveys such 
as the SAVE survey.11  
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation 
Tanner and Wong (1987) present an iterative simulation framework for imputation based 
on an argument that involves the estimation of a set of parameters from conditioning 
information that is potentially unobserved. I review briefly their arguments to motivate the 
iterative imputation method that is used for the SAVE study: 
                                                 
9 Details about the inclusion of conditioning variables in the SAVE imputation method are discussed in 
section 3.2.4. 
10 Both, the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (Bover, 2004) and the U.S. Survey of Consumer 
Finances (Kennickell, 1998) also provide 5 imputations. 
11 Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1997) define efficiency in the context of multiply imputed datasets and discuss 
the choice of M and its impact on efficiency in detail.  
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Let xu be unobserved values of a larger set x and let xo=x\xu. Xu is the sample space 
of the unobserved data, θ  is a set of parameter values to be estimated for which the 
parameter space is denoted by Θ. The desired posterior distribution of the parameter 
values, given the observed data, can be written as: 
∫=
uX
uouuoo dxxxfxxfxf )|(),|()|( θθ  (1) 
Here, ),|( uo xxf θ  is the conditional density of θ given the complete data X, and 
)|( ou xxf  is the predictive density of the unobserved data given the observed data. The 
predictive density of the unobserved data given the observed data can be related to the 
posterior distribution that is shown above as follows: 
∫
Θ
= φφφ dxfxxfxxf oouou )|(),|()|(  (2) 
The basic idea of Tanner and Wong is that the desired posterior is intractable based 
on only the observed data, but it is tractable after the data are augmented by unobserved 
data xu in an iterative framework. The suggested iterative method for the calculation of the 
posterior starts with an initial approximation of the posterior. Then, a new draw of xu is 
made from )|( ou xxf  given the current draw from the posterior )|( oxf θ , and this draw is 
then used for the next draw of )|( oxf θ . Tanner and Wong show that under mild regularity 
conditions, this iterative procedure converges to the desired posterior.  
In an imputation framework, the target distribution is the joint conditional 
distribution of xu and θ, given xo. Based on the ideas of Tanner and Wong, the iterative 
simulation method is summarized as follows: First, replace all missing data by plausible 
starting values. Given certain parametric assumptions, θ  can then be estimated from the 
resulting complete data posterior distribution ),|( uo xxf θ . Let now tθ  be the current value 
of θ. The next iterative sample of xu can then be drawn from the predictive distribution of 
xu given xo and tθ : 
),|(~1 tou
t
u xxfx θ+  [Imputation step (I-step)] (3) 
The next step is again to simulate the next iteration of θ  from the complete data posterior 
distribution: 
),|(~ 11 ++ tuot xxf θθ  [Prediction step (P-step)] (4) 
Repeating steps (3) and (4), i.e. sequential sampling from the two distributions, 
generates an iterative Markovian procedure },...,2,1:),{( Ntxtut =θ . For the purpose of 
imputation, this procedure yields a successive simulation of the distribution of missing 
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values, conditioned on both, observed data and distributions of missing data previously 
simulated. The set of conditioning variables in this algorithm is not necessarily the entire 
set of all possible values (Tanner and Wong, 1987). Geman and Geman (1984) apply a 
similar procedure in the field of image processing and show that the stochastic sequence is 
a Markov chain that has the correct stationary distribution under certain regularity 
conditions. Li (1988) presents an additional formal argument that the process moves closer 
to the true latent distribution with each iteration and finally converges. The method is 
called Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) because it involves simulation and the 
sequence is a Markov Chain. Formally, the method is also related to Gibbs sampling 
(Hastings, 1970), and in the missing data literature, it is often referred to as data augmen-
tation. This method has been used in many statistical applications (e.g., Bover 2004; 
Kennickell, 1998; Schafer 1997). Sequential simulation algorithms of the MCMC-type 
can be modified and implemented in different ways, I briefly come back to this issue in 
section 5. 
3.2  The MIMS-Model 
3.2.1 Variable Definitions 
The multiple imputation method for SAVE (MIMS) distinguishes between core variables 
and non-core variables. The core variables have been chosen such that they cover the 
financial modules of the SAVE survey that involve all questions related to income, 
saving(s), and wealth of the household. The non-core variables include socio-demographic 
and psychometric variables, as well as indicator variables for household economic 
behavior. Except for the participation questions of the core variables (e.g., “Did you or 
your partner own asset X?”) and the question about the value of owner-occupied housing, 
all core variables have missing rates of at least 6%. The non-core variables have 
considerably lower missing rates, in almost all cases much less than 2%. The following 
variables (grouped into three categories) are defined as core-variables: 
• Income variables (E): 40 binary variables indicating income components, 1 
continuous variable for monthly net income, and 1 ordinal variable indicating net 
income in follow-up brackets.  
• Savings variables (S): 1 binary variable indicating whether the household has a 
certain savings goal, 1 continuous variable indicating the amount of this savings 
goal, and 1 continuous variable indicating the amount of total annual saving.  
• Asset variables (A): 48 binary variables indicating asset ownership and credit, 44 
continuous variables indicating the particular amounts.  
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All other variables in the dataset are non-core variables.  
3.2.2 Algorithmic Overview  
MIMS is a multiple imputation procedure that is based on the idea of a Markovian process 
that I have described in the previous subsection. The general algorithmic structure of 
MIMS is similar to the FRITZ imputation method that is used for the multiple imputation 
of the Survey of Consumer Finances and for the Spanish Survey of Household Finances 
(Kennickell, 1998; Bover, 2004). To set the stage for a more detailed discussion of MIMS 
in the next section, this section gives a brief algorithmic overview of MIMS. 
For this purpose, all variables are categorized as follows: 
• All variables that are not core variables are called other variables, O.  
• P is a subset of O, the subset of all variables that is used as conditioning variables 
or predictors for the current imputation step. 
• The union of all variables from P and all core variables that are used as 
conditioning variables for the current imputation step is referred to as the set C (= 
conditioning variables). In the following algorithmic description, C always 
contains the updated information based on the most recent iteration step. It 
contains, in particular, the imputed core variables that have been obtained in the 
last iteration step.  
The complete imputation algorithm for the SAVE data works as follows: 
__________ 
- Impute all variables using logical imputation, whenever possible. 
Outer Loop – REPEAT 5 times, j = 1,..., 5 (= Generate 5 datasets) 
 - Impute variables from O using (sequential) hotdeck imputation, obtain complete  
   data O*. 
 - Impute the income variables E using P*, obtain complete data E*. 
 - Impute the savings variables S using P* and E*, obtain complete data S*. 
 - Impute the asset variables A using P*, E*, and S*, obtain complete data A*. 
 Inner Loop – REPEAT N times (= Iterate N times) 
  - Impute the income variables E using C. 
  - Impute the savings variables S using C.  
  - Impute the asset variables A using C.  
 Inner Loop – END 
Outer Loop – END 
__________ 
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The five repetitions in the outer loop generate one imputed dataset each. After the 
complete algorithm, five complete datasets are obtained, which I henceforth refer to as 
implicates. The algorithm generates an additional flag-dataset which contains binary 
indicators that identify for each value whether it has been imputed or observed.  
3.2.3 Description of MIMS 
As the algorithmic description shows, MIMS follows a fixed path through the dataset. The 
first step of the procedure consists of logical imputation. In many cases, the complex tree 
structure of the SAVE survey or cross-variable relationships allow for the possibility to 
logically impute missing values. The following path through the dataset is guided by the 
knowledge of the missing item rates and by cross-variable relationships. The path starts 
with variables with low missing rates, such that those variables can subsequently be used 
as conditioning variables for variables with higher missing rates. For example, among the 
core variables, the net income variable is imputed first, since its missing rate is generally 
lower than the missing rates of other core variables.12 The algorithmic description shows 
that as soon as the iteration loop starts, all variables are already imputed, i.e. starting 
values for the iteration process have been obtained, and all variables can be used as 
conditioning variables during the iteration. 
Each variable is imputed based on one of the following three general methods:13  
(1) For all categorical or ordinal variables with only few categories and with a low 
missing rate, a hotdeck procedure with several conditioning variables is used.  
(2) For all binary, categorical, or ordinal core variables, binomial or ordered Probit 
models are used.  
(3) For all continuous or quasi-continuous variables, randomized linear regressions with 
normally distributed errors are used. This regression procedure, in particular the handling 
of constraints and restrictions, follows Bover (2004) and Kennickell (1998). First, the 
conditional expected value is estimated and an error term, drawn from a symmetrically 
censored normal distribution, is added. This normal distribution has mean zero and its 
variance is the residual variance of the estimation. The error term is always restricted to 
the central three standard deviations of the distribution in order to avoid imputing extreme 
                                                 
12 The lower missing rate for the net income variable is – at least partly – due to the survey design. The net 
income question was presented using an open-ended format with follow-up brackets for those who did not 
answer the open-ended question. The imputation of the bracket answers is described later in this paper. 
13 These methods and their application to binary, categorical, ordinal and (quasi-)continuous variables with 
high and low missing rates are illustrated and discussed in more detail in Little and Rubin (2002). 
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values. In few cases, logical or other constraints require that the error term has to be 
further restricted; examples are non-negativity constraints. The imputed value is also 
restricted to lie in the observed range of values for the corresponding variable. That is, in 
particular, imputed values will not be higher than observed values for a certain variable.  
Due to the skip patterns in the questionnaire, the SAVE data have a very complex 
tree structure that imposes a logical structure and that has to be accounted for in the 
imputation process. Further constraints stem from these logical conditions of the data, 
from the ranges provided (e.g., bracket respondents), from cross-relationships with other 
variables, or from any prior knowledge about feasible outcomes. For several variables, the 
specification of all relevant constraints is the most complex part of the imputation 
software. If necessary, the procedure draws from the estimated conditional distribution 
limited to the central three standard deviations, until an outcome is found that satisfies all 
possible constraints that apply in the particular case. 
 
Two remarks are important at this point to gain an understanding of key procedures of the 
algorithm. 
(1) Ownership and amount imputations 
For certain quantities, e.g. the amount of assets held by a household, the SAVE survey 
uses a two-step question mode: In step one, households are asked about ownership of 
assets from a certain asset category and a binary variable records the answer. In step two, 
those households that have reported that they own assets from the particular category are 
asked about the exact value of the corresponding assets. From a modeling point of view, 
this is a corner solution application. Following Bover (2004) and Kennickell (1998), a 
hurdle model is used in MIMS to impute the missing values in these two steps: First, a 
Probit model is estimated for the binary ownership variable, and missing information is 
predicted. Then, as described above, randomized linear regressions with normally 
distributed errors are used for imputing continuous amounts. These regressions are 
estimated based on all observations that own the asset. Alternatively, Tobit models or 
sample-selection models might be appropriate. Tobit models are less attractive for the 
given problem, since they include the implicit assumption that the model governing 
selection and the model governing the estimation of the amounts are the same. Heckman 
selection models are theoretically attractive, but cause estimation problems in practice: 
First, the necessary exclusion restrictions differ substantially across asset categories, but 
there is no theoretical reason why they should differ. Second, in most cases, strong 
 15
exclusion restrictions are needed to ensure identification and convergence of the Heckman 
procedure in each iteration step of MIMS. This means that in practice only a very small set 
of conditioning variables can be used for the estimation of the second step of the Heckman 
model. Under these circumstances and given that the goal of the multiple imputation 
method is to simulate the distribution of amounts conditional on ownership and 
conditional on a maximally large set of potentially correlated variables, MIMS uses hurdle 
models for ownership and amount imputations. 
(2) Net income variables 
To alleviate the problem of item nonresponse to income questions (see, e.g., Juster and 
Smith, 1997), the survey question on monthly net income was presented using an open-
ended format with follow-up brackets for those who did not answer the open-ended 
question. That is, there are two types of income information available: Exact (in the sense 
of point data) income information for households that answered the open-ended question, 
and interval information on household income for those who only answered the bracket 
question. To make best possible use of all the available income information, the 
imputation procedure uses a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure. The likelihood is 
a mixture of discrete terms (for the interval information) and continuous terms (for the 
point data information). After prediction of the missing income values and the addition of 
the randomized error term, a nearest neighbor approach is used to determine the imputed 
amount for household net income.14 The procedure works as follows: First, an income 
bracket is predicted for all complete nonrespondents to both (i.e., open-ended and bracket) 
income questions. Now, all observations have either exact income information (if they 
have reported this information) or bracket information (either they have reported this 
information, or it has been imputed in the preceding step). Then, each observation i for 
whom an exact net income value has to be imputed and whose net income lies in bracket j 
is matched with the continuous reporter r from bracket j whose predicted net income value 
is closest to the predicted value of respondent i. The net income value assigned to 
observation i is then the reported continuous income value of the respondent r.15 
                                                 
14 Nearest neighbor methods have been motivated in a statistical missing data context by Little et al. (1988) 
and they have subsequently used in the context of bracketed follow-up questions by, e.g., Hoynes et al. 
(1998) in the AHEAD. 
15 In contrast to this procedure, Hoynes et al. (1998) impute the brackets for the full nonrespondents using an 
ordered Probit model that is estimated using only those respondents that have provided bracket answers. The 
chosen procedure in MIMS has the advantage of making better use of the available information (since it uses 
the information from bracket respondents and from contiuous, i.e. open-ended, respondents) and it 
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3.2.4 Selection of Conditioning Variables 
As is clear from the descriptions above, each regression or hotdeck method is tailored 
specifically to the variable to be imputed.16 Of particular importance are the conditioning 
variables which have been selected individually for every single variable with missing 
information according to the following guidelines: 
(A) Hotdeck imputations: Hotdeck imputations, which have been used for discrete 
variables with very low missing rates, allow for only few and discrete conditioning 
variables due to the quickly increasing number of the corresponding conditioning cells. 
The conditioning variables have first been selected based on theoretical relationships if 
available and, second, based on the strength of a correlation with the variable to be 
imputed; those correlations have been systematically explored. As an example for the 
latter, consider the question which asks respondents to rate their expectation concerning 
the future development of their own health situation on a scale from 0 (negative) to 10 
(positive), which has a missing rate of 0.6%. As conditioning variables, the respondents’ 
age (subdivided into five age classes), self-assessed information on the respondents’ 
current health status (rated on a scale from 0 to 10 and subdivided into three classes), and 
self-assessed information on how optimistic the respondent generally is (rated on a scale 
from 0 to 10 and subdivided into three classes) are used.17 All these conditioning variables 
are significantly correlated with the variable to be imputed, both individually, as well as 
jointly in a multiple regression. In some cases, it would be desirable to include core 
variables as additional conditioning variables in the hotdeck imputations. For example, net 
income is clearly expected to be correlated with educational status. Generally, the pattern 
of nonresponse makes this impossible, since the set of nonrespondents to the qualitative 
questions is in almost all cases a subset of the set of nonrespondents to the relevant core 
questions.  
                                                                                                                                                   
circumvents the practical problem in SAVE that the subsample of bracket respondents is too small to be able 
to include much conditioning information into the estimation of an ordered Probit model. Hoynes et al. 
(1998) motivate their procedure by arguing that full nonrespondents are more similar to bracket respondents 
than to continuous reporters. Note, however, that the evidence on the similarity between nonrespondents, 
bracket respondents and continuous respondents is mixed (Kennickell, 1997). 
16 A spreadsheet with information on the specific imputation methods for each imputed variable in SAVE 
(e.g., hotdeck, various regression techniques), as well as information on the used conditioning variables can 
be obtained from the author upon request. 
17 Note that these three conditioning variables already correspond to 5 · 3 · 3 = 45 different cells. 
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(B) Regression-based imputations: In theory, every regression-based imputation should 
use all relevant variables in the dataset, as well as higher powers and interactions of those 
terms as conditioning variables (see section 3.1 and Little and Raghunathan, 1997). The 
imputation procedure should, in particular, attempt to preserve the relationships between 
all variables that might be jointly analyzed in future studies based on the imputed data 
(Schafer, 1997). In practice, a limit to the number of included conditioning variables is 
imposed by the degrees of freedom of the regressions. Additionally, there must not be 
collinearity between conditioning variables, which can easily arise in some cases due to 
the tree structure of the questions. Due to these constraints concerning the inclusion of 
conditioning variables, it is of particular importance to select these variables following 
certain guidelines such that best possible use is made of the available information. For that 
purpose, the variables used in the regression-based imputations of the core variables have 
been classified into three non-disjoint categories: 
(B-1) Determinants of the nonresponse.  
Research in psychology, economics, and survey methodology has investigated the 
relationship between observed respondent and household characteristics and item 
nonresponse behavior in various survey contexts (for an overview, see Groves et al., 
2002). Findings from empirical studies that focus particularly on financial survey items 
suggest that certain variables might be useful predictors of nonresponse to wealth and 
income questions (Hoynes et al., 1998; Riphahn and Serfling, 2005). Following these 
findings, MIMS considers the following variables as determinants of nonresponse to the 
core variables: Age (as well as squared and cubic age), gender, dummy variables for 
educational achievement and employment status, as well as household size. Riphahn and 
Serfling (2005) and Schräpler and Wagner (2001) provide evidence that it is not only the 
individual respondent’s characteristics that may be associated with item nonresponse to 
financial variables, but also the combination of interviewer and respondent characteristics. 
In this spirit, the following variables that capture the relationship between interviewer and 
interviewee characteristics are also considered as determinants of nonresponse to the core 
financial variables in SAVE: Dummies for whether the interviewer is older than the 
interviewee, for her/his educational status relative to the interviewee, for the interviewer’s 
gender, and for the gender combination of interviewer and interviewee. 
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(B-2) Variables that are related to the variable to be imputed based on different economic 
models. 
This category contains essentially all core variables, since financial characteristics of 
households, e.g. saving(s), income and asset categories, are all interrelated. Certain 
qualitative variables on household socio-economic and financial characteristics that are 
not already part of the variables in (B-1) are also included, for example an indicator for 
marital status. Variables that measure individual preferences, such as measures for risk 
attitude, are further included into this category.  
(B-3) Other variables that might be related to the variables to be imputed. 
This category includes variables that are correlated with the variables to be imputed but 
this relationship is not captured in any formal established economic theory that the author 
knows of. An example is the smoking habit of the respondent: While there is no formal 
theory that directly relates smoking habits to economic characteristics of a household, 
there is abundant evidence for a statistically strong association between smoking habits 
and economic characteristics (e.g., Hersch, 2000; Hersch and Viscusi, 1990; Levine et al., 
1997).  
 
The selection of the conditioning variables for the regression is based on the following 
procedure: First, since the goal is to include as many conditioning variables as possible, all 
variables from categories (B-1), (B-2), and (B-3) are included for each imputation 
regression. If necessary – because of multicollinearity or insufficient degrees of freedom – 
variables are removed in the following order: First, variables from (B-3) are removed. 
Then, variables from (B-2) are aggregated if possible: E.g., instead of including 
information on the value of owner-occupied housing and on other real estate as two 
separate conditioning variables, these two variables can be combined to form a variable 
for total real estate wealth. In a few cases, notably variables with very low variability, 
such as the measure of wealth in “other contractually agreed private pension schemes”, 
further conditioning variables from category (B-2) have to be removed. In this case, the 
decision is based on the significance of the variables in the regression. Generally, 
psychometric variables are removed first and credit variables are removed subsequently, 
since those variables have the lowest variability and the highest missing rate among the 
core variables. 
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4 Results 
MIMS has been applied to the 2003/2004 wave of the SAVE survey which contains 3154 
observed households and all statistics presented in this section are based on this wave. 
This section discusses the convergence properties of the algorithm and presents 
descriptive analyses of the imputed and the observed data. The presented analyses serve to 
illustrate the differences between the five implicates, the impact of imputation on the 
distribution of values in the complete dataset, and they are informative concerning the 
differences in the character of nonresponse across various financial survey items.  
4.1  Convergence of MIMS 
Assessing convergence of the sequence of draws to the target distribution is more difficult 
than assessing convergence of, e.g., EM-type algorithms, since there is no single target 
quantity to monitor, like the maximum value of the likelihood. In this subsection, I first 
develop a convergence criterion that is based on a measure for the average change in the 
values of a certain variable vector between two consecutive iteration steps. I then use a 
standard convergence criterion that is also mentioned in Bover (2004) and which is 
defined with respect to measures of position and dispersion of the distribution of the 
variable to be imputed. Both convergence criteria are used for assessing convergence of 
three core variables of the SAVE survey. 
Let us assume first that there is missing information on only one variable Y in the 
dataset. That is, all conditioning variables are complete data vectors without missing 
values. Let Yi,t be the imputed value of the variable of interest for household i in iteration 
step t, and let I be the total number of imputed observations for variable Y in the dataset. 
Then, the squared change in the value of variable Y between iteration step t and t-1 is: 
∑
=
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If the procedure has converged, the parameters θ  that characterize the distribution of the 
imputed variable have stabilized.18 That is, after convergence has been achieved, there is 
no systematic component in the change of Y over iterations steps any more; only a non-
                                                 
18 Note: This suggests a further way to assess convergence: One can investigate the degree of serial 
dependence of a certain parameter value over iteration steps by analyzing the autocorrelation function. 
Ideally, this has to be done for all parameters of the particular imputation model, and it is preferred for 
datasets with only few variables and a correspondingly small set of conditioning variables and parameters 
(Schafer, 1997).  
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systematic component remains. tiY ,  and 1, −tiY  can then be assumed to be draws from the 
same distribution. This implies that – as soon as convergence has been achieved – we 
have: 
)(2)()()()(1)( ,1,,1,,
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−∑  (6) 
Indeed, if the procedure has converged, the distribution of the remaining non-systematic 
component is well known, since it is characterized by the distribution of the simulated 
error term that is added to the particular predicted value of in each iteration step. I.e., 
)( ,tiYVar can be calculated as the variance of the simulated error term: This error term, ε , is 
drawn from a normal distribution, the variance of which is – by construction – the residual 
variance of the particular estimation (see section 3.2.3). This normal distribution is then 
double censored to the central three standard deviations. I derive the variance of a double 
censored variable ε in the appendix (see section 6.1).  
From these deliberations follows: If the process has converged, )(ts , calculated 
based on the imputed values of the variable tiY ,  and 1, −tiY , should be equal to 
)(2)( tVarte ε= , i.e. it should be equal to two times the variance of the simulated error term 
in iteration step t. Furthermore, if convergence has been achieved, )(ts  and )(te  are 
stationary, i.e. they should not have any trend over iterations steps and the sample 
autocorrelation function for )(ts  and )(te  should not indicate autocorrelations at any lag. 
 
In real world data-sets, such as in the SAVE data, it is rarely the case that all conditioning 
variables are non-missing, as I have assumed for the derivation above. In particular, this 
condition will not be satisfied in MIMS, since – for reasons given above (see section 
3.2.4) – MIMS conditions on as many core variables as possible which have rather high 
missing rates themselves. But even if the conditioning variables themselves have been 
imputed, the parameters θ  that characterize the distribution of imputed variables should, 
of course, have stabilized if the process has converged. That is, if the process converges, 
)(ts  and )(te  are stationary, i.e. they should not have any trend over iterations steps, and 
the corresponding autocorrelation functions should not indicate any autocorrelations. 
Therefore, displaying )(ts  and )(te  over time provides an intuitive graphical way to 
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investigate convergence of the process.19 Note, however, that the fact that the conditioning 
variables are also imputed has the effect that )(ts  should be in fact larger than )(te  even if 
the process has converged, since the imputed conditioning variables themselves are drawn 
from the corresponding posterior distribution in the particular iteration step. 
 
Figure 1 shows )(ts  and )(te . Five different iteration runs are shown for t = 1,..., 30 and 
one additional run is shown for t = 1,..., 100 in the last row of the figure. The runs are 
displayed for three variables that are used to assess convergence, one from each category 
of the core variables.20 In all simulation runs, )(te  quickly resembles a horizontal line. As 
expected due to the sample size, )(ts  is very volatile. It lies above the value )(te , and after 
few iterations, it does not exhibit any trend over the following iteration steps.21 The results 
indicate quick convergence in the first few iteration steps for net income and for annual 
saving. For the net income variable, )(ts  is lower than )(te 22; this is due to the nearest 
neighbor algorithm and the available bracket information for many nonrespondents which 
reduces variability of a certain imputed value over iteration steps. 
A further investigation of the sample autocorrelation functions of )(ts  and )(te  does not 
reveal any correlations. The corresponding autocorrelation data and figures can be 
obtained from the author upon request. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The purpose of these derivations is to suggest a simple graphical convergence diagnostic for an MCMC-
method that is applied to a large dataset and that uses a very large set of conditioning variables. I do not 
claim an equivalence result: While convergence of the algorithm would imply that s(t) and e(t) do not 
exhibit any downward or upward trend, the converse is not true; i.e. stationarity of s(t) and e(t) does not 
imply convergence of the algorithm.  
20 Note that only those values for whom no further constraints apply in all iteration steps (e.g., neither non-
negativity constraints nor maximum-value constraints), are used for the calculation of s(t) and e(t).  
21 If the calculation of s(t) is restricted to those observations for which the conditioning variables are almost 
complete, i.e. non-missing, then the plot reveals that s(t) fluctuates around e(t), as predicted. However, the 
number of observations is even smaller in this case. 
22 Note, that s(t) and e(t) are plotted on a logarithmic scale for the net income variable in order to be able to 
plot both variables in one graph. 
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Figure 1: Convergence diagnostics: s(t) and e(t) displayed for three key variables. 
 
s(t) e(t)
 
Note: For net income, s(t) and e(t) are divided by 1,000,000, for annual saving and 
savings/term accounts, s(t) and e(t) are divided by 10,000,000. 
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A common criterion for assessing the convergence of a distribution, also suggested in 
Bover (2004), is to compare (functions of) quantiles, e.g., the median and the interquartile 
range, resulting from successive iterations of the variable Y: 
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Here, Q25, Q50, and Q75 denote the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile, respectively, of the 
particular distribution of imputed values. As long as the process converges, tb  has a 
downward trend. As soon as the process has converged, )(tb  should not exhibit a trend 
any more. Figure 2 shows tb  for the three variables that are used for convergence 
diagnosis. As before, five iteration runs are shown for t = 1,..., 30 and one run is shown 
for t = 1,..., 100. The figures reveal convergence for the net income variable, and some 
indication for convergence of the annual saving variable, which is, however, not really 
convincing. 
Overall, the findings from the two convergence diagnostics presented above suggest 
relatively quick convergence of the algorithm on the net income variable, and mixed 
evidence for the annual saving variable. The convergence properties of the algorithm have 
been investigated on all other core variables. No indication for divergent behavior or long-
term drift has been found, in all cases, )(ts , )(te , and )(tb  are stationary after few 
iteration steps and no autocorrelation is present in )(ts , )(te , and )(tb . However, )(ts  and 
)(tb  do not exhibit a clear downward trend for many variables in the early iteration steps; 
that is, they are stationary from the first iteration step on. The variable savings and term 
accounts which is displayed in the presented figures, is an example of such a variable. 
This result, which is also mentioned by Kennickell (1998), suggests that those variables 
have essentially converged in the first iteration step; i.e. convergence has already been 
achieved in the first prediction step which has served to generate the starting values for the 
iteration. 
Note, that iteration runs with t = 300, which are not displayed graphically in this paper, 
have also been analyzed for both suggested convergence criteria; as well, the 
corresponding autocorrelation functions have been investigated. The findings show that 
even longer iteration procedures do not achieve better convergence results based on the 
presented diagnostics; in particular, no autocorrelation at longer lags is found. 
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Figure 2: Convergence diagnostics: b(t) displayed for three key variables. 
 
Note: Values b(t) are divided by 100. 
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Overall, the results are in line with findings based on the iterative algorithm implemented 
for the imputation of the Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, 1998). Kennickell 
reports quick convergence on key variables, the algorithm is run for 6 iteration steps 
overall.23 Given the findings about convergence in this section, MIMS is run for 20 
iteration steps, this takes about 2 days per implicate. 
4.2  Observed, Imputed, and Complete Data 
This subsection has two main purposes: First, the reader should get an impression of the 
differences across the five imputed and across the five complete data implicates. For this 
reason, the following tables report descriptive statistics of key financial variables for all 
five implicates. Second, the section presents and briefly discusses differences between the 
distributions of observed and imputed data. The section ends with a graphical comparison 
between observed and imputed data.  
 
The following table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the observed data, for the five 
imputed implicates, and for the five complete data implicates (complete data implicates 
consist of observed and imputed data, i.e. the full rectangular data matrix). The means of 
all variables vary across complete data implicates and across imputed data implicates. 
Medians of all variables vary only across imputed data implicates, not across complete 
data implicates.24 I first turn to the financial wealth variables. The table shows a consistent 
pattern for all financial wealth variables and for the saving variable: The mean of the 
imputed data is considerably higher than the mean of the observed data. This finding 
deserves further investigation. 
                                                 
23 A comparison with similar iterative imputation methods, described in Bover (2004) and Kennickell 
(1998), would be informative. Bover (2004) and Kennickell (1998) do not present graphical or numerical 
evaluations of the convergence properties of their imputation method.  
24 The fact that summary distributional characteristics, such as mean values, are similar across implicates is 
in line with our finding that the imputation for all 5 implicates – which have all started with different initial 
values for the imputed variables – have indeed converged, and not diverged. Again, longer simulations lead 
to similar results.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the observed data, for the 5 imputed implicates, and for the 5 complete data implicates. 
 
Observed data
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 2,554 2,382 2,390 2,400 2,386 2,388 2,501 2,504 2,507 2,502 2,503
Median 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Min. 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Max. 120,000 20,000 20,000 23,333 20,000 20,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000
Mean 2,624 5,453 5,336 5,624 5,553 5,784 2,948 2,940 2,971 2,970 2,994
Median 1,000 3,929 3,738 3,895 3,946 3,772 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 150,000 78,206 56,586 98,161 55,435 112,878 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000
Mean 8,174 12,155 12,272 11,755 12,274 12,129 9,068 9,094 8,978 9,094 9,062
Median 500 10,784 11,176 10,360 11,628 10,436 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 1,000,000 88,897 95,767 116,545 81,713 143,290 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Mean 1,775 3,917 3,873 3,755 3,726 3,907 2,124 2,117 2,098 2,093 2,122
Median 0 1,844 1,805 1,528 1,671 1,972 0 0 0 0 0
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 100,000 54,442 64,057 58,061 66,725 68,408 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000
Savings/term accounts  [€]
Building society savings agreements  [€]
Implicate No.
Imputed data
Net income [€]
Annual saving [€]
Complete data
Implicate No.
 
Note: All calculations are unweighted. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Observed data
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 5,042 13,881 14,333 14,393 13,981 13,821 6,813 6,904 6,916 6,833 6,801
Median 0 9,970 10,793 10,380 9,840 9,922 0 0 0 0 0
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 500,000 196,235 189,196 224,734 198,699 203,240 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000
Mean 1,644 10,237 10,459 11,364 11,291 10,915 2,625 2,650 2,754 2,745 2,702
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 1,000,000 316,511 349,122 345,260 403,173 380,301 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Mean 3,857 8,511 8,350 8,618 8,291 8,460 4,555 4,531 4,571 4,522 4,547
Median 0 526 558 962 925 845 0 0 0 0 0
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 18,000,000 250,392 264,187 249,577 270,813 277,270 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000
Mean 123,280 44,800 43,388 40,108 38,672 43,639 111,710 111,501 111,018 110,806 111,538
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 5,000,000 934,811 1,159,067 1,243,168 876,550 1,248,193 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
Shares & real-estate funds  [€]
Owner occupied housing  [€]
Whole life insurance policies  [€]
Bonds  [€]
Imputed data Complete data
Implicate No. Implicate No.
 
Note: All calculations are unweighted. 
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For this purpose, table 5 gives information on the imputation of asset variables by 
showing the results of the ownership imputation. The first column of the table shows the 
asset ownership rates for those who answer the ownership question, the following columns 
show imputed ownership rates for all implicates. It is found that except for the item 
savings and term accounts, ownership rates among nonrespondents are in fact lower than 
ownership rates among respondents. Both findings, namely that the imputation overall 
leads to higher means for financial asset variables (table 4) but at the same time generates 
lower ownership rates for financial assets (table 5) is in line with findings by Hoynes et al. 
(1998) who use a non-iterative regression-based single imputation method.25  
 
Table 5: Percentage of households owning assets: Observed values and 5 imputed 
implicates 
 
Observed data
1 2 3 4 5
Savings/term accounts 60.8 70.5 70.5 70.5 70.5 70.5
Building society savings agreements 27.8 15.5 16.7 15.1 14.7 15.9
Whole life insurance policies 30.4 17.1 16.7 16.7 17.5 17.5
Bonds 8.8 2.0 2.4 1.6 2.4 2.0
Shares & real-estate funds 19.8 9.2 9.2 10.0 9.6 9.2
Owner occupied housing 48.6 35.9 37.6 36.8 35.0 36.8
Imputed data
Implicate No.
 
Note: All calculations are unweighted. 
 
It can be concluded that, for most financial asset items, the included conditioning 
variables shift the distribution to higher values for financial wealth on average, compared 
to the original distribution of observed values, which would simply be replicated if no 
conditioning variables were used. The findings by Smith (1995), who reports that the 
                                                 
25 Hoynes et al. (1998) find higher mean values for all complete nonrespondents on all comparable financial 
asset variables. They also find lower imputed ownership rates than observed ownership rates on all financial 
asset variables, except from the item “bonds” and the item “checking and savings accounts”. For these items, 
they find imputed ownership rates that are similar to the observed rates. A more detailed comparison with 
results from other imputation procedures would be of high interest at this point. To the author’s knowledge, 
however, a systematic evaluation of the effect of the imputation on the distribution of different wealth 
components is only presented in the paper by Hoynes et al. (1998). Further methodological insights about 
the impact and relevance of an iterative procedure could be obtained from comparing an application of the 
Hoynes et al. (1998)-procedure and the MIMS-procedure to the same dataset. 
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effect of follow-up brackets to open-ended financial wealth questions in the HRS is a 
substantial increase in mean wealth, go into the same direction. 
In contrast to the findings concerning the financial wealth variables, table 4 shows 
that the mean of imputed values of owner occupied housing are lower than observed 
values. How are home ownership and owner-occupied housing values distributed across 
observed and imputed values? Table 5 has already shown that – according to the 
imputation – the fraction of homeowners, i.e. households with a positive value for owner-
occupied housing26, is considerably lower among nonrespondents than among 
respondents. Table 6 serves to further investigate the difference between the observed and 
the imputed distribution of the value of owner occupied housing. Each column of the table 
gives the percentage distribution of home values for homeowners across four categories. 
The table shows that households that did not answer the corresponding question are more 
likely to occupy real estate with a low value. Interestingly, the results on home-ownership 
and owner-occupied housing values are again in line with findings by Hoynes et al. 
(1998), who report that those with incomplete responses on the housing questions have 
characteristics that make them more likely to be renters, and – given that they are 
homeowners – it makes them more likely to have low values for real estate.27 
 
Table 6: Distribution of owner-occupied housing values for homeowners (percent). 
Observed data
Range (1,000 €) 1 2 3 4 5
0 - 49.9 9.0 12.9 13.7 14.9 14.1 14.9
50 - 99.9 8.3 12.9 16.8 17.0 18.5 8.5
100 - 199.9 29.3 26.9 27.4 31.9 26.1 34.0
> 200 53.4 47.3 42.1 36.2 41.3 42.6
Imputed data
Implicate No.
 
Note: All calculations are unweighted. 
                                                 
26 Of course, one can argue that the fraction of homeowners is not equal to the fraction of households with a 
positive value for owner-occupied housing, since it can also be the case that respondents own real estate and 
answer that its value is zero. In fact, about 5% of the respondents that report owning real estate give a value 
of zero in the follow-up question. In all tables above, these respondents are counted as homeowners. 
27 While the purpose of this paper is not to investigate the relationship between item nonresponse to certain 
questions and socio-economic characteristics, the above findings are interesting in this respect: They suggest 
that nonrespondents to questions about housing might have other socio-economic characteristics than 
nonrespondents to the financial wealth questions. A multivariate analysis indeed finds some evidence for 
this hypothesis. 
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Finally, I turn to the findings for the net income variable. Though medians are 
identical for imputed and observed values, the mean of monthly net income is lower for 
the imputed than for the observed values (table 4). For further investigation, table 7 
compares the distribution of net income values between imputed and observed data. No 
substantial difference in the net income distributions of both groups is observable. The 
reason for the finding that the mean of monthly net income is lower for the imputed than 
for the observed values are a few extreme values in the observed distribution of monthly 
net income: If the observed distribution of monthly net income values is trimmed such that 
the top 0.5-percentile is left out (corresponding to 10 observations that reported having a 
net income between 26,000 € and 120,000 € per month), a mean monthly net income 
value of 2,306 € is found. This value is lower than the mean monthly net income of the 
imputed observations of all five implicates (see table 4); on average by about 83 €.  
 
Table 7: Distribution of monthly net income (percent) 
Observed data
Range (1,000 €) 1 2 3 4 5
0 - 0.9 13.3 14.1 13.9 14.2 13.8 14.0
1 - 1.99 34.4 33.7 33.3 33.1 33.8 33.1
2 - 2.99 28.3 29.4 29.8 29.3 29.5 30.0
3 - 3.99 13.9 11.8 12.3 12.2 12.1 11.9
4 - 4.99 4.8 6.2 5.9 6.4 6.2 6.2
5 - 6.99 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.4
> 7 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4
Imputed data
Implicate No.
 
Note: All calculations are unweighted. 
 
Overall, it is found that MIMS does not have a strong effect on the distribution of 
income values in SAVE. In contrast, findings from a regression-based single imputation 
procedure of annual income variables for the SOEP suggest that item nonresponse on 
income appears to be selective with respect to both tails of the income distribution (Frick 
and Grabka, 2005); the overall effect of their imputation is an increase in the mean of 
after-tax income by 1.7%.  
 
To further illustrate the effects of imputation, figure 3 presents kernel density estimates of 
observed and imputed values for the above mentioned financial variables. The kernel 
density is estimated for positive values of the variables that have been analyzed above, an 
Epanechnikov kernel and Silverman’s rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986) for bandwidth 
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selection have been used. Kernel density estimates for the imputed data are usually 
obtained using Rubin’s (1987) method to combine the data from the five implicates before 
the density estimation. According to Rubin (1987)28, the overall imputed value iY  of 
variable Y for a certain observation i is simply the average over the individual five 
imputed values, m = 1,..., 5, that is: 
.
5
1 5
1
,∑
=
=
m
mii YY  (8) 
 
In addition to the discussed findings concerning mean financial wealth differences 
between imputed and observed values, the figures illustrate nicely that the inclusion of 
covariates has a substantial effect on the distribution of asset holdings, a conclusion that is 
also emphasized by Hoynes et al. (1998). For the variables annual saving and owner 
occupied housing, the effect of focal point answers on the density is clearly visible: For 
example, the leftmost spike in the distribution of annual saving is due to the large amount 
of households reporting a total amount of annual saving of exactly 1,000 €. The second 
“spike” (or better: “plateau”) stems from all households reporting 5,000 €. This 
multimodality is not replicated by the distribution of the imputed data, and it is debatable 
whether it should be replicated. One way of replicating multimodality would be to 
additionally use a nearest neighbor procedure after the regression-based imputation. For 
reasons given above, MIMS uses a nearest neighbor procedure only for variables that have 
follow-up brackets.  
                                                 
28 Rubin (1987) derives general methods for combining the information from multiply imputed datasets. A 
brief summary of these methods, given in the appendix of this paper, section 6.2, informs the reader about 
how to work with the multiply imputed SAVE data. 
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Figure 3: Density functions of observed and imputed values. 
 
Observed Imputed
 
Note: All calculations are unweighted. 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Except for controlled experimental settings, survey studies about human past and intended 
behavior rarely generate complete information. For several reasons that have been 
discussed in this paper, it is however desirable to provide users with a complete dataset in 
which all missing values have been imputed.  
Missing values are rarely known with certainty. To be able to reflect the uncertainty 
of missing data in subsequent analyses, multiple imputation is used for the SAVE survey. 
This goal of this paper is to present the key theoretical underpinnings of a Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo multiple imputation algorithm, to describe and document the practical 
application of such a multiple imputation algorithm to the SAVE data, and to present and 
discuss properties of the algorithm as well as the resulting imputed datasets.  
The Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique that is used for the algorithm presented in 
this paper is similar to the method presented in Schafer (1997) who uses smaller datasets 
with few conditioning variables, and it is similar to the method presented in Bover (2004) 
and in Kennickell (1998), who apply an iterative method to data from two large scale 
socio-economic surveys. It is important to note that modifications of this implementation 
are conceivable and should be explored: For example, the sequential simulation algorithm 
can be modified such that each draw from a certain conditional distribution depends not 
only on the conditional distribution estimated in the preceding iteration step, but also on 
conditional distributions estimated in earlier iteration steps (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Alternatively, in each iteration step the distribution of unobserved values can be simulated 
a certain number of times p, and the parameter values for the next iteration step can then 
be estimated from all p simulated distributions; this means that multiple versions of the 
unobserved data are generated from the predictive distribution in one iteration step. A 
comparison of convergence properties between these different ways of implementing the 
data augmentation algorithm would certainly be helpful. Considering the fact that the 
method proposed in this paper is based on the assumption of ignorable missing data, future 
research efforts should also be directed towards modeling the missing data mechanism 
explicitly and eventually a model should be formulated for each incomplete survey 
variable and for the corresponding mechanism of missingness. Particularly given the 
complexity of the nonresponse patterns in SAVE, this constitutes a substantial effort. A 
comparison with the results obtained from MIMS would be of highest scientific interest. 
So far, convergence properties of MCMC methods have only been systematically 
analyzed on simulated datasets and datasets with fewer variables compared to the large 
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household survey that is analyzed in this paper (see, e.g., Schafer, 1997). The findings of 
the present study suggest that the algorithm converges in only few iteration steps. For 
most variables, the process is stationary after not more than about 5-10 iterations steps. 
For all other variables, it is stationary from the first iteration step on, suggesting that the 
algorithm has already converged in the first iteration step – a phenomenon that is also 
reported by Kennickell (1998). It is certainly worth investigating the convergence 
properties of MCMC algorithms in the context of large surveys or large simulated datasets 
in a collaborative effort and with standardized methods. This will further contribute to a 
more comprehensive evaluation of the relevance of MCMC methods for survey research. 
Finally, the comparison of the imputed implicates has revealed some insights that 
are of interest from a methodological point of view as well as for the practitioner. First, it 
has been shown that variable means differ across implicates; this reflects the uncertainty 
about the imputed values. A comparison between imputed and observed values has further 
revealed that the use of covariates in the imputation process has a substantial effect on the 
distributions of individual asset holdings. This finding suggests that item nonresponse is 
not occurring randomly but is related to the included covariates. The analyses have also 
indicated that there might be differences in the character of nonresponse across asset 
types. The results indicate interesting directions for future research on the relationship 
between socio-economic characteristics and nonresponse to specific items. Furthermore, 
the presented brief comparison with findings from other studies suggests that – from the 
point of view of imputation methodology – it would be of particular interest to apply 
different imputation methods, e.g. iterative and non-iterative methods, to the same dataset 
and to compare the resulting effects. 
 
Eventually, the SAVE survey will be a longer panel survey. This offers additional 
possibilities for the imputation of each cross section. So far, the panel consists of only two 
waves. Of those households that are part of the random sample in 2003, 646 have 
participated again in 2005. From the point of view of imputation, the interesting 
observations are those that did not provide an answer to a certain question in one of the 
two waves but did answer in the respective other wave. As an example, I consider the 
monthly net income variable. The proportion of households that did not provide an answer 
to the income question in one of the two waves and for whom the relevant socio-
demographic characteristics, for example employment and marital status, have not 
changed between 2003 and 2005, is 6%. I find that for two thirds of the households for 
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which this condition applies, the imputed value in the wave in which the nonresponse had 
occurred lies in the +/-25%-band around the value given by the same household in the 
respective other wave. While a bit more than half of those households had given bracket 
information in one of the waves, the others did not provide any information about net 
income in one of the waves. This is informative in two respects: First, the fraction of 
imputed values that lie in this band can be used as one possible measure to evaluate the 
imputation procedure (although one should be cautious since it is based on only small 
numbers). It is found that – on average – a much lower fraction of imputed values would 
lie in this +/-25%-band if the procedure simply drew from the observed distribution of net 
income values, instead of conditioning the imputation on a large set of variables. Second, 
this finding shows that with respect to imputation one cannot learn too much from a panel 
that consists of only two waves, since the proportion of households who answer in only 
one of the two waves and for whom relevant socio-demographic characteristics have not 
changed between the two waves is rather low – an observation that is confirmed for all 
other core variables in SAVE. Exploiting the panel dimension for imputation makes more 
sense with a longer panel, since a longer panel increases the probability of having 
additional information on item nonrespondents in at least one of the waves. This 
information which is available in waves other than the one that is currently being imputed 
can then be used as further conditioning information for the hotdeck and regression-based 
methods. This is one important direction for the further development of MIMS. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Derivation of the Variance of a Normally Distributed Random Variable that is 
Symmetrically Censored 
 
Consider a normally distributed random variable *y with mean zero and standard deviation 
σ : 
),0(~* σNy              (A1) 
Alternatively, with )(⋅ϕ  being the density function of the standard normal distribution, we 
can write:          
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
σϕσ
*
* 1~ yy              (A2) 
 
We now define a new random variable y , which is obtained from the original one, *y , by 
symmetrically censoring the variable y : 
⎪⎩
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⎧
>
−<−
=
∗
∗
∗
ayif
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ayif
a
y
a
y              (A3) 
This variable has the following density function:  
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(A4) 
Here, )(⋅Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of )(⋅ϕ . 
This distribution is a mixture of discrete and continuous parts. It is the variance of the 
random variable y  that we want to calculate as a function of the censoring value a. 
In order to do so, I use the variance decomposition formula: 
( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )ayEVarayVarEyVar || +=          (A5) 
I compute the first term on the right-hand side, then the second term on the right-hand 
side, and then combine the two results. 
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(a) Computation of [ ]( )ayVarE | : 
The expected value of the conditional variance of y, given the censoring value a, can be 
decomposed as follows: 
[ ]( ) ( ) [ ] ( )[ ] [ ]ayyVaraayyVaraayVarE <⋅−Φ−+=⋅−Φ= |21|2| σσ      (A6) 
It is obvious that [ ] 0| == ayyVar . 
That is, [ ]ayyVar <|  remains to be computed, and it is known that 
[ ] [ ]ayyVarayyVar <=< ** || . 
[ ]ayyVar <** |  can be decomposed as follows: 
[ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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[ ]ayyVar >∗∗ |  is the variance of a truncated normally distributed variable. This variance is 
computed as follows (see Johnson and Kotz, 1970): 
[ ] ( ),)(1| 2** aayyVar δσ −=>           (A8) 
where 
( )σλλδ aaa −= )()( , and ( )( )σσ
ϕλ
a
a
a Φ−= 1)( . 
It follows: 
[ ] ( )
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2
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         (A9) 
 
And therefore: 
[ ]( ) ( )[ ] ( )1)(221| 2 −⋅−Φ−= aaayVarE δσσ         (A10) 
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(b) Computation of [ ]( )ayEVar | : 
We find: 
[ ]( ) ( ) [ ]{ } ( )[ ] [ ] ( ){ }
( ) ,2
|212|
2
22
aa
yEayyEayEaaayEVar
⋅−Φ=
−<⋅−Φ−+−⋅−Φ=
σ
σσ
    (A11) 
since [ ] ayE = , [ ] 0| =< ayyE , and ( ) 0=yE  by symmetry arguments. 
 
Combining the results of (a) and (b) finally yields the expression for the variance of a 
symmetrically censored normally distributed variable, with mean zero, standard deviation 
σ  and censoring value a: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )1)(2212 22 −⋅−Φ−+⋅−Φ= aaaayVar δσσσ       (A12) 
 
6.2 Rules for Inference Based on Multiply Imputed Datasets 
The 5 implicates of the SAVE data can be analyzed using standard complete data 
methods. Every model has to be estimated 5 times, once for each complete and imputed 
dataset. The results across these estimations vary, this reflects the missing-data 
uncertainty. Rubin (1987) has derived a method for combining the results from a data 
analysis performed M times, once for each of M imputed data sets, to obtain a single set of 
results: Suppose that mQˆ  is the scalar point estimate of interest, obtained from data set m. 
Suppose further that mUˆ  is the standard error associated with mQˆ .The overall estimate is 
then the average of the individual estimates,  
.ˆ1
1
∑
=
=
M
m
mQM
Q             (A13) 
For the overall standard error, one must first calculate the within-imputation variance,  
∑
=
=
M
m
mUM
U
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ˆ1             (A14) 
and the between-imputation variance,  
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m QQM
B            (A15) 
The total estimated variance of the multiple-imputation point estimate is then 
.)11( B
M
UT ++=             (A16) 
Single imputation underestimates the standard errors of the estimates because it has zero 
between imputation variance. 
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Additional methods for combining the results from multiply imputed data that hold under 
certain special assumptions about the data are presented in Schafer (1997). 
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